ILNews

COA disagrees on reason to grant appeal

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The Indiana Court of Appeals unanimously reversed the revocation of a man's probation but disagreed as to the manner in which the appellate court was authorized to do so.

In Cornelius Cooper v. State of Indiana, 49A02-0709-CR-780, Judges Melissa May, Paul Mathias, and Nancy Vaidik reached the same conclusion: that Cornelius Cooper was denied due process at his probation revocation hearing.

Judges May and Mathias believed Cooper's case qualified for appellate review even though he didn't timely appeal his revocation order. These judges believe the case is a matter of great public interest. Judge May wrote the facts of Cooper's case are extraordinary because the trial judge told him he'd go back on probation if he hadn't been convicted of the domestic violence charges on which the probation revocation was based. The domestic violence charges were later dropped. Cooper asked the trial court to reconsider the revocation, which the court denied.

The appellate court wrote the record doesn't reflect Cooper was advised of his right to appeal. The majority believed the fact that Cooper was denied due process was a fundamental error that allowed the Court of Appeals to review Cooper's appeal. The appellate court reversed the denial of his motion to reconsider and remanded for a probation revocation hearing.

Judge Vaidik concurred in result in a separate opinion but made an argument that the appellate court should have reviewed Cooper's appeal under Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 2. She wrote because he wasn't at fault for the belated appeal of his probation revocation and because he had been diligent in pursuing an appeal of the revocation, he's entitled to a belated appeal under Post-Conviction Rule 2.

Judge Vaidik noted the disagreement in the Court of Appeals on whether a probation revocation order is appealable under this rule, but she believes that right exists.

"... we have concluded in the past that the imposition of a modified sentence carries with it the right to belatedly appeal pursuant to Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 2," she wrote. "It makes sense to treat probation revocations similarly for the purpose of allowing belated appeals."

Judge Vaidik also wrote about her concern that by reviewing the merits of an appeal on grounds other than Post-Conviction Rule 2, the appellate court is sending the wrong message to practitioners that the court is prepared to pick up an appeal regardless of its timeliness, without strictly adhering to Post-Conviction Rule 2.

"By ignoring these requirements in some cases, we create arbitrariness in the system, and arbitrariness denies litigants notice of when and how we will apply our own rules," she wrote.

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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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