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COA discusses vouching testimony in child molesting trials

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The Indiana Court of Appeals addressed vouching testimony by witnesses called during child molesting trials in two opinions Tuesday. In one case, an appellate judge was troubled by the possible effect of the cumulative vouching testimony on the jury.

The issue of vouching by witnesses came up in Keith Hoglund v. State of Indiana, No. 90A02-1005-CR-591, and State of Indiana v. Andy J. Velasquez II, No. 53A05-1003-CR-194. In Hoglund, Keith Hoglund appealed his sentence of and conviction for Class A felony child molesting involving his young daughter, A.H. He claimed the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence from pediatrician Dr. Carol Butler, mental health counselor Christine Shestak, and clinic psychologist Dr. Amanda Mayle regarding the likelihood that A.H. fabricated her story of child abuse.

In Velasquez, the state appealed following the acquittal of Andy Velasquez for Class A felony and Class C felony child molesting of his stepdaughter. The state argued, among other issues, that the trial court abused its discretion by concluding the testimony of clinical social worker Judy Kline, psychologist Dr. Jennifer Spencer, and victim G.S.’s grandmother constituted vouching testimony.  

In Keith Hoglund v. State of Indiana,  90A02-1005-CR-591, the appellate court relied on Lawrence v. State, 464 N.E.2d 923, 925 (Ind. 1984), in which the Indiana Supreme Court allowed testimony which permits “some accrediting of the child witness in the form of opinions from parents, teachers, and others having adequate experience with the child, that the child is not prone to exaggerate or fantasize about sexual matters.” The witnesses are limited to “indirect” vouching.

Hoglund didn’t dispute that the evidence at issue is indirect vouching by an expert under Lawrence, but he argued that case is no longer good law because of Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 498-99 (Ind. 1995). Steward addressed the question of admissibility of evidence of Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, which deals with behaviors typical of child molesting victims. But question of whether that case, which held that CSAAS evidence couldn’t be used to show that child abuse occurred, would apply to behavioral evidence without the use of the term CSAAS hasn’t been addressed yet by any appellate court. The judges affirmed the trial court didn’t abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony that indirectly vouched for A.H.’s credibility.  

In State of Indiana v. Andy J. Velasquez II, No. 53A05-1003-CR-194, the judges also noted that Steward hadn’t been applied in other cases, and instead followed Stout v. State, 612 N.E.2d 1076, 1080 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), in which the Court of Appeals found expert testimony that an individual’s subsequent behavior is consistent or inconsistent with that observed from other victims is a type of evidence which is admissible.

The Court of Appeals found that the trial court erred in excluding the evidence of Kline, Spencer, and the grandmother because it improperly excluded it on the grounds that it constituted vouching. The state didn’t attempt to elicit testimony regarding whether G.S.’s allegations were true, but on her behavior or demeanor when discussing Velasquez. But even though the appellate court found the trial court erred in excluding this testimony, double jeopardy principles bar a second trial since Velasquez was acquitted, wrote Judge Carr Darden.

Judge Darden concurred in result in Hoglund, writing he couldn’t disagree with the legal reasoning of the majority, but noted he was concerned by the possible effect of the cumulative vouching testimony. It wasn’t until Velasquez’s attorney objected several times to the testimony of Dr. Butler did the trial court instruct the jury that her comment regarding her opinion on whether A.H. was truthful or not was stricken from the record. He also was concerned that statements by Shestak effectively expressed her belief in A.H.’s account of the allegations.

“Although, as stated, I find the cumulative vouching testimony heard by the jury to be troubling, there is ‘no entitlement to a perfect trial,’” he wrote. He found that the vouching testimony wasn’t so prejudicial that it required reversal.
 

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  1. Applause, applause, applause ..... but, is this duty to serve the constitutional order not much more incumbent upon the State, whose only aim is to be pure and unadulterated justice, than defense counsel, who is also charged with gaining a result for a client? I agree both are responsible, but it seems to me that the government attorneys bear a burden much heavier than defense counsel .... "“I note, much as we did in Mechling v. State, 16 N.E.3d 1015 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied, that the attorneys representing the State and the defendant are both officers of the court and have a responsibility to correct any obvious errors at the time they are committed."

  2. Do I have to hire an attorney to get co-guardianship of my brother? My father has guardianship and my older sister was his co-guardian until this Dec 2014 when she passed and my father was me to go on as the co-guardian, but funds are limit and we need to get this process taken care of quickly as our fathers health isn't the greatest. So please advise me if there is anyway to do this our self or if it requires a lawyer? Thank you

  3. I have been on this program while on parole from 2011-2013. No person should be forced mentally to share private details of their personal life with total strangers. Also giving permission for a mental therapist to report to your parole agent that your not participating in group therapy because you don't have the financial mean to be in the group therapy. I was personally singled out and sent back three times for not having money and also sent back within the six month when you aren't to be sent according to state law. I will work to het this INSOMM's removed from this state. I also had twelve or thirteen parole agents with a fifteen month period. Thanks for your time.

  4. Our nation produces very few jurists of the caliber of Justice DOUGLAS and his peers these days. Here is that great civil libertarian, who recognized government as both a blessing and, when corrupted by ideological interests, a curse: "Once the investigator has only the conscience of government as a guide, the conscience can become ‘ravenous,’ as Cromwell, bent on destroying Thomas More, said in Bolt, A Man For All Seasons (1960), p. 120. The First Amendment mirrors many episodes where men, harried and harassed by government, sought refuge in their conscience, as these lines of Thomas More show: ‘MORE: And when we stand before God, and you are sent to Paradise for doing according to your conscience, *575 and I am damned for not doing according to mine, will you come with me, for fellowship? ‘CRANMER: So those of us whose names are there are damned, Sir Thomas? ‘MORE: I don't know, Your Grace. I have no window to look into another man's conscience. I condemn no one. ‘CRANMER: Then the matter is capable of question? ‘MORE: Certainly. ‘CRANMER: But that you owe obedience to your King is not capable of question. So weigh a doubt against a certainty—and sign. ‘MORE: Some men think the Earth is round, others think it flat; it is a matter capable of question. But if it is flat, will the King's command make it round? And if it is round, will the King's command flatten it? No, I will not sign.’ Id., pp. 132—133. DOUGLAS THEN WROTE: Where government is the Big Brother,11 privacy gives way to surveillance. **909 But our commitment is otherwise. *576 By the First Amendment we have staked our security on freedom to promote a multiplicity of ideas, to associate at will with kindred spirits, and to defy governmental intrusion into these precincts" Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 574-76, 83 S. Ct. 889, 908-09, 9 L. Ed. 2d 929 (1963) Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, concurring. I write: Happy Memorial Day to all -- God please bless our fallen who lived and died to preserve constitutional governance in our wonderful series of Republics. And God open the eyes of those government officials who denounce the constitutions of these Republics by arbitrary actions arising out capricious motives.

  5. From back in the day before secularism got a stranglehold on Hoosier jurists comes this great excerpt via Indiana federal court judge Allan Sharp, dedicated to those many Indiana government attorneys (with whom I have dealt) who count the law as a mere tool, an optional tool that is not to be used when political correctness compels a more acceptable result than merely following the path that the law directs: ALLEN SHARP, District Judge. I. In a scene following a visit by Henry VIII to the home of Sir Thomas More, playwriter Robert Bolt puts the following words into the mouths of his characters: Margaret: Father, that man's bad. MORE: There is no law against that. ROPER: There is! God's law! MORE: Then God can arrest him. ROPER: Sophistication upon sophistication! MORE: No, sheer simplicity. The law, Roper, the law. I know what's legal not what's right. And I'll stick to what's legal. ROPER: Then you set man's law above God's! MORE: No, far below; but let me draw your attention to a fact I'm not God. The currents and eddies of right and wrong, which you find such plain sailing, I can't navigate. I'm no voyager. But in the thickets of law, oh, there I'm a forester. I doubt if there's a man alive who could follow me there, thank God... ALICE: (Exasperated, pointing after Rich) While you talk, he's gone! MORE: And go he should, if he was the Devil himself, until he broke the law! ROPER: So now you'd give the Devil benefit of law! MORE: Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after the Devil? ROPER: I'd cut down every law in England to do that! MORE: (Roused and excited) Oh? (Advances on Roper) And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you where would you hide, Roper, the laws being flat? (He leaves *1257 him) This country's planted thick with laws from coast to coast man's laws, not God's and if you cut them down and you're just the man to do it d'you really think you would stand upright in the winds that would blow then? (Quietly) Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's sake. ROPER: I have long suspected this; this is the golden calf; the law's your god. MORE: (Wearily) Oh, Roper, you're a fool, God's my god... (Rather bitterly) But I find him rather too (Very bitterly) subtle... I don't know where he is nor what he wants. ROPER: My God wants service, to the end and unremitting; nothing else! MORE: (Dryly) Are you sure that's God! He sounds like Moloch. But indeed it may be God And whoever hunts for me, Roper, God or Devil, will find me hiding in the thickets of the law! And I'll hide my daughter with me! Not hoist her up the mainmast of your seagoing principles! They put about too nimbly! (Exit More. They all look after him). Pgs. 65-67, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS A Play in Two Acts, Robert Bolt, Random House, New York, 1960. Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen. of Indiana, Indianapolis, for defendants. Childs v. Duckworth, 509 F. Supp. 1254, 1256 (N.D. Ind. 1981) aff'd, 705 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1983)

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