ILNews

COA finds attorney was not ineffective

Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a man’s petition for post-conviction relief, finding he failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel with respect to either the manner in which voir dire was conducted or in the failure to object to the supplemental jury instruction defining “intentionally.”

Wayne Campbell appealed the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his convictions on two counts of attempted murder and one count of Class B felony burglary. The convictions stem from an altercation he got into with neighbors over use of an easement. He attacked Alva and Jean Kincaid, striking them with a shotgun and causing severe injuries.

In his petition, Campbell claimed his attorney was ineffective by engaging in improper voir dire during jury selection and by failing to object to a jury instruction regarding the definition of “intentionally” that was given during deliberations in response to a jury question requesting “the definition of intent.”

Campbell took issue with the hypothetical questions his trial counsel proposed to prospective jurors. His attorney explained that he was attempting to find jurors who would be receptive to a claim of self-defense. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the hypotheticals did not incorrectly suggest that Campbell was going to pursue a defense of abandonment, as he claimed, and instead explored the jurors’ understanding of the substantial step requirement for attempt crimes.  

“We cannot say trial counsel performed below an objective standard of reasonableness in the manner in which he conducted voir dire. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to hyper-regulation and second-guessing of trial counsel’s strategy and tactics, a task we cannot and should not undertake,” Judge Michael Barnes wrote in Wayne Campbell v. State of Indiana, 13A05-1304-PC-201.

Campbell also argued that the trial court erred in giving the instruction to the jury when it asked for a definition of “intent” during its deliberations: “A person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so. If a person is charged with intentionally causing a result by his conduct, it must have been his conscious objective not only to engage in the conduct, but to cause the result.”

He believed the second statement shouldn’t have been given because it is a misstatement of the law. But the instruction is from the Indiana Pattern Jury Instructions. The appellate court noted that there is some tension as to whether this second sentence is a correct statement of the law that has yet to be resolved by the Indiana Supreme Court.

“Regarding reasonable performance, trial counsel indicated at the post-conviction hearing that he doubted any objection to the instruction would have been fruitful because it was a pattern instruction,” Barnes wrote.

Since there is no unequivocal legal basis upon which counsel should have objected, the appellate court declined to say Campbell’s attorney performed deficiently.




 

ADVERTISEMENT

Post a comment to this story

COMMENTS POLICY
We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
 
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
 
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
 
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
 
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.
 

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by

facebook - twitter on Facebook & Twitter

Indiana State Bar Association

Indianapolis Bar Association

Evansville Bar Association

Allen County Bar Association

Indiana Lawyer on Facebook

facebook
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. It's a big fat black mark against the US that they radicalized a lot of these Afghan jihadis in the 80s to fight the soviets and then when they predictably got around to biting the hand that fed them, the US had to invade their homelands, install a bunch of corrupt drug kingpins and kleptocrats, take these guys and torture the hell out of them. Why for example did the US have to sodomize them? Dubya said "they hate us for our freedoms!" Here, try some of that freedom whether you like it or not!!! Now they got even more reasons to hate us-- lets just keep bombing the crap out of their populations, installing more puppet regimes, arming one faction against another, etc etc etc.... the US is becoming a monster. No wonder they hate us. Here's my modest recommendation. How about we follow "Just War" theory in the future. St Augustine had it right. How about we treat these obvious prisoners of war according to the Geneva convention instead of torturing them in sadistic and perverted ways.

  2. As usual, John is "spot-on." The subtle but poignant points he makes are numerous and warrant reflection by mediators and users. Oh but were it so simple.

  3. ACLU. Way to step up against the police state. I see a lot of things from the ACLU I don't like but this one is a gold star in its column.... instead of fighting it the authorities should apologize and back off.

  4. Duncan, It's called the RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION and in the old days people believed it did apply to contracts and employment. Then along came title vii.....that aside, I believe that I am free to work or not work for whomever I like regardless: I don't need a law to tell me I'm free. The day I really am compelled to ignore all the facts of social reality in my associations and I blithely go along with it, I'll be a slave of the state. That day is not today......... in the meantime this proposed bill would probably be violative of 18 usc sec 1981 that prohibits discrimination in contracts... a law violated regularly because who could ever really expect to enforce it along the millions of contracts made in the marketplace daily? Some of these so-called civil rights laws are unenforceable and unjust Utopian Social Engineering. Forcing people to love each other will never work.

  5. I am the father of a sweet little one-year-old named girl, who happens to have Down Syndrome. To anyone who reads this who may be considering the decision to terminate, please know that your child will absolutely light up your life as my daughter has the lives of everyone around her. There is no part of me that condones abortion of a child on the basis that he/she has or might have Down Syndrome. From an intellectual standpoint, however, I question the enforceability of this potential law. As it stands now, the bill reads in relevant part as follows: "A person may not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion . . . if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome." It includes similarly worded provisions abortion on "any other disability" or based on sex selection. It goes so far as to make the medical provider at least potentially liable for wrongful death. First, how does a medical provider "know" that "the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion SOLELY" because of anything? What if the woman says she just doesn't want the baby - not because of the diagnosis - she just doesn't want him/her? Further, how can the doctor be liable for wrongful death, when a Child Wrongful Death claim belongs to the parents? Is there any circumstance in which the mother's comparative fault will not exceed the doctor's alleged comparative fault, thereby barring the claim? If the State wants to discourage women from aborting their children because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis, I'm all for that. Purporting to ban it with an unenforceable law, however, is not the way to effectuate this policy.

ADVERTISEMENT