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COA lengthens defendant's sentence

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The Indiana Court of Appeals revised a defendant's sentence for rape and other convictions, but it may not have been what the man had in mind when he appealed. In a rare move, the Court of Appeals increased his sentence by 25 years.

In Jeffrey E. Akard v. State of Indiana, No. 79A02-0904-CR-345, Jeffrey Akard claimed the sentence was inappropriate for his convictions of three counts of rape, two as Class A felonies and one as a Class B felony; three counts of criminal deviate conduct, two as Class A felonies and one as a Class B felony; two counts of criminal confinement, as Class B felonies; and two counts of battery, as Class C felonies. He wanted his aggregate 93-year sentence to be revised so that all his sentences run concurrently, reducing it to a 40-year sentence.

But the appellate court decided to lengthen his sentence because his is a "most unusual case," citing Indiana Supreme Court Justice Theodore Boehm's concurring opinion in McCullough v. State, 900 N.E.2d 745, 750 (Ind. 2009).

Akard convinced his victim, A.A., a young homeless woman, to walk him home because he was too drunk to do so himself. Once there, he locked her inside and repeatedly beat and raped her for nearly a day before she was let go.

"Along with children, the homeless are individuals who are susceptible to being abused as they live on the fringes of society, barely able to acquire the necessities of life. This is not what makes this case most unusual," wrote Judge L. Mark Bailey. "Rather, it is Akard's demented purpose in attempting to satisfy his prurient interests in child bondage-style rape by performing similar acts on a homeless woman who possessed physical characteristics akin to those of a child."

The judges noted the mentality of someone who rapes an adult is disturbing, but when the acts are premeditated and carried out to satisfy even more of a diabolical interest, it becomes even more heinous.

The trial court had sentenced Akard below the statutory minimum on several convictions. The Court of Appeals found he should have been sentenced to an aggregate of 94 years. But, because of the circumstances of the case, the judges ordered his Class B felony rape and Class B felony criminal deviate conduct convictions to be served consecutively to the other counts, revising Akard's aggregate sentence to 118 years.

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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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