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COA: Let a sex offender stipulate

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A convicted sex offender accused of failing to register will get a new trial, the Indiana Court of Appeals ruled today.

The unanimous three-judge panel in Darrick T. McClain v. State of Indiana, No. 02A03-0808-CR-428, reversed and remanded McClain's jury trial conviction for failing to register as a sex offender, finding the Allen Superior Court abused its discretion.

Convicted of sexual battery in 1999, McClain was required to register with police and he did that in March 2007, listing his sister's Fort Wayne home as his new address. His sister later saw her address listed on the online sex offender registry and informed police that McClain wasn't living there; he was eventually charged.

At trial, he offered to stipulate to his sex offender status and to the fact that he'd listed his sister's home address on his registration form. But the state didn't agree, and entered into evidence over McClain's objection the registration form that also included details about his prior sex offense.

But turning to U.S. Supreme Court precedent in Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 190 (1997), the appellate panel found that the lower court should not have admitted the form into evidence because it was prejudicial. Not admitting it at trial would not have interfered with the state's ability to prove that McClain was a sex offender required to register - as he'd offered to stipulate.

"Here, we also find the reasoning in Old Chief applies and hold that McClain's offer to stipulate that he is a sex offender precludes admission of the registration form at trial," the court wrote. "The prejudicial impact of the details of his sexual battery conviction is clear, and that evidence has no probative value in relation to the instant offense."

Since several witnesses testified at trial that McClain was residing with his sister when he filled out the form, the court determined it couldn't prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the probable impact of the prejudicial evidence didn't affect the jury and McClain's rights.

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  1. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  2. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  3. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

  4. Here's an idea...how about we MORE heavily regulate the law schools to reduce the surplus of graduates, driving starting salaries up for those new grads, so that we can all pay our insane amount of student loans off in a reasonable amount of time and then be able to afford to do pro bono & low-fee work? I've got friends in other industries, radiology for example, and their schools accept a very limited number of students so there will never be a glut of new grads and everyone's pay stays high. For example, my radiologist friend's school accepted just six new students per year.

  5. I totally agree with John Smith.

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