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COA: Manufactured home subject to law

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The Indiana Court of Appeals determined that manufactured mobile homes are subject to Indiana's common law warranty of habitability, so it reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of a manufacturer in a homeowner's property damage and personal injury complaint.

In Sandra Dinsmore, et al. v. Fleetwood Homes of Tennessee, Inc., No. 49A02-0807-CV-615, Sandra filed a complaint against Fleetwood Homes that the home she purchased in 1999 wasn't a safe place to live because it had latent defects that caused toxic mold throughout the home, leaving it uninhabitable. After Dinsmore moved into the home, the bathroom vent leaked water and caused mold to grow. The company who sold her the home attempted to repair the problem twice. Less than a year later, Sandra and her family moved out and Sandra's son, fiancee, and baby moved into the mobile home and paid rent. There were no more complaints about the home until July 2002 when she called Fleetwood to report mold growing throughout the home; Brian and his family moved out.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Fleetwood and denied Dinsmore and her family's motion to amend by interlineation Sandra's response to Fleetwood's motion for summary judgment.

The Court of Appeals granted Fleetwood's motion to strike evidentiary assertions in the appellants' brief that depend on evidence that wasn't specifically designated to the trial court.

The only issue on appeal is the application of the common law implied warranty of habitability, which Fleetwood suggested isn't applicable to manufactured mobile homes. And even if it were applicable, Fleetwood's warranty is only applicable during the time frame the initial homebuyer occupies the unit as a resident, the company argued.

Citing Barnes v. MacBrown & Co., Inc., 264 Ind. 277, 342 N.E.2d 619 (Ind. 1976), the Court of Appeals noted the use by the Indiana Supreme Court of the term "manufacturer" supports the reasonable inference there is no distinction between a site-built home and a manufactured home, wrote Judge Carr Darden.

Fleetwood could have disclaimed the implied warranty of habitability to someone who lives in the home yet didn't initially purchase it; however, it had to follow the steps in Indiana Code Section 32-27-2-9. Fleetwood didn't argue or show it properly disclaimed "all implied warranties" as provided by the statute.

"The undisputed facts do not establish that Fleetwood is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiffs' claims under Indiana's common law warranty of habitability, and Fleetwood's express warranties do not supersede Indiana's implied warranty of habitability because Fleetwood did not follow the builder's statutory disclaimer procedure," wrote Judge Darden.

In addition, numerous issues of material fact remain, so the trial court erred in granting Fleetwood summary judgment.

The Court of Appeals also found the issue of the intervening plaintiffs' response to the summary judgment is moot because summary judgment to Fleetwood is precluded.

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  1. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  2. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  3. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

  4. Here's an idea...how about we MORE heavily regulate the law schools to reduce the surplus of graduates, driving starting salaries up for those new grads, so that we can all pay our insane amount of student loans off in a reasonable amount of time and then be able to afford to do pro bono & low-fee work? I've got friends in other industries, radiology for example, and their schools accept a very limited number of students so there will never be a glut of new grads and everyone's pay stays high. For example, my radiologist friend's school accepted just six new students per year.

  5. I totally agree with John Smith.

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