ILNews

COA: More proceedings are needed on parents’ ITCA compliance

Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

Finding a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Richmond parents’ complied with the Indiana Tort Claims Act notice provision when filing a lawsuit after their severely disabled daughter died at school, the Indiana Court of Appeals ordered that issue to go before a jury.

Michael and Denita Lyons’ 17-year-old daughter Megan attended Richmond High School. She had Down syndrome and was severely mentally disabled, according to court records. She required around-the-clock care and someone to cut her food up. She choked on a sandwich while at school on Jan. 2, 2009, was deprived of oxygen for 15 to 20 minutes, and died two days later.

The Lyonses sued Richmond Community School Corporation under the ITCA and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging the school’s acts or omissions caused their daughter’s death. The trial court granted summary judgment to RCSC on the issues of compliance with ITCA’s notice provision and contributory negligence, as well as on the Section 1983 claims. The parents didn’t file their notice of tort claim until Jan. 11, 2010, and their lawsuit until June 8, 2010. They claim that they had no knowledge of the school’s negligence until a cafeteria worker contacted them in October 2009 and said “things were not done properly.”  

“The proper question, therefore, is: in the exercise of ordinary diligence, could the Lyonses have learned of RCSC’s alleged acts or omissions before July 15, 2009, which was 180 days before the Lyonses filed notice of their claims on January 11, 2010? This question is not resolved by the designated evidence, and therefore, it remains a genuine issue of material fact for the jury’s determination,” Judge Cale Bradford wrote in Michael E. Lyons, Denita L. Lyons, individually and as Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of Megan Renee Lyons, Deceased v. Richmond Community School Corp. d/b/a Richmond High School; Joe Spicer; et al., 89A04-1204-PL-159.

The judges found many of the Lyonses’ other claims on appeal failed, including that the trial court erred in quashing their third-party discovery requests against RCSC’s insurance company and in granting RCSC summary judgment on the issue of contributory negligence.

“I believe many of the things that raise a question of fact as to when the Lyonses should have discovered their cause of action also raise a question of fact as to whether RCSC was fraudulently concealing material facts concerning the Lyonses’ cause of action,” Chief Judge Margret Robb wrote in a separate opinion.

She also dissented from the majority’s decision affirming the grant of summary judgment on the Lyonses’ Section 1983 claims regarding the school corporation’s liability.   

 

ADVERTISEMENT

Post a comment to this story

COMMENTS POLICY
We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
 
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
 
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
 
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
 
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.
 

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by

facebook - twitter on Facebook & Twitter

Indiana State Bar Association

Indianapolis Bar Association

Evansville Bar Association

Allen County Bar Association

Indiana Lawyer on Facebook

facebook
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. I need an experienced attorney to handle a breach of contract matter. Kindly respond for more details. Graham Young

  2. I thought the slurs were the least grave aspects of her misconduct, since they had nothing to do with her being on the bench. Why then do I suspect they were the focus? I find this a troubling trend. At least she was allowed to keep her law license.

  3. Section 6 of Article I of the Indiana Constitution is pretty clear and unequivocal: "Section 6. No money shall be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of any religious or theological institution."

  4. Video pen? Nice work, "JW"! Let this be a lesson and a caution to all disgruntled ex-spouses (or soon-to-be ex-spouses) . . . you may think that altercation is going to get you some satisfaction . . . it will not.

  5. First comment on this thread is a fitting final comment on this thread, as that the MCBA never answered Duncan's fine question, and now even Eric Holder agrees that the MCBA was in material error as to the facts: "I don't get it" from Duncan December 1, 2014 5:10 PM "The Grand Jury met for 25 days and heard 70 hours of testimony according to this article and they made a decision that no crime occurred. On what basis does the MCBA conclude that their decision was "unjust"? What special knowledge or evidence does the MCBA have that the Grand Jury hearing this matter was unaware of? The system that we as lawyers are sworn to uphold made a decision that there was insufficient proof that officer committed a crime. How can any of us say we know better what was right than the jury that actually heard all of the the evidence in this case."

ADVERTISEMENT