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COA reverses dismissal of drug charges

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A trial court erred when it sua sponte decided to exclude evidence from a warrantless search of a defendant's car and dismiss the drug charges against him as a result of that search, the Indiana Court of Appeals ruled today.

In State of Indiana v. James S. Hobbs IV, No. 19A01-0904-CR-187, the state asked the appellate court to overturn the Dubois Superior Court's decision that dismissed James Hobbs' charges of possession of marijuana and possession of paraphernalia as Class A misdemeanors.

Police served a felony warrant on Hobbs while he was at work. Prior to serving the warrant, police saw him leave the restaurant he worked at, put something in his car, and go back inside. Hobbs refused permission to search his car, so a narcotics detection dog sniffed the outside of it. The dog smelled an illegal narcotic and inside the car police found a cooler that contained scales, rolling papers, and marijuana.

After the trial court dismissed the charges, the state filed a motion to correct error and a change of judge; those motions were denied.

The Court of Appeals analyzed the search under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Under the federal constitution, police don't have to have a search warrant before they search a car they have probable cause to believe contains illegal drugs. A canine sweep of the outside of a car doesn't intrude upon the privacy interest under the Fourth Amendment, so probable cause isn't required to use a narcotics detection dog, wrote Judge James Kirsch.

"The narcotics detection dog's alert, on the exterior of Hobbs' vehicle, to the presence of contraband supplied the probable cause necessary for further police investigation of the contents of Hobbs' vehicle. Accordingly, the warrantless search of Hobbs' vehicle does not appear to have contravened the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by our Supreme Court," he wrote.

The appellate court relied on Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. 2005), Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77 (Ind. 1995), and Myers v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 (Ind. 2005), when analyzing the search under the state's constitution. Based on those cases, the Court of Appeals concluded the warrantless search didn't violate Article 1, Section 11. The alert by the narcotics detection dog had provided a significant "degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation had occurred," wrote Judge Kirsch quoting from Litchfield. The judges also determined the three factors of Litchfield were satisfied in the instant case.

"We conclude, after application of the Litchfield factors, that the present case is more similar to Myers, where the warrantless search was upheld, than it is to Brown, where the search was found to be in violation of the Indiana Constitution. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it determined, sua sponte, that the warrantless search violated the Indiana Constitution," Judge Kirsch wrote.

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  1. It's a big fat black mark against the US that they radicalized a lot of these Afghan jihadis in the 80s to fight the soviets and then when they predictably got around to biting the hand that fed them, the US had to invade their homelands, install a bunch of corrupt drug kingpins and kleptocrats, take these guys and torture the hell out of them. Why for example did the US have to sodomize them? Dubya said "they hate us for our freedoms!" Here, try some of that freedom whether you like it or not!!! Now they got even more reasons to hate us-- lets just keep bombing the crap out of their populations, installing more puppet regimes, arming one faction against another, etc etc etc.... the US is becoming a monster. No wonder they hate us. Here's my modest recommendation. How about we follow "Just War" theory in the future. St Augustine had it right. How about we treat these obvious prisoners of war according to the Geneva convention instead of torturing them in sadistic and perverted ways.

  2. As usual, John is "spot-on." The subtle but poignant points he makes are numerous and warrant reflection by mediators and users. Oh but were it so simple.

  3. ACLU. Way to step up against the police state. I see a lot of things from the ACLU I don't like but this one is a gold star in its column.... instead of fighting it the authorities should apologize and back off.

  4. Duncan, It's called the RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION and in the old days people believed it did apply to contracts and employment. Then along came title vii.....that aside, I believe that I am free to work or not work for whomever I like regardless: I don't need a law to tell me I'm free. The day I really am compelled to ignore all the facts of social reality in my associations and I blithely go along with it, I'll be a slave of the state. That day is not today......... in the meantime this proposed bill would probably be violative of 18 usc sec 1981 that prohibits discrimination in contracts... a law violated regularly because who could ever really expect to enforce it along the millions of contracts made in the marketplace daily? Some of these so-called civil rights laws are unenforceable and unjust Utopian Social Engineering. Forcing people to love each other will never work.

  5. I am the father of a sweet little one-year-old named girl, who happens to have Down Syndrome. To anyone who reads this who may be considering the decision to terminate, please know that your child will absolutely light up your life as my daughter has the lives of everyone around her. There is no part of me that condones abortion of a child on the basis that he/she has or might have Down Syndrome. From an intellectual standpoint, however, I question the enforceability of this potential law. As it stands now, the bill reads in relevant part as follows: "A person may not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion . . . if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome." It includes similarly worded provisions abortion on "any other disability" or based on sex selection. It goes so far as to make the medical provider at least potentially liable for wrongful death. First, how does a medical provider "know" that "the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion SOLELY" because of anything? What if the woman says she just doesn't want the baby - not because of the diagnosis - she just doesn't want him/her? Further, how can the doctor be liable for wrongful death, when a Child Wrongful Death claim belongs to the parents? Is there any circumstance in which the mother's comparative fault will not exceed the doctor's alleged comparative fault, thereby barring the claim? If the State wants to discourage women from aborting their children because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis, I'm all for that. Purporting to ban it with an unenforceable law, however, is not the way to effectuate this policy.

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