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COA reverses dismissal of drug charges

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A trial court erred when it sua sponte decided to exclude evidence from a warrantless search of a defendant's car and dismiss the drug charges against him as a result of that search, the Indiana Court of Appeals ruled today.

In State of Indiana v. James S. Hobbs IV, No. 19A01-0904-CR-187, the state asked the appellate court to overturn the Dubois Superior Court's decision that dismissed James Hobbs' charges of possession of marijuana and possession of paraphernalia as Class A misdemeanors.

Police served a felony warrant on Hobbs while he was at work. Prior to serving the warrant, police saw him leave the restaurant he worked at, put something in his car, and go back inside. Hobbs refused permission to search his car, so a narcotics detection dog sniffed the outside of it. The dog smelled an illegal narcotic and inside the car police found a cooler that contained scales, rolling papers, and marijuana.

After the trial court dismissed the charges, the state filed a motion to correct error and a change of judge; those motions were denied.

The Court of Appeals analyzed the search under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Under the federal constitution, police don't have to have a search warrant before they search a car they have probable cause to believe contains illegal drugs. A canine sweep of the outside of a car doesn't intrude upon the privacy interest under the Fourth Amendment, so probable cause isn't required to use a narcotics detection dog, wrote Judge James Kirsch.

"The narcotics detection dog's alert, on the exterior of Hobbs' vehicle, to the presence of contraband supplied the probable cause necessary for further police investigation of the contents of Hobbs' vehicle. Accordingly, the warrantless search of Hobbs' vehicle does not appear to have contravened the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by our Supreme Court," he wrote.

The appellate court relied on Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. 2005), Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77 (Ind. 1995), and Myers v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 (Ind. 2005), when analyzing the search under the state's constitution. Based on those cases, the Court of Appeals concluded the warrantless search didn't violate Article 1, Section 11. The alert by the narcotics detection dog had provided a significant "degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation had occurred," wrote Judge Kirsch quoting from Litchfield. The judges also determined the three factors of Litchfield were satisfied in the instant case.

"We conclude, after application of the Litchfield factors, that the present case is more similar to Myers, where the warrantless search was upheld, than it is to Brown, where the search was found to be in violation of the Indiana Constitution. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it determined, sua sponte, that the warrantless search violated the Indiana Constitution," Judge Kirsch wrote.

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  1. CCHP's real accomplishment is the 2015 law signed by Gov Pence that basically outlaws any annexation that is forced where a 65% majority of landowners in the affected area disagree. Regardless of whether HP wins or loses, the citizens of Indiana will not have another fiasco like this. The law Gov Pence signed is a direct result of this malgovernance.

  2. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  3. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  4. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

  5. Here's an idea...how about we MORE heavily regulate the law schools to reduce the surplus of graduates, driving starting salaries up for those new grads, so that we can all pay our insane amount of student loans off in a reasonable amount of time and then be able to afford to do pro bono & low-fee work? I've got friends in other industries, radiology for example, and their schools accept a very limited number of students so there will never be a glut of new grads and everyone's pay stays high. For example, my radiologist friend's school accepted just six new students per year.

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