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COA reverses in favor of FSSA in provider payment dispute

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The Indiana Court of Appeals held that a trial court erred in ruling in favor of health care providers regarding payments from the state’s Residential Care Assistance Program.

In Michael A. Gargano, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration, et al. v. Lee Alan Bryant Health Care Facilities, Inc., et al., No. 49A02-1105-PL-449, the appellants contended that the trial court violated separation of powers when it found that the Family and Social Services Administration and Division of Aging had acted unlawfully in refusing to accept RCAP applications after Dec. 1, 2009.

The FSSA had notified providers that relied on RCAP funds in October 2009 that due to budgetary constraints affecting all state agencies, the RCAP would not be accepting new applications effective Dec. 1, 2009. Following that date, a number of applications for the RCAP submitted by individuals admitted to providers’ facilities were denied.

The COA declined to hold that FSSA and the DOA may not exercise or perform conventional administrative and executive steps of directing or redirecting allotted funds in order to meet the directives of the State Budget Agency, and therefore reversed the trial court’s award of damages to providers.

The appellants also claimed that the court erred in ordering them to recalculate reimbursement rates paid to RCAP providers. The trial court had ordered the state agencies in 2011 to recalculate reimbursement amounts from 2003 to 2009.

Citing Indiana Code 12-10-6-2.1, subsection (g), the COA held that “a prenegotiated payment rate is predicated on a reasonable cost related basis with a growth of profit factor in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and methods and written standards and criteria as established by the division.” RCAP providers had been paid the upper rate limit and therefore were not entitled to additional reimbursement, nor were the reimbursement rates unlawful, the COA held.

The Court of Appeals remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion.

 

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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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