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COA reverses order requiring victim to pay attorney fees

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A man who claims he was struck by a vodka bottle that resulted in 18 stitches won’t have to pay attorney fees to a woman against whom he had been awarded a protective order, the Court of Appeals ruled Tuesday, reversing a lower court order.

Richard Troy Dunno was granted a protective order on Dec. 22, 2011, a day after he told an Allen Superior magistrate that Ronalee Rasmussen hit him with the bottle. The P.O. was issued ex parte.

Dunno failed to appear at a hearing in February at which time the order was dismissed. Rasmussen presented evidence that she wasn’t the person responsible for the offense and asked the court for attorney fees, which were granted in the sum of $500. Prior to the appeal in Richard Troy Dunno v. Ronalee Rasmussen, 02A03-1207-PO-310, Dunno’s motions to correct error at the trial court failed.

“Dunno argues that “[a]llowing the trial court to award attorney fees against someone petitioning for a protective order would undoubtedly have a chilling effect and cause some victims of domestic violence to forgo making a legitimate plea for protection,” Judge Elaine Brown wrote for the unanimous panel. “Dunno also claims that the record does not support an attorney fee assessment under Ind. Code § 34-52-1-1(b).”

Finding that his claim was not frivolous or in bad faith, “We conclude that Dunno has made a prima facie showing that the award of attorney fees was improper,” Brown wrote. “We reverse the trial court’s judgment ordering Dunno to pay Rasmussen’s attorney fees.”


 

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  1. I need an experienced attorney to handle a breach of contract matter. Kindly respond for more details. Graham Young

  2. I thought the slurs were the least grave aspects of her misconduct, since they had nothing to do with her being on the bench. Why then do I suspect they were the focus? I find this a troubling trend. At least she was allowed to keep her law license.

  3. Section 6 of Article I of the Indiana Constitution is pretty clear and unequivocal: "Section 6. No money shall be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of any religious or theological institution."

  4. Video pen? Nice work, "JW"! Let this be a lesson and a caution to all disgruntled ex-spouses (or soon-to-be ex-spouses) . . . you may think that altercation is going to get you some satisfaction . . . it will not.

  5. First comment on this thread is a fitting final comment on this thread, as that the MCBA never answered Duncan's fine question, and now even Eric Holder agrees that the MCBA was in material error as to the facts: "I don't get it" from Duncan December 1, 2014 5:10 PM "The Grand Jury met for 25 days and heard 70 hours of testimony according to this article and they made a decision that no crime occurred. On what basis does the MCBA conclude that their decision was "unjust"? What special knowledge or evidence does the MCBA have that the Grand Jury hearing this matter was unaware of? The system that we as lawyers are sworn to uphold made a decision that there was insufficient proof that officer committed a crime. How can any of us say we know better what was right than the jury that actually heard all of the the evidence in this case."

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