ILNews

COA reverses vacation of grandparent visitation

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Even though a grandmother lacked standing to pursue a grandparent visitation order when it was granted, the trial court erred in later vacating the order, the Indiana Court of Appeals ruled. The grandchildren’s guardians’ objections to the grandmother’s lack of standing were waived when they failed to appeal the original order.

J.C. is the mother of M.A., who had two daughters with his wife. The girls were home when he shot and killed his wife. M.A. went to prison and the girls moved in with M.A.’s half brother J.B. and his partner S.B. The couple later filed for guardianship of the girls, in which the grandmother filed to intervene and a petition for visitation.

J.C. was eventually granted unsupervised grandparent visitation on a strict schedule. The guardians didn’t appeal the original order or an amended order. After the grandmother initiated a telephone call between one of the girls and her incarcerated father, the guardians sought to terminate J.C.’s visitation. They claimed she never had standing under the grandparent visitation statute. J.C. argued that the guardians waived their standing by consenting to the provisional visitation agreement and by not appealing the original visitation order.

The trial court ruled in favor of the guardians and vacated the visitation order.

The Court of Appeals reversed, pointing out that the grandmother’s appeal is not moot because the girls were adopted by J.B., who is the girls’ uncle. It does not matter that S.B. is not biologically related to the girls.

J.C. does not have standing under the Act because she is the parent of M.A., who is still alive and her son’s marriage was not dissolved at the time of his wife’s death. But although the initial visitation order was erroneous, the guardians waived their objections to J.C.’s standing when they failed to appeal.

“Given that nearly a year has passed since the grandparent visitation order has been vacated, it may be wise for the trial court to schedule a hearing sua sponte on the children’s best interests to determine whether and to what extent grandparent visitation should occur in the future,” Judge John Baker wrote in In Re The Guardianship of A.J.A. and L.M.A., J.C. v. J.B. and S.B., 48A02-1204-GU-326.

 

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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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