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COA rules in favor of chamber in breach of contract dispute

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In its decision ordering summary judgment be entered in favor of the Brownsburg Chamber of Commerce in a lawsuit involving damages to a former employee, the Indiana Court of Appeals adopted the proposition that damages for breach of notice provisions are limited to compensation for the notice period.

In Walter B. Duncan v. The Greater Brownsburg Chamber of Commerce, Inc., No. 32A01-1109-CC-429, Walter Duncan sued the Greater Brownsburg Chamber of Commerce over the amount of damages he received after he was forced to resign as executive director in March 2010. The chamber’s board of directors voted to terminate his contract immediately, but Duncan was given the option of resigning. Per his resignation, he was to work one more week and take a three-week paid vacation. His daily salary was $138, so he was due just under $15,000 for working through April 18, one month after he submitted his resignation letter. The chamber paid more than $15,500 to him in 2010.

Duncan sued later that year, arguing he should have been due damages from the date of the alleged breach through the term of the contract. Both Duncan and the chamber filed for summary judgment. The chamber’s argument basically asks the appellate court to adopt the general proposition that damages for breach of a notice requirement are limited to the compensation for the notice period.

The COA did, adopting the majority rule that “the summary discharge of an employee entitled under the employment contract to a specified period of notice ordinarily permits him to recover his compensation for the notice period only and not for the entire balance of the contract period.” This is consistent with decisions from other jurisdictions.

Here, the contract required a 30-day written notice to the other party before canceling the employment agreement. The most that Duncan was entitled to recover then was 30 days compensation. He received more than what he was entitled to, so the appellate court declined to address whether the chamber actually breached the notice requirement. The judges ordered the trial court enter summary judgment in favor of the chamber.
 

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  1. I need an experienced attorney to handle a breach of contract matter. Kindly respond for more details. Graham Young

  2. I thought the slurs were the least grave aspects of her misconduct, since they had nothing to do with her being on the bench. Why then do I suspect they were the focus? I find this a troubling trend. At least she was allowed to keep her law license.

  3. Section 6 of Article I of the Indiana Constitution is pretty clear and unequivocal: "Section 6. No money shall be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of any religious or theological institution."

  4. Video pen? Nice work, "JW"! Let this be a lesson and a caution to all disgruntled ex-spouses (or soon-to-be ex-spouses) . . . you may think that altercation is going to get you some satisfaction . . . it will not.

  5. First comment on this thread is a fitting final comment on this thread, as that the MCBA never answered Duncan's fine question, and now even Eric Holder agrees that the MCBA was in material error as to the facts: "I don't get it" from Duncan December 1, 2014 5:10 PM "The Grand Jury met for 25 days and heard 70 hours of testimony according to this article and they made a decision that no crime occurred. On what basis does the MCBA conclude that their decision was "unjust"? What special knowledge or evidence does the MCBA have that the Grand Jury hearing this matter was unaware of? The system that we as lawyers are sworn to uphold made a decision that there was insufficient proof that officer committed a crime. How can any of us say we know better what was right than the jury that actually heard all of the the evidence in this case."

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