ILNews

COA rules insurer has no duty to defend

Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's ruling that an insurance company doesn't have the duty to defend its client in lawsuits arising out of environmental contamination on its property, noting that if the court were to rule in favor of the client's arguments, insurance business practices would dramatically change.

Accepting Crawfordsville Square's argument - that its insurer, Monroe Guaranty Insurance Co., knew about possible contamination of land Crawfordsville purchased because the insurer was aware a dry cleaner previously operated at that location - would burden insurers with essentially the same duty of due diligence as potential insureds to investigate and discover known losses, wrote Judge Cale Bradford.

In Crawfordsville Square, LLC, et al. v. Monroe Guaranty Ins. Co., No. 54A01-0807-CV-327, Crawfordsville argued there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether it knew about contamination when it purchased a parcel of land and whether Monroe knew about it when it added the land to an existing insurance policy.

When Crawfordsville purchased the parcel in 1998, it contained a dry cleaner and car wash that sold gasoline. Crawfordsville member L.E. Kleinmaier Jr. sent a letter to the agent of the seller regarding testing and cleaning up of the site and that the company would still buy the land if an escrow account was established to pay an environmental firm for cleanup. Crawfordsville told Monroe there was a dry cleaner on the site and it wanted to add the parcel to its existing general commercial liability insurance policy. Crawfordsville didn't tell Monroe of any actual or potential contamination at the site, which turned out to exist.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Monroe and denied summary judgment for Crawfordsville on the insurer's duty to defend.

The "known loss" doctrine precludes coverage and excuses Monroe from its duty to defend, the appellate court ruled. Crawfordsville contended there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether it knew when it added the parcel to its insurance that a loss had occurred or could occur based on Kleinmaier's 1998 letter and his testimony in 2007 that the company only had knowledge of potential contamination at the site.

Crawfordsville is trying to create a genuine issue of material fact because of the contradictions of Kleinmaier's letter and testimony, but the law in Indiana doesn't allow for contradictory testimony contained in an affidavit of the non-movant to be used by him to create a summary judgment motion where the only issue of fact raised by the affidavit is the credibility of the affiant, wrote the judge. Although the facts are different than those stated in the "sham affidavit" case in Gaboury v. Ireland Rd. Grace Brethren, Inc., 446 N.E.2d 1310, 1314 (Ind. 1983), the rationale for the rule applies in the instant case.

Crawfordsville claimed it didn't have actual knowledge of the loss, but the letter it sent indicates knowledge of actionable contamination. Judge Bradford wrote in a footnote that ruling in favor of Crawfordsville on this point would "essentially reward" it for what may well have been "deceptive behavior on its part, and thereby serve as an unintended endorsement of the practice of exaggerating one's beliefs regarding possible or known contamination in order to negotiate a better price."

In addition, the mere knowledge that Monroe knew a dry cleaner had operated on the parcel at the time of closing doesn't create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether it had actual knowledge of actionable levels of contamination.

"Of course, such a ruling would have the effect of relieving the potential insureds of any practical duty of due diligence, as the insurance company would be performing it in any event, or failing to do so at its peril," wrote the judge in another footnote. "We are, to say the least, reluctant to endorse such a dramatic change in insurance business practice, i.e., to shift the financial incentive entirely to insurers to discover latent defects in property their insureds propose to buy and insure, thereby removing the incentive to do so from the insured - the party typically better positioned to carry out this task."

ADVERTISEMENT

Post a comment to this story

COMMENTS POLICY
We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
 
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
 
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
 
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
 
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.
 

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by

facebook - twitter on Facebook & Twitter

Indiana State Bar Association

Indianapolis Bar Association

Evansville Bar Association

Allen County Bar Association

Indiana Lawyer on Facebook

facebook
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. Video pen? Nice work, "JW"! Let this be a lesson and a caution to all disgruntled ex-spouses (or soon-to-be ex-spouses) . . . you may think that altercation is going to get you some satisfaction . . . it will not.

  2. First comment on this thread is a fitting final comment on this thread, as that the MCBA never answered Duncan's fine question, and now even Eric Holder agrees that the MCBA was in material error as to the facts: "I don't get it" from Duncan December 1, 2014 5:10 PM "The Grand Jury met for 25 days and heard 70 hours of testimony according to this article and they made a decision that no crime occurred. On what basis does the MCBA conclude that their decision was "unjust"? What special knowledge or evidence does the MCBA have that the Grand Jury hearing this matter was unaware of? The system that we as lawyers are sworn to uphold made a decision that there was insufficient proof that officer committed a crime. How can any of us say we know better what was right than the jury that actually heard all of the the evidence in this case."

  3. wow is this a bunch of bs! i know the facts!

  4. MCBA .... time for a new release about your entire membership (or is it just the alter ego) being "saddened and disappointed" in the failure to lynch a police officer protecting himself in the line of duty. But this time against Eric Holder and the Federal Bureau of Investigation: "WASHINGTON — Justice Department lawyers will recommend that no civil rights charges be brought against the police officer who fatally shot an unarmed teenager in Ferguson, Mo., after an F.B.I. investigation found no evidence to support charges, law enforcement officials said Wednesday." http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/22/us/justice-department-ferguson-civil-rights-darren-wilson.html?ref=us&_r=0

  5. Dr wail asfour lives 3 hours from the hospital,where if he gets an emergency at least he needs three hours,while even if he is on call he should be in a location where it gives him max 10 minutes to be beside the patient,they get paid double on their on call days ,where look how they handle it,so if the death of the patient occurs on weekend and these doctors still repeat same pattern such issue should be raised,they should be closer to the patient.on other hand if all the death occured on the absence of the Dr and the nurses handle it,the nurses should get trained how to function appearntly they not that good,if the Dr lives 3 hours far from the hospital on his call days he should sleep in the hospital

ADVERTISEMENT