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COA rules on excessive force under ITCA

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The use of excessive force is not conduct immunized under section 3(8) of the Indiana Tort Claims Act, the Indiana Court of Appeals ruled today.

In Richard Patrick Wilson and Billy Don Wilson v. Gene Isaacs, Sheriff of Cass County, and Brad Craven, No. 09A05-0906-CV-344, the appellate court had to determine if the trial court correctly granted summary judgment for Cass County Sheriff Gene Isaacs in the Wilsons' suit alleging injuries as a result of excessive force.

Deputy Brad Craven was called to a party held at Billy Don Wilson's house in response to a report that the Wilsons' brother, Carl, had punched a juvenile in the head. The account of the events following Craven's arrival differed among the parties: Craven said Patrick Wilson grabbed him from behind and wasn't compliant with his orders, so Craven ultimately fired his Taser at him. Patrick said he tapped the deputy on the shoulder to show him the person at the party the deputy was looking for when Craven pulled out his Taser and yelled at Patrick. Patrick claimed he was shot with the Taser after not knowing which of the deputy's commands to obey. The three Wilson brothers were arrested.

There's been some confusion whether the ITCA law enforcement immunity provision applies to claims for injuries resulting from the use of excessive force during a detention or arrest, noted Judge James Kirsch.

In 1993, the Indiana Supreme Court issued Quakenbush v. Lackey, 622 N.E.2d 1284 (Ind. 1993), which held section 3(8) of the ITCA conferred immunity to law enforcement officials for breaches of public duties owed to the public at large, but didn't shelter officers who breached private duties owed to individuals. In Kemezy v. Peters, 622 N.E.2d 1296 (Ind. 1993), the high court found that law enforcement officers owed a private duty to refrain from using excessive force when making arrests and the use of excessive force isn't conduct immunized by section 3(8).

The high court later criticized the public duty/private duty test used in Quakenbush in Benton v. Oakland City, 721 N.E.2d 224, 230 (Ind. 1999), but didn't expressly overrule Quakenbush. The Supreme Court in another case later explained Benton overruled the public/private duty test at common law.

There are questions as to whether Kemezy still remains good law, wrote Judge Kirsch, noting Kemezy is directly on point with the instant case and has not been overruled. The judges followed the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana's reasoning on Kemezy to conclude the use of excessive force is not conduct immunized under section 3(8) of the ITCA.

"Therefore, consistent with the holding in Kemezy, police officers and the governmental entities that employ them can be found liable for excessive force claims despite the immunity coverage of the ITCA," he wrote. "Until our Supreme Court overrules Kemezy, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the Sheriff is immune from liability for the Wilsons' excessive force claim based solely on the ITCA."

The trial court was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of the sheriff as to the state law claims against Craven individually. The Wilsons complained Craven acted outside the scope of his employment, but didn't present a reasonable factual basis supporting the allegations as required under Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-5(c). The undisputed evidence established Craven was acting within the scope of his employment, wrote the judge.

The case was remanded for further proceedings.

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  1. Such things are no more elections than those in the late, unlamented Soviet Union.

  2. It appears the police and prosecutors are allowed to change the rules halfway through the game to suit themselves. I am surprised that the congress has not yet eliminated the right to a trial in cases involving any type of forensic evidence. That would suit their foolish law and order police state views. I say we eliminate the statute of limitations for crimes committed by members of congress and other government employees. Of course they would never do that. They are all corrupt cowards!!!

  3. Poor Judge Brown probably thought that by slavishly serving the godz of the age her violations of 18th century concepts like due process and the rule of law would be overlooked. Mayhaps she was merely a Judge ahead of her time?

  4. in a lawyer discipline case Judge Brown, now removed, was presiding over a hearing about a lawyer accused of the supposedly heinous ethical violation of saying the words "Illegal immigrant." (IN re Barker) http://www.in.gov/judiciary/files/order-discipline-2013-55S00-1008-DI-429.pdf .... I wonder if when we compare the egregious violations of due process by Judge Brown, to her chiding of another lawyer for politically incorrectness, if there are any conclusions to be drawn about what kind of person, what kind of judge, what kind of apparatchik, is busy implementing the agenda of political correctness and making off-limits legit advocacy about an adverse party in a suit whose illegal alien status is relevant? I am just asking the question, the reader can make own conclsuion. Oh wait-- did I use the wrong adjective-- let me rephrase that, um undocumented alien?

  5. of course the bigger questions of whether or not the people want to pay for ANY bussing is off limits, due to the Supreme Court protecting the people from DEMOCRACY. Several decades hence from desegregation and bussing plans and we STILL need to be taking all this taxpayer money to combat mostly-imagined "discrimination" in the most obviously failed social program of the postwar period.

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