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COA upholds denial of post-conviction relief

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The Indiana Court of Appeals agreed with the post-conviction court that a defendant didn’t receive ineffective assistance of trial counsel, finding the man had no right to the effective assistance of counsel at the time he gave a statement to police in front of the attorney.

James Oberst was charged with two counts of sexual misconduct with a minor in 1998 and later convicted. The Court of Appeals reversed one of his convictions and ordered he be re-sentenced. In 2008, Oberst filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming his trial counsel was ineffective on several grounds.

 When Oberst gave his statement to the police detective in December 1998, he hadn’t been charged yet with a crime. Oberst’s attorney on an unrelated criminal matter happened to be at the sheriff’s department on the day he went in to speak with the detective, and the attorney agreed to help Oberst in the instant matter. Oberst signed a waiver of rights and admitted to having sex with the victim. His attorney in the unrelated matter was later appointed to defend him in the sexual misconduct case.

In James K. Oberst v. State of Indiana, No. 14A05-1003-PC-157, Oberst argued that his attorney should have somehow stopped him from confessing during the interview. But the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is activated at the initiation of adversary criminal proceedings, noted Judge Nancy Vaidik.

“And because Oberst did not have the Sixth Amendment right to counsel during the December 2 interview, it does not matter what trial counsel did or did not do during that interview. In other words, Oberst did not have the right to effective representation during that interview,” she wrote.

The judges also rejected Oberst’s arguments that his trial counsel was ineffective by not conducting an adequate pretrial investigation. Oberst couldn’t establish ineffective assistance on this issue or on his claims of trial ineffectiveness. Oberst argued the trial counsel should have withdrawn as his counsel at the beginning of the trial when Oberst indicated he wanted to fire the attorney for failing to file a notice of alibi. But the trial court resolved the matter by allowing the alibi witness, so he had no reason to fire his trial counsel, wrote the judge.

As with his other arguments, the appellate judges found Oberst didn’t provide sufficient evidence to support his ineffective assistance claim.

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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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