ILNews

COA voids custody order in favor of father

Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

The Indiana Court of Appeals has reversed the grant of custody in favor of an Indiana father because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act to make a custody determination.

Diamond Parks and Deante Rashon Tate had a child together out of wedlock in 2009. Parks put Tate’s name on the birth certificate, but paternity was not adjudicated until 2013. Parks moved to Mississippi with D.T. after a domestic battery incident.

In July 2011, she filed an action in Mississippi seeking Medicaid benefits and child support from Tate. A request for paternity determination and child support enforcement under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act was sent to Indiana, where the Madison County prosecutor filed a UIFSA action in the Indiana trial court.

Shortly after paternity was established, Tate sought custody of D.T. through the Indiana trial court. Parks had consented for D.T. to be in Indiana with Tate to attend a memorial service for Tate’s mother, but she never received notice of the motion for change of custody. It wasn’t until she came to Indiana and picked him up did she learn the trial court granted Tate full custody. He had listed his aunt’s address as Parks’ address for purposes of service of process.

The trial court denied mother’s motion to correct error as well as her emergency motion to vacate the custody order pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B)(6). The trial court ruled Parks didn’t establish that an emergency existed as alleged in the title of her motion.

Trial Rule 60(B)(6) does not require a showing of “emergency” circumstances, but just that a judgment be “void,” Judge Terry Crone wrote in In Re Paternity of D.T. (Minor Child) Diamond T. Parks (Mother) v. Deante Rashon Tate (Father), 48A05-1309-JP-486.

“Shortly after the paternity order was issued, Father filed a pro se motion under the same cause number seeking full custody of D.T., who was with him in Indiana pending attendance at a family memorial service. Curiously, the trial court adjudicated the custody request as part of the UIFSA cause of action, even though UIFSA specifies that the court lacks jurisdiction to make such a determination absent a stipulation between the parties. The record is devoid of documentation indicating any such stipulation, and Mother never received notice of the custody hearing. As such, she cannot be deemed to have stipulated to the trial court’s jurisdiction over the matter,” Crone wrote.

The judges also ordered UIFSA proceedings reinstated. The prosecutor dismissed them after custody was awarded to father.
 

ADVERTISEMENT

Post a comment to this story

COMMENTS POLICY
We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
 
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
 
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
 
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
 
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.
 

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by

facebook - twitter on Facebook & Twitter

Indiana State Bar Association

Indianapolis Bar Association

Evansville Bar Association

Allen County Bar Association

Indiana Lawyer on Facebook

facebook
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. I need an experienced attorney to handle a breach of contract matter. Kindly respond for more details. Graham Young

  2. I thought the slurs were the least grave aspects of her misconduct, since they had nothing to do with her being on the bench. Why then do I suspect they were the focus? I find this a troubling trend. At least she was allowed to keep her law license.

  3. Section 6 of Article I of the Indiana Constitution is pretty clear and unequivocal: "Section 6. No money shall be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of any religious or theological institution."

  4. Video pen? Nice work, "JW"! Let this be a lesson and a caution to all disgruntled ex-spouses (or soon-to-be ex-spouses) . . . you may think that altercation is going to get you some satisfaction . . . it will not.

  5. First comment on this thread is a fitting final comment on this thread, as that the MCBA never answered Duncan's fine question, and now even Eric Holder agrees that the MCBA was in material error as to the facts: "I don't get it" from Duncan December 1, 2014 5:10 PM "The Grand Jury met for 25 days and heard 70 hours of testimony according to this article and they made a decision that no crime occurred. On what basis does the MCBA conclude that their decision was "unjust"? What special knowledge or evidence does the MCBA have that the Grand Jury hearing this matter was unaware of? The system that we as lawyers are sworn to uphold made a decision that there was insufficient proof that officer committed a crime. How can any of us say we know better what was right than the jury that actually heard all of the the evidence in this case."

ADVERTISEMENT