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Counties must pay for juvenile facilities

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Juvenile Justice

Indiana counties are responsible to pay a portion of costs to operate juvenile detention facilities, the Indiana Court of Appeals decided June 13.

The appellate court reached that decision in Marion County and St. Joseph County, Indiana v. State of Indiana, et al., No. 73A01-0705-CV-238, affirming summary judgment in favor of the state.

Marion and St. Joseph counties filed a lawsuit seeking relief from their debts to the state for costs of operating juvenile detention facilities after the state attempted to collect arrearages from the counties. The two counties - which owed a total of $75 million - sought declaratory and injunctive relief and restitution on all of their payments since 1995.

They claimed Article 9, Section 2 of the Indiana Constitution requires the state to pay the total cost of operation. The appellate judges examined Article 9, which states, “The General Assembly shall provide institutions for the correction and reformation of juvenile offenders.” The text of this article doesn’t specify how the General Assembly will determine the method of funding, wrote Judge Melissa May.

The counties failed to show whether requiring them to share in the costs of operating the facilities is unconstitutional.

The counties argued Indiana Code only allowed the state to charge them for expenses incurred by the Plainfield Juvenile Correctional Facility and the Indianapolis Juvenile Correctional Facility, and that all accounts submitted since 1995 are invalid because they didn’t comply with requirements under Indiana Code.

If the counties are constitutionally required to pay, the counties argued, they are only liable for expenses from the Plainfield and Indianapolis correctional facilities because they are the ones mentioned in the statute. In 2005, the specific references to those facilities were removed and replaced with a general reference to the DOC.

The Court of Appeals found the counties’ interpretation of Indiana Code Sections 4-24-7-2 and 11-10-2-3 would lead to an absurd and unjust result because the General Assembly always intended for counties to bear part of the costs of the entire state system.

The DOC has the authority to determine which facilities to operate and where to assign juveniles, so it no longer made sense for the General Assembly to identify specific facilities in the statutes, Judge May wrote. As such, the DOC has the authority to charge the counties for expenses incurred at all facilities.

Indiana Code Section 4-24-7-2 outlines the collection procedures for juvenile accounts, which include signature and attestation requirements. The state didn’t comply with these procedures, which the counties believe led the state to overcharge them.

The appellate judges agreed with the trial court that the alleged overcharges aren’t sufficiently connected with the state’s failure to follow the signature and seal requirements of Indiana Code, Judge May wrote, and the DOC’s billing procedure sufficiently fulfilled the purpose of I.C. Section 4-24-7-2.

The state countered that the counties lacked standing and their suit was barred by the statute of limitations and doctrines of laches; the Court of Appeals disagreed, yet affirmed the trial court’s decision on the merits of the counties' claims.

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  1. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  2. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  3. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

  4. Here's an idea...how about we MORE heavily regulate the law schools to reduce the surplus of graduates, driving starting salaries up for those new grads, so that we can all pay our insane amount of student loans off in a reasonable amount of time and then be able to afford to do pro bono & low-fee work? I've got friends in other industries, radiology for example, and their schools accept a very limited number of students so there will never be a glut of new grads and everyone's pay stays high. For example, my radiologist friend's school accepted just six new students per year.

  5. I totally agree with John Smith.

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