ILNews

Counties must pay for juvenile facilities

Back to TopE-mailPrintBookmark and Share
Juvenile Justice

Indiana counties are responsible to pay a portion of costs to operate juvenile detention facilities, the Indiana Court of Appeals decided June 13.

The appellate court reached that decision in Marion County and St. Joseph County, Indiana v. State of Indiana, et al., No. 73A01-0705-CV-238, affirming summary judgment in favor of the state.

Marion and St. Joseph counties filed a lawsuit seeking relief from their debts to the state for costs of operating juvenile detention facilities after the state attempted to collect arrearages from the counties. The two counties - which owed a total of $75 million - sought declaratory and injunctive relief and restitution on all of their payments since 1995.

They claimed Article 9, Section 2 of the Indiana Constitution requires the state to pay the total cost of operation. The appellate judges examined Article 9, which states, “The General Assembly shall provide institutions for the correction and reformation of juvenile offenders.” The text of this article doesn’t specify how the General Assembly will determine the method of funding, wrote Judge Melissa May.

The counties failed to show whether requiring them to share in the costs of operating the facilities is unconstitutional.

The counties argued Indiana Code only allowed the state to charge them for expenses incurred by the Plainfield Juvenile Correctional Facility and the Indianapolis Juvenile Correctional Facility, and that all accounts submitted since 1995 are invalid because they didn’t comply with requirements under Indiana Code.

If the counties are constitutionally required to pay, the counties argued, they are only liable for expenses from the Plainfield and Indianapolis correctional facilities because they are the ones mentioned in the statute. In 2005, the specific references to those facilities were removed and replaced with a general reference to the DOC.

The Court of Appeals found the counties’ interpretation of Indiana Code Sections 4-24-7-2 and 11-10-2-3 would lead to an absurd and unjust result because the General Assembly always intended for counties to bear part of the costs of the entire state system.

The DOC has the authority to determine which facilities to operate and where to assign juveniles, so it no longer made sense for the General Assembly to identify specific facilities in the statutes, Judge May wrote. As such, the DOC has the authority to charge the counties for expenses incurred at all facilities.

Indiana Code Section 4-24-7-2 outlines the collection procedures for juvenile accounts, which include signature and attestation requirements. The state didn’t comply with these procedures, which the counties believe led the state to overcharge them.

The appellate judges agreed with the trial court that the alleged overcharges aren’t sufficiently connected with the state’s failure to follow the signature and seal requirements of Indiana Code, Judge May wrote, and the DOC’s billing procedure sufficiently fulfilled the purpose of I.C. Section 4-24-7-2.

The state countered that the counties lacked standing and their suit was barred by the statute of limitations and doctrines of laches; the Court of Appeals disagreed, yet affirmed the trial court’s decision on the merits of the counties' claims.

ADVERTISEMENT

Sponsored by
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  2. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

  3. Why in the world would someone need a person to correct a transcript when a realtime court reporter could provide them with a transcript (rough draft) immediately?

  4. This article proved very enlightening. Right ahead of sitting the LSAT for the first time, I felt a sense of relief that a score of 141 was admitted to an Indiana Law School and did well under unique circumstances. While my GPA is currently 3.91 I fear standardized testing and hope that I too will get a good enough grade for acceptance here at home. Thanks so much for this informative post.

  5. No, Ron Drake is not running against incumbent Larry Bucshon. That’s totally wrong; and destructively misleading to say anything like that. All political candidates, including me in the 8th district, are facing voters, not incumbents. You should not firewall away any of voters’ options. We need them all now more than ever. Right? Y’all have for decades given the Ds and Rs free 24/7/365 coverage of taxpayer-supported promotion at the expense of all alternatives. That’s plenty of head-start, money-in-the-pocket advantage for parties and people that don’t need any more free immunities, powers, privileges and money denied all others. Now it’s time to play fair and let voters know that there are, in fact, options. Much, much better, and not-corrupt options. Liberty or Bust! Andy Horning Libertarian for IN08 USA House of Representatives Freedom, Indiana

ADVERTISEMENT