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Court affirms felony nonsupport of a dependent conviction

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A man claiming he proved he was unable to pay child support because of his numerous incarcerations did not convince the Indiana Court of Appeals. In its ruling today, the court relied on Becker v. Becker, 902 N.E.2d 818 (Ind. 2009), to affirm the man’s conviction of Class C felony nonsupport of a dependent child.

In George H. Culbertson v. State of Indiana, No. 63A01-1002-CR-68, George Culbertson appealed his felony conviction of nonsupport of his three daughters. Culbertson and Victoria Patton were divorced in October 1986 and she was awarded custody of their daughters. He was ordered in gross to pay $200 a month through the Pike County Clerk’s office beginning Oct. 15, 1986.

According to the Pike County Prosecutor’s Office, Culbertson paid $100 toward support in 1994; he made no other payments through the clerk’s office.

From October 1986 through July 2003, Patton periodically enrolled in and received assistance from the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program. The state charged him July 26, 2006, with felony nonsupport of a dependent child; Culbertson’s total arrearage determined by the court was $37,400.

Patton testified at trial that Culbertson worked in construction and often worked “‘under the table’ to avoid paying child support.” During his trial, all three daughters testified they’d dropped out of high school and eventually moved out of their mother’s home. They also testified that they each received $100 from Culbertson after their parents’ divorce.

Admitted into evidence were copies of case summaries showing Culbertson’s convictions and sentences under numerous cause numbers. He testified that from the time they were divorced until his trial, he had been incarcerated for a total of eight years.

The trial court in its ruling noted he was a skilled carpenter and had the skills to earn an income to pay the support, and yet he failed to prove his inability to pay support during times he was not incarcerated. He also had never petitioned for child support modification. He was sentenced to eight years, with two years suspended to probation.

The appellate court noted that even allowing for Culbertson’s periods in jail, he didn’t adequately establish an “inability to pay any child support.” He provided no evidence he did not have any income or means to earn an income during his freedom, and he did not establish a defense to nonsupport of a dependent, the court noted. He also presented no evidence that abating his support obligations during his incarcerations would have resulted in a child support arrearage of less than $15,000, which is a Class D felony. Like the trial court, the appeals panel noted that at no time did he seek to modify his child support obligation because of an inability to pay.

Culbertson also claimed the trial court abused its discretion in failing to reduce the support owed proportionally as each child became emancipated.

The court noted the dissolution decree ordered undivided child support and there was no abuse of discretion on the court’s calculation of support.

“Waiver notwithstanding, we find that Culbertson’s argument fails. ‘[W]hen a court enters an order in gross, that obligation similarly continues until the order is modified and/or set aside, or all the children are emancipated, or all of the children reach the age of twenty-one.’ Whited v. Whited, 859 N.E.2d 657, 661 (Ind. 2007),” wrote Judge Carr Darden.

Culbertson said he was entitled to retroactive modification of the child support and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction of Class C felony nonsupport.

The Court of Appeals noted the Supreme Court’s rulings in Lambert v. Lambert, 861 N.E.2d 1176, 1177 (Ind. 2007), about calculating support based on actual income and assets available to an imprisoned parent, and Clark v. Clark, 902 N.E.2d 813 (Ind. 2009), which held incarceration may constitute a substantial change in circumstances justifying modification of an existing support obligation.

However, it was the Becker case that Judge Darden relied on: “Finding ‘[n]othing in Lambert or Clark suggests a contrary rule for modifications due to incarceration,’ the Becker-court held that ‘Lambert and Clark do not apply retroactively to modify child support orders already final, but only relate to petitions to modify child support granted after Lambert was decided.’ Id. at 820-21. Thus, a ‘trial court only has the discretion to make a modification of child support due to incarceration effective as of a date no earlier than the date of the petition to modify.’ Id. at 821.”

Because Culbertson never petitioned for a modification of his child support obligation, the appellate court ruled the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
 

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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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