ILNews

Court answers question on subcontractors' ability to recover

Michael W. Hoskins
January 1, 2007
Keywords
Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share
The Indiana Supreme Court today delved into the meaning of "subcontractor" and determined that performance bond coverage for third parties only goes so far.

Stemming from a certified question from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, justices considered: "Does a performance bond required by and issued in accordance with Ind. Code §8-23-9-9 afford coverage to a third-tier claimant?"

Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard wrote the opinion saying the statute does not afford that coverage, noting that a subcontractor is "any person or organization entering into a contract with a contractor to furnish labor and materials used in the actual construction of a state highway project."

Further in the decision, he wrote: "Accordingly, a claimant who does not share privity of contract with the contractor or a subcontractor is not entitled to the coverage of a performance bond issued under §8-23-9-9."

Justice Brent Dickson dissented without a separate opinion. The 4-1 decision came down in Alberici Constructors, Inc. v. Ohio Farmers Insurance Co., 94S00-0612-CQ-488, which involved a federal contract dispute relating to an Indiana Department of Transportation bridge project near Bluffton.

Contractor Primco secured a performance bond with defendant Ohio Farmers Insurance Co. and later entered purchase agreements with three other companies for needed materials. The third, Hillsdale Fabricators or Alberici Constructors, delivered bridge pieces but was not paid by the second company, Gateway Bridge. The insurance company rejected a claim by Alberici, saying it was "too far removed to have standing." Alberici ultimately sued the insurance company in federal court, arguing that it could recover under the state's performance bond statute.

"Without a bright line defining where surety coverage extends, contractors would face an incalculable risk of liability for claims made by distantly remote suppliers or laborers on contracts made without contractor approval," the chief justice wrote, later adding that the statute doesn't extend coverage under a performance bond to any entity more remote than a second-tier laborer or material supplier.

However, he added that this holding doesn't mean parties working on state highway projects are left without any way to ensure payment. Advance payments or some other "financial understanding" could be reached, as well as additional contract arrangements to extend that coverage, the chief justice wrote. The General Assembly could also amend the statute, he wrote.
ADVERTISEMENT

Post a comment to this story

COMMENTS POLICY
We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
 
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
 
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
 
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
 
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.
 

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by

facebook - twitter on Facebook & Twitter

Indiana State Bar Association

Indianapolis Bar Association

Evansville Bar Association

Allen County Bar Association

Indiana Lawyer on Facebook

facebook
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. I need an experienced attorney to handle a breach of contract matter. Kindly respond for more details. Graham Young

  2. I thought the slurs were the least grave aspects of her misconduct, since they had nothing to do with her being on the bench. Why then do I suspect they were the focus? I find this a troubling trend. At least she was allowed to keep her law license.

  3. Section 6 of Article I of the Indiana Constitution is pretty clear and unequivocal: "Section 6. No money shall be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of any religious or theological institution."

  4. Video pen? Nice work, "JW"! Let this be a lesson and a caution to all disgruntled ex-spouses (or soon-to-be ex-spouses) . . . you may think that altercation is going to get you some satisfaction . . . it will not.

  5. First comment on this thread is a fitting final comment on this thread, as that the MCBA never answered Duncan's fine question, and now even Eric Holder agrees that the MCBA was in material error as to the facts: "I don't get it" from Duncan December 1, 2014 5:10 PM "The Grand Jury met for 25 days and heard 70 hours of testimony according to this article and they made a decision that no crime occurred. On what basis does the MCBA conclude that their decision was "unjust"? What special knowledge or evidence does the MCBA have that the Grand Jury hearing this matter was unaware of? The system that we as lawyers are sworn to uphold made a decision that there was insufficient proof that officer committed a crime. How can any of us say we know better what was right than the jury that actually heard all of the the evidence in this case."

ADVERTISEMENT