Court: CHINS fact-finding hearing required by due process

Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

The Indiana Court of Appeals disagrees with the state Department of Child Services that fact-finding and dispositional hearings in a child in need of services case are interchangeable. The appellate panel has ruled a Marion County father’s due process rights were denied because he didn’t receive the opportunity for a fact-finding hearing.

A three-judge appellate panel issued a decision Wednesday in the case of In The Matter of T.N., G.N. v. Indiana Department of Child Services and Child Advocates, No. 49A05-1101-JC-15, which addresses an aspect of an Indiana Supreme Court holding from last year that the state agency says gave it the ability to sacrifice one parent’s CHINS objections at a fact-finding hearing when another agrees state services are needed.

The appellate judges offered guidance for trial courts addressing these issues locally: If one parent disagrees with claims that a child is in need of services, a court must hold a fact-finding hearing to address those concerns before making a CHINS determination even if the other parent admits a CHINS determination is valid.

In this case from Marion Superior Judge Pro Tempore Gary Chavers, the court focused on a CHINS determination involving a teen daughter, T.N. The state agency had filed a CHINS petition in August 2010 alleging that the mother and father didn’t provide the girl with a safe living environment and appropriate supervision. Specifically, the petition included claims that T.N.’s mother allowed the daughter’s boyfriend to sleep over, which resulted in her pregnancy and giving birth at age 14, and that the father had untreated substance and mental-health issues. The trial court allowed T.N. to stay at the father’s home following an initial hearing, but less than a month later removed her and placed her in foster care because the father wasn’t cooperating with DCS, T.N. wasn’t enrolled in school, and she was hospitalized after attacks by family members of the mother’s boyfriend.

In November, the trial court held a fact-finding CHINS hearing to hear evidence. The mother and DCS reached an agreement and acknowledged the CHINS determination was necessary, but the father’s attorney objected because the two had shared joint, physical, and legal custody and he needed to participate in that hearing.

The father’s lawyer argued that the court couldn’t make that determination based only on the mother’s admission, but the court disagreed and found father G.N. could later present his evidence at a subsequent contested dispositional hearing about what services might be provided.

On appeal, the judges found the father was denied due process.

The DCS argued that the Supreme Court’s decision last year In Re: N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2010), held that a CHINS determination establishes the status of a child alone and as a result it eliminated the requirement that the DCS prove the child is in need of services for the fact-finding process.

“We agree DCS does not have to prove a child is a CHINS as a result of both Mother’s actions and Father’s actions. Nor must the court assign ‘blame’ to each parent in its determination. Nevertheless, N.E. did not eliminate the requirement that DCS prove the child is, in fact, in need of services as alleged in the petition,” Judge Melissa May wrote. “Thus, we decline DCS’s invitation to hold one parent’s admission is sufficient to prove a child is a CHINS, when the child’s other parent contests that allegation.”

The court disagreed with the DCS that a later dispositional hearing was adequate to address the contesting parent’s concerns.

“As the necessity of court-ordered intervention has already been determined by the dispositional hearing, any argument a party might make that his child does not need court-ordered intervention is moot at that point,” Judge May wrote. “We therefore cannot agree that a contested dispositional hearing is an adequate substitute for a fact-finding hearing, just as we could not agree that a sentencing hearing would be an adequate substitute for a criminal trial.”

Balancing the three factors necessary for determining whether a litigant received due process, the appellate court determined the father’s interest in being able to raise his child without interference from the government is more substantial than the state’s interest in denying G.N. a fact-finding hearing. Due process requires a fact-finding hearing before the court declares the child is a CHINS, the appellate judges ruled. Even though the father later withdrew his objection to the CHINS determination and agreed to participate in the dispositional services ordered by the court, the appellate judges said that doesn’t mean the father – or any litigant – sacrifices due process rights simply by cooperating with a subsequent court order.


Post a comment to this story

We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. Lori, you must really love wedding cake stories like this one ... happy enuf ending for you?

  2. This new language about a warning has not been discussed at previous meetings. It's not available online. Since it must be made public knowledge before the vote, does anyone know exactly what it says? Further, this proposal was held up for 5 weeks because members Carol and Lucy insisted that all terms used be defined. So now, definitions are unnecessary and have not been inserted? Beyond these requirements, what is the logic behind giving one free pass to discriminators? Is that how laws work - break it once and that's ok? Just don't do it again? Three members of Carmel's council have done just about everything they can think of to prohibit an anti-discrimination ordinance in Carmel, much to Brainard's consternation, I'm told. These three 'want to be so careful' that they have failed to do what at least 13 other communities, including Martinsville, have already done. It's not being careful. It's standing in the way of what 60% of Carmel residents want. It's hurting CArmel in thT businesses have refused to locate because the council has not gotten with the program. And now they want to give discriminatory one free shot to do so. Unacceptable. Once three members leave the council because they lost their races, the Carmel council will have unanimous approval of the ordinance as originally drafted, not with a one free shot to discriminate freebie. That happens in January 2016. Why give a freebie when all we have to do is wait 3 months and get an ordinance with teeth from Day 1? If nothing else, can you please get s copy from Carmel and post it so we can see what else has changed in the proposal?

  3. Here is an interesting 2012 law review article for any who wish to dive deeper into this subject matter: Excerpt: "Judicial interpretation of the ADA has extended public entity liability to licensing agencies in the licensure and certification of attorneys.49 State bar examiners have the authority to conduct fitness investigations for the purpose of determining whether an applicant is a direct threat to the public.50 A “direct threat” is defined as “a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices or procedures, or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services as provided by § 35.139.”51 However, bar examiners may not utilize generalizations or stereotypes about the applicant’s disability in concluding that an applicant is a direct threat.52"

  4. We have been on the waiting list since 2009, i was notified almost 4 months ago that we were going to start receiving payments and we still have received nothing. Every time I call I'm told I just have to wait it's in the lawyers hands. Is everyone else still waiting?

  5. I hope you dont mind but to answer my question. What amendment does this case pretain to?