ILNews

Court clarifies responses under T.R. 56(I)

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The Indiana Court of Appeals used a decision today to clarify that when a nonmoving party has received an enlargement of time pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 56(I), any response must be made within the additional time period granted by the trial court.

The issue arose in Marvin Jay Miller, M.D. v. Tiffany Brook Yedlowski, deceased, Mario Yedlowski and Kim Rinehart, No. 49A02-0901-CV-78, in which Dr. Marvin Jay Miller appealed of the denial of his motion for summary judgment. Tiffany Yedlowski's parents, Mario Yedlowski and Kim Rinehart, filed a complaint against Miller following the death of Tiffany while under his care at Larue Carter Hospital in Indianapolis.

Miller filed a motion for summary judgment; the parents filed a motion for enlargement of time to respond to his motion. They were granted a Sept. 4, 2008 deadline to respond to the motion.

Six days after the deadline, the parents filed a second motion for enlargement of time, requesting five more days to get their expert's report. Miller again filed for summary judgment, arguing he was entitled to it as a matter of law since the plaintiffs' hadn't responded or filed a continuance within the time limit set by the trial court.

The trial court denied Miller's motion, granted the parents' second motion for enlargement of time, and then allowed the parents to file their response more than ten days after their Sept. 4 deadline.

On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals determined the trial court erred in granting the second motion for enlargement of time because it wasn't filed by the deadline imposed by the court. The Indiana Supreme Court, in HomEq Servicing Corp. v. Baker, 883 N.E.2d 95, 98 (Ind. 2008), established a bright-line rule that prohibits a trial court from considering summary judgment filings after the 30-day period, wrote Judge Nancy Vaidik.

Even though the plaintiffs filed their first motion within the 30-day period, their second one wasn't within the time period defined by the first motion for enlargement of time, so their response shouldn't have been allowed, per Thayer v. Gohil, 740 N.E.2d 1266, 1269 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).

"The rationale behind the rule requiring a nonmoving party to respond to a motion for summary judgment ... within thirty days does not vanish because the trial court has happened to grant one extension of time," wrote the judge. "That is, the nonmoving party should not be rewarded and relieved from the restriction of responding within the time limit set by the court because he or she has had the good fortune of one enlargement of time."

Because the parents' response was filed late, it can't be considered by the trial court and leaves no evidence to oppose Miller's motion for summary judgment. The appellate court remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of the doctor.

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  1. Just an aside, but regardless of the outcome, I 'm proud of Judge William Hughes. He was the original magistrate on the Home place issue. He ruled for Home Place, and was primaried by Brainard for it. Their tool Poindexter failed to unseat Hughes, who won support for his honesty and courage throughout the county, and he was reelected Judge of Hamilton County's Superior Court. You can still stand for something and survive. Thanks, Judge Hughes!

  2. CCHP's real accomplishment is the 2015 law signed by Gov Pence that basically outlaws any annexation that is forced where a 65% majority of landowners in the affected area disagree. Regardless of whether HP wins or loses, the citizens of Indiana will not have another fiasco like this. The law Gov Pence signed is a direct result of this malgovernance.

  3. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  4. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  5. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

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