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Court correctly dismissed man’s motion to correct sentence

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The Indiana Court of Appeals found the Clay Superior Court was right in dismissing a man’s pro se motion to correct his sentence stemming from drug convictions in 1994.

Robert D. Davis was convicted of three Class D felony drug counts in 1994. His sentence for dealing in marijuana and possession of marijuana were to be served concurrently, with his sentence for possession of a Schedule II drug to run consecutively, for a total of six years. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found double jeopardy issues and ordered the fourth count, the possession conviction and sentence, vacated.

Davis’ attorney appeared at the 1995 hearing at which the trial court resentenced Davis based on the COA’s instructions. Sixteen years later, Davis filed this pro se motion to correct erroneous sentence. He argued that it was erroneous because the trial court didn’t follow the instructions of the appellate court, he should have been present at the 1995 hearing, and he was entitled to be resentenced under the laws in effect at that time.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of his motion in Robert D. Davis v. State of Indiana, 11A01-1204-CR-251.The court’s order that vacated the conviction and sentence on the possession count was just as the appellate court ordered. A new sentence is not required because Davis wasn’t present at the 1995 hearing, and he failed to present a cogent argument with respect to how a 1994 amendment applied at the time the court entered its order in 1995 would have affected his sentence, the judges held.

 

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