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Court divides over injury claim under insurance policy

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The Indiana Court of Appeals split today on whether a couple’s emotional distress claim constitutes “bodily injury” under their uninsured motorist coverage.

John and Sarah Taele witnessed in the rear-view mirror of their car the car accident that killed their daughter. She was riding in the car behind them when it was hit by an uninsured motorist. A piece of debris from the accident may have hit their car but they were not injured.  

The Taeles filed a complaint against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. seeking uninsured motorist benefits for their emotional distress claims. State Farm claimed it didn’t have to pay the UM coverage because the Taeles didn’t sustain any “bodily injury” in the accident as defined by their policy and their alleged emotional distress from seeing their daughter die didn’t qualify as such an injury. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer.

In John Taele and Sarah Taele v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., No. 06A01-1004-CT-259, the judges took into account several previous cases in their decisions to affirm or reverse the trial court, including Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452 (Ind. 1991), in which the Indiana Supreme Court established the “direct impact” test in negligent infliction of emotional distress claims; and Groves v. Taylor, 749 N.E.2d 569 (Ind. 2000), which held if the direct impact test is not met, a bystander may establish direct involvement by proving he or she witnessed or came onto the scene soon after the death or severe injury of a loved one caused by the defendant’s negligent conduct.

Judges Michael Barnes and Ezra Friedlander concluded based on State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Jakupko, 881 N.E.2d 654 (Ind. 2008), Elliot v. Allstate Ins. Co., 881 N.E.2d 662 (Ind. 2008), State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. v. D.L.B., 881 N.E.2d 665 (Ind. 2008), Bush v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 905 N.E.2d 1003 (Ind. 2009), and Armstrong v. Federated Mutual Ins. Co., 785 N.E.2d 284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), that the Taeles aren’t entitled to recover UM benefits because they weren’t directly impacted or directly physically injured by the accident.

“It does seem slightly incongruous that persons having NIED claims arising in a Shuamber-type scenario may be entitled to recover UM benefits for ‘bodily injury,’ but those having equally valid NIED claims arising in a Groves-type scenario are not so entitled,” wrote Judge Barnes. “Nonetheless, we presume that if our supreme court intended Groves-type claims to be covered under the definition of ‘bodily injury’ for purposes of insurance policy and UM statutory interpretation, it would have mentioned that case at some point in Jakupko, Elliott, D.L.B., or Bush.”

Judge Terry Crone dissented from his colleagues’ view that the Taeles didn’t sustain any “direct impact” in the accident and that their NIED claim arises under the Groves rule, not the Shuamber test. He compared the instant case to Conder v. Wood, 716 N.E.2d 432 (Ind. 1999), in which the Supreme Court held that plaintiff Wood sustained the requisite direct impact necessary to maintain an NIED action when she pounded on the side of the defendant’s truck, which hit her friend, to try to get the truck to stop before it crushed her friend. A piece of debris hit the windshield of the Taeles’ car and “in my view, this is sufficient to establish a ‘direct impact’ for purposes of the modified impact rule,” he wrote.

“The critical commonality here is that both Wood and the Taeles personally witnessed the tragic accidents that killed their friend and daughter, respectively, and thus were ‘directly involved’ in the tortfeasors’ negligent conduct,” he wrote, adding he would reverse summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

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  1. Just an aside, but regardless of the outcome, I 'm proud of Judge William Hughes. He was the original magistrate on the Home place issue. He ruled for Home Place, and was primaried by Brainard for it. Their tool Poindexter failed to unseat Hughes, who won support for his honesty and courage throughout the county, and he was reelected Judge of Hamilton County's Superior Court. You can still stand for something and survive. Thanks, Judge Hughes!

  2. CCHP's real accomplishment is the 2015 law signed by Gov Pence that basically outlaws any annexation that is forced where a 65% majority of landowners in the affected area disagree. Regardless of whether HP wins or loses, the citizens of Indiana will not have another fiasco like this. The law Gov Pence signed is a direct result of this malgovernance.

  3. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  4. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  5. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

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