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Court erred in judgment, sanctions order

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The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals overturned summary judgment in favor of a company on a former employee's suit for disability discrimination, finding there is a genuine issue as to whether the company regarded the employee as disabled when it fired him.

In Frank Brunker v. Schwan's Home Service, Inc., No. 07-3183, Frank Brunker sued his former employer, Schwan's Home Service Inc., for disability discrimination and failure to accommodate in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Route manager Brunker began experiencing shaking in his hands, slurred speech, dizziness, and other impairments leading Schwan's to place him on temporary disability leave. Brunker later returned to light-duty work in which he rode along with another employee because he was restricted from driving. He also told his supervisor that he wanted to go to the Mayo Clinic for more tests because he may have multiple sclerosis.

Before he left for the clinic, Brunker was written up several times for failing to adhere to the dress code, failing to run a rescheduled route, and other issues. After he returned from the clinic - where he was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis - he was fired for unsatisfactory performance and for being unable to perform essential job duties. The termination form was backdated to the day Brunker left for the clinic.

The trial court denied Brunker's request for various information in discovery, including personnel files, financial information, and that his former supervisor - who accused Brunker of being dishonest - reveal the dishonest conduct that led to his firing. The court imposed sanctions on Brunker on his motions to compel on grounds of irrelevancy and overbreadth, ruled Brunker couldn't be considered disabled, and granted summary judgment for Schwan's.

The trial court was correct in finding Brunker wasn't disabled because he only had intermittent difficulties in major life activity. But, his evidence was enough to show Schwan's regarded him as disabled, creating a genuine issue as to whether the company treated him as disabled, wrote Judge Ilana Rovner. The Circuit Court upheld the grant of summary judgment for Schwan's on Brunker's reasonable-accommodation claim because evidence shows they did accommodate him by providing him short-term disability and having a driver help him on his routes.

Brunker wasn't entitled to the company's financial records, records of employees who requested light-duty work, or those of route managers, wrote the judge, but the trial court should have allowed his motion to compel his former supervisor to explain what dishonest conduct led to his firing. Discovery also should have been allowed on the company's anti-discrimination training, as it was relevant to the question of punitive damages, wrote Judge Rovner.

Brunker's motions to compel discovery weren't unjustified, so sanctions were inappropriate.

"In addition, Brunker's request for information about whether Schwan's disciplined other employees who failed to follow its dress code or to keep accurate route books was justified because, despite Schwan's promise that in its motion for summary judgment it would not rely on Brunker's discipline for these offenses, it did so anyway," she wrote.

Schwan's even conceded the bulk of Brunker's requests were substantially justified. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion and Circuit Rule 36 applies on remand.

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  1. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  2. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  3. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

  4. Why in the world would someone need a person to correct a transcript when a realtime court reporter could provide them with a transcript (rough draft) immediately?

  5. This article proved very enlightening. Right ahead of sitting the LSAT for the first time, I felt a sense of relief that a score of 141 was admitted to an Indiana Law School and did well under unique circumstances. While my GPA is currently 3.91 I fear standardized testing and hope that I too will get a good enough grade for acceptance here at home. Thanks so much for this informative post.

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