ILNews

Court interprets revised procedural statute

Michael W. Hoskins
January 1, 2008
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The Indiana Court of Appeals has found strong and compelling evidence to apply retroactivity to a procedural state statute lawmakers changed last year following a ruling from Indiana Supreme Court.

In Mark Hurst v. State of Indiana, No. 64A03-0710-CR-490, the appellate court affirmed a Porter Superior judge's ruling that the court properly amended charging information 15 months after the original omnibus date, that sufficient evidence of seriously bodily injury existed to support a felony battery conviction, and that Hurst was properly sentenced to nine years.

The case involves a battery on the woman that Hurst was living with off and on for about five years, who was also the mother of Hurst's child. In July 2005, the two got into an argument and Hurst came over to the woman's home, kicked in the door, and beat her to the point of unconsciousness. The state charged him with felony rape, residential entry, domestic battery, and a misdemeanor for interference with reporting a crime. Charges were later amended twice in January 2007 to ramp up the seriousness of his alleged actions.

A main issue in the case was whether modifications were allowed in charging information related to matters of substance when the substantial rights of the defendant were not prejudiced. Prior to last year, caselaw allowed that. But the Indiana Supreme Court ruled Jan. 16, 2007, in Fajardo v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1201 (Ind. 2007), to interpret Indiana Code 35-34-1-5(b), holding that when a person is charged with a felony, any amendments are only allowed if it's more than 30 days before the omnibus date, regardless of whether the defendant's rights are prejudiced.

Lawmakers revised that statute allowing the state to amend charges before a trial starts as long as the amendment doesn't prejudice the defendant's substantial rights. It took effect May 8, 2007.

In Hurst, parties disagree which statute applied - the former version as interpreted by Fajardo or the current version enacted during Hurst's trial. Hurst doesn't want the new statute to apply because it allowed the change in charging information.

"This prompt return to pre-Fajardo law indicates urgency in the legislature's desire to negate the effects of Fajardo," the court wrote today. "Though the legislature did not expressively provide for retroactive application of the amended statute, we are confident that this was the clear intent of such legislation. Therefore, the current statute applies."

The appellate court found no error because Hurst had reasonable time to prepare for and defend against the amended charges.
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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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