ILNews

Court: Man may be classified as sexually violent predator

Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

The Indiana Supreme Court ruled 4-1 that classifying a man as a sexually violent predator due to an amendment to the Sex Offender Registration Act doesn’t violate Indiana’s prohibition of ex post facto laws or the doctrine of separation of powers.

Michael Harris challenged being classified as a sexually violent predator and the requirement that he must register for life instead of 10 years. When he pleaded guilty to Class B felony child molesting in April 1999, “sexually violent predator” status did not exist. He was required to register for 10 years on the sex offender registry after his release from prison. He was released in December 2008.

Based on a 2007 amendment to the Indiana Sex Offender Registration Act, the Department of Correction notified Harris that he was required to register as a sexually violent predator and register for life. The 2007 amendment says “a person is an SVP ‘by operation of law if an offense committed by the person [is a qualifying offense] and the person was released from incarceration, secure detention, or probation for the offense after June 30, 1994.’”

He filed suit while still incarcerated. The trial court ruled in favor of Harris, granting a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, thereby removing his SVP status. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed.

In Bruce Lemmon, et al. v. Michael L. Harris, No. 52S02-1011-CV-642, the justices ruled on June 28 that based on the plain language of the statute, the amendment applies to Harris. Using the seven factors outlined in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963), the majority found the first three factors – whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; whether it has historically been regarded as punishment; and whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter – lean in favor of treating the act as punitive. But the last four factors – whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment; whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned – lean in favor of treating the act as nonpunitive when applied to Harris, wrote Justice Frank Sullivan.

Justice Brent Dickson dissented on this issue, citing former Justice Theodore Boehm’s dissent in Jensen v. State, 905 N.E.2d 384, 396-98 (Ind. 2009). Justice Dickson believed the reclassification and resulting enhanced requirements under the 2007 amendment constitute additional punishments when applied to Harris.

The high court also addressed an issue recently raised in Ohio but not yet discussed here: whether the act violates the constitutional principle of separation of powers. The Ohio State Supreme Court ruled on a similar issue, finding certain provisions unconstitutional in that state’s Adam Walsh Act that required the attorney general to reclassify sex offenders who had already been classified by court order under a former law.

But Indiana’s “by operation of law” clause doesn’t work to reopen a final judgment. Harris’ case isn’t one where the sentencing court considered expert testimony and expressly refused to classify him as an SVP. The clause did not change a judicial determination that Harris was not an SVP to him being one. Nor does the clause remove the judiciary’s discretionary function in sentencing and place it with the DOC, wrote Justice Sullivan.

“The statute does not grant the DOC any authority to classify or reclassify. SVP status under Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.5(b) is determined by the statute itself,” he wrote, pointing out that offenders may petition the court to remove his or her designation or to make the registration requirement less restrictive by filing a petition in court.

ADVERTISEMENT

Post a comment to this story

COMMENTS POLICY
We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
 
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
 
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
 
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
 
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.
 

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. CCHP's real accomplishment is the 2015 law signed by Gov Pence that basically outlaws any annexation that is forced where a 65% majority of landowners in the affected area disagree. Regardless of whether HP wins or loses, the citizens of Indiana will not have another fiasco like this. The law Gov Pence signed is a direct result of this malgovernance.

  2. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  3. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  4. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

  5. Here's an idea...how about we MORE heavily regulate the law schools to reduce the surplus of graduates, driving starting salaries up for those new grads, so that we can all pay our insane amount of student loans off in a reasonable amount of time and then be able to afford to do pro bono & low-fee work? I've got friends in other industries, radiology for example, and their schools accept a very limited number of students so there will never be a glut of new grads and everyone's pay stays high. For example, my radiologist friend's school accepted just six new students per year.

ADVERTISEMENT