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Court: Man properly executed will, not under undue influence

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The Indiana Court of Appeals today affirmed a jury’s decision that upheld a will after the decedent’s children questioned whether the will was executed properly and whether the trial court erred in rejecting a jury instruction regarding undue influence.

In James D. Callaway, Jason M. Callaway, and Greg R. Callaway v. Hannah Callaway, Truman Callaway, and Debra J. Mathew, No. 28A04-0908-CV-467, James Callaway, Jason Callaway, and Greg Callaway alleged that Debra Mathew had exerted undue influence on their father. The brothers had appealed whether the will was published in accordance with Indiana Code Section 29-1-5-3, whether it was executed and witnessed in accordance with that section, and whether the trial court abused its discretion when it rejected the sons’ proposed jury instruction.

John Callaway, who lived on a 40-acre farm in Greene County from 1995 to 2008, met Mathew in 1999. Though they spent much of their time together, they did maintain their separate residences.

On Sept. 27, 2007, John drove 100 miles to Noblesville to visit Patricia Ogborn, a notary public he’d known for a long time, about creating a last will and testament. Ogborn’s daughter, Christeen, and grandson, Jeremy, came to the house and were asked to sign the document as witnesses. Because Christeen and Jeremy knew Ogborn sometimes helped people with their wills, both had asked John prior to signing as witnesses if the signature on the document was John’s; he affirmed it was his signature.

John, who had a history of heavy drinking, was diagnosed with alcoholic liver disease in April 2008. While he was inpatient, his sons petitioned for guardianship. When he returned home, Debra coordinated his hospice and home therapy visits, and either stayed with him or arranged for someone to be with him around the clock. He died June 9, 2008.

John’s attorney, who was faxed a copy of the will, contacted the funeral home director and informed him that John had a will. The funeral home director in turn told the sons that John had a will.

Despite that, the sons filed a petition June 11, 2008, seeking Jim’s appointment as the personal representative of John’s estate, alleging that he’d died intestate. They didn’t notify Debra, who filed a petition that same day for probate, appointment of personal representative, and unsupervised administration of John’s estate. John’s attorney learned of the sons’ petition and the next day filed a verified petition for order ex parte, advising the court that John had died testate and that the funeral home director had informed the sons of that fact before they had filed their petition. As a result, the court vacated the order appointing Jim as administrator of the estate and revoked the letters of administration.

Litigation commenced regarding various issues.

Following the close of evidence at the jury trial, the court refused to give the sons’ proposed final jury instruction regarding the presumption of undue influence. The jury decided in Mathew’s favor, and the trial court denied the sons’ motion for judgment on the evidence under Trial Rule 50.4, which led to this appeal.

The appellate court wrote the sons’ evidence that the will was not proper was insufficient: the attestation in the will and Christeen and Jeremy’s Proofs of Will were sufficient evidence that John properly published the will.

While the instruction did correctly state the law on the presumption of undue influence in cases where a confidential relationship exists as a matter of law, the court found a relationship of trust and confidence as a matter of law does not apply in this situation. However, wrote Judge Edward W. Najam Jr., a question remained about whether John and Mathew’s relationship was one of trust and confidence on the case’s facts.

In refusing to give the instruction, the trial court had noted, “‘the nature of the relationship between Ms. Mathew and [John] was so akin to a spouse-like relationship[,] that that analogy is obvious[,] and based upon that I think that rule of law applies in this particular case.’ Transcript at 1019. … Although we agree with the trial court that the relationship between Debra and John was more analogous to a spousal relationship than to a fiduciary relationship, we agree with the Sons that there is no authority in Indiana for ‘extending’ the rule of law applied in Womack v. Womack, 622 N.E.2d 481, 483 (Ind. 1993), and Hamilton v. Hamilton, 858 N.E.2d 1032, 1037 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied, to unmarried couples.”

In those cases, the Court of Appeals held the presumption of undue influence did not apply to transactions between spouses. Womack, 622 N.E.2d at 483, Hamilton, 858 N.E.2d at 1037. But the appellate court noted the trial court’s statements could be interpreted to mean the rule of Womack and Hamilton applies in this case, so the trial court did err.

Regarding the sons’ argument that Mathew and John “were in a relationship of trust and confidence on the facts of this case, the proposed jury instruction should have defined the term. As such, the instruction was incomplete and potentially confusing for the jury,” Judge Najam wrote.

He further noted that “a proper instruction would not have included a presumption of undue influence. See [Carlson v. Warren, 878 N.E.2d 844 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)], 878 N.E.2d at 852 (holding that, instead of a presumption of undue influence, a party must prove both a confidential relationship on the facts and that the parties did not deal on equal terms). Thus, again, the trial court did not err when it refused to give the instruction.”

The panel also noted it does not condone the “casual manner in which the will was executed and witnessed in this case.” It went on to say the evidence supports that John’s conduct was deliberate, that it was his intent to make a will, and that everyone present knew his purpose for being there.
 

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  1. Falk said “At this point, at this minute, we’ll savor this particular victory.” “It certainly is a historic week on this front,” Cockrum said. “What a delight ... “Happy Independence Day to the women of the state of Indiana,” WOW. So we broke with England for the right to "off" our preborn progeny at will, and allow the processing plant doing the dirty deeds (dirt cheap) to profit on the marketing of those "products of conception." I was completely maleducated on our nation's founding, it would seem. (But I know the ACLU is hard at work to remedy that, too.)

  2. congratulations on such balanced journalism; I also love how fetus disposal affects women's health protection, as covered by Roe...

  3. It truly sickens me every time a case is compared to mine. The Indiana Supreme Court upheld my convictions based on a finding of “hidden threats.” The term “hidden threat” never appeared until the opinion in Brewington so I had no way of knowing I was on trial for making hidden threats because Dearborn County Prosecutor F Aaron Negangard argued the First Amendment didn't protect lies. Negangard convened a grand jury to investigate me for making “over the top” and “unsubstantiated” statements about court officials, not hidden threats of violence. My indictments and convictions were so vague, the Indiana Court of Appeals made no mention of hidden threats when they upheld my convictions. Despite my public defender’s closing arguments stating he was unsure of exactly what conduct the prosecution deemed to be unlawful, Rush found that my lawyer’s trial strategy waived my right to the fundamental error of being tried for criminal defamation because my lawyer employed a strategy that attempted to take advantage of Negangard's unconstitutional criminal defamation prosecution against me. Rush’s opinion stated the prosecution argued two grounds for conviction one constitutional and one not, however the constitutional true threat “argument” consistently of only a blanket reading of subsection 1 of the intimidation statute during closing arguments, making it impossible to build any kind of defense. Of course intent was impossible for my attorney to argue because my attorney, Rush County Chief Public Defender Bryan Barrett refused to meet with me prior to trial. The record is littered with examples of where I made my concerns known to the trial judge that I didn’t know the charges against me, I did not have access to evidence, all while my public defender refused to meet with me. Special Judge Brian Hill, from Rush Superior Court, refused to address the issue with my public defender and marched me to trial without access to evidence or an understanding of the indictments against me. Just recently the Indiana Public Access Counselor found that four over four years Judge Hill has erroneously denied access to the grand jury audio from my case, the most likely reason being the transcription of the grand jury proceedings omitted portions of the official audio record. The bottom line is any intimidation case involves an action or statement that is debatably a threat of physical violence. There were no such statements in my case. The Indiana Supreme Court took partial statements I made over a period of 41 months and literally connected them with dots… to give the appearance that the statements were made within the same timeframe and then claimed a person similarly situated would find the statements intimidating while intentionally leaving out surrounding contextual factors. Even holding the similarly situated test was to be used in my case, the prosecution argued that the only intent of my public writings was to subject the “victims” to ridicule and hatred so a similarly situated jury instruction wouldn't even have applied in my case. Chief Justice Rush wrote the opinion while Rush continued to sit on a committee with one of the alleged victims in my trial and one of the judges in my divorce, just as she'd done for the previous 7+ years. All of this information, including the recent PAC opinion against the Dearborn Superior Court II can be found on my blog www.danbrewington.blogspot.com.

  4. On a related note, I offered the ICLU my cases against the BLE repeatedly, and sought their amici aid repeatedly as well. Crickets. Usually not even a response. I am guessing they do not do allegations of anti-Christian bias? No matter how glaring? I have posted on other links the amicus brief that did get filed (search this ezine, e.g., Kansas attorney), read the Thomas More Society brief to note what the ACLU ran from like vampires from garlic. An Examiner pledged to advance diversity and inclusion came right out on the record and demanded that I choose Man's law or God's law. I wonder, had I been asked to swear off Allah ... what result then, ICLU? Had I been found of bad character and fitness for advocating sexual deviance, what result then ICLU? Had I been lifetime banned for posting left of center statements denigrating the US Constitution, what result ICLU? Hey, we all know don't we? Rather Biased.

  5. It was mentioned in the article that there have been numerous CLE events to train attorneys on e-filing. I would like someone to provide a list of those events, because I have not seen any such events in east central Indiana, and since Hamilton County is one of the counties where e-filing is mandatory, one would expect some instruction in this area. Come on, people, give some instruction, not just applause!

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