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Court: Murderer not eligible for parole

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The Indiana Supreme Court ruled that a man serving two life sentences for his 1975 murder convictions isn't eligible to seek parole under the laws in effect at the time the murders took place, but could seek clemency though the Indiana Parole Board.

In State of Indiana v. Steve Hernandez, No. 45S00-0806-CR-377, both the state and Steve Hernandez appealed rulings made by the court concerning Hernandez's petition for post-conviction relief. He was convicted of two counts of murder in 1975 and sentenced to two terms of life in prison.

Hernandez filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming the trial court had only sentenced him to one life sentence because according to the record, it appeared the trial court recited the murder and robbery counts in the wrong order in one cause such that a withheld sentence applied to one of the murder counts. He also argued the parole board, by applying 1979 statute Indiana Code Section 11-13-3-2(b)(3) to his convictions, had denied him consideration for parole in violation of ex post facto clauses in the U.S. and state constitutions. The post-conviction court held the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him, but denied his petition regarding his sentencing.

The Supreme Court affirmed the post-conviction court's denial of relief based on the alleged sentencing error. Hernandez never raised on direct appeal that his sentence was improper, so he is foreclosed from raising the claim in post-conviction court, wrote Justice Frank Sullivan. Hernandez's argument of the sentencing being a fundamental error also fails because there's no basis for it to apply in this case.

Next, the high court had to determine whether Hernandez would be eligible for parole based on law at the time he was convicted. The justices reversed the post-conviction court's finding that I.C. Section 11-13-3-2(b)(3) was unconstitutional as applied to Hernandez. The constitutional provisions are only implicated if he was otherwise eligible to be considered for parole except for the enactment of the statute; however, because he wasn't, there is no ex post facto clause violation.

The justices adopted the majority opinion in White v. Indiana Parole Board, 713 N.E.2d 327 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), which held people serving life sentences weren't eligible to be considered for parole. The Supreme Court has held people serving life sentences aren't eligible for good time credit because a life sentence is neither determinate nor indeterminate, which should apply to the eligibility to be considered for parole, wrote Justice Sullivan. A statute enacted in 1974 set parole eligibility only for people serving indeterminate or determinate terms of imprisonment.

The Supreme Court also revisited its ruling in Johnston v. Dobeski, 739 N.E.2d 121 (Ind. 2000), which the post-conviction court relied on to find that a person under a life sentence in 1975 had been eligible for parole until the enactment of I.C. Section 11-13-2-2(b)(3). But given the ruling in White and its analysis in the instant case, the high court overruled its portion of Johnston that held life sentences were indeterminate and that a person serving a life sentence was eligible for consideration of parole.

The Supreme Court determined Hernandez is eligible to seek clemency in the same manner that other prisoners sentenced to life did during 1962-1973: He can ask for clemency from the Indiana Parole Board, who can then forward it on to the governor if they consider his petition to be meritorious, wrote Justice Sullivan. Prisoners used to be able to petition the Indiana Clemency Commission; in 1979, the commission was abolished and the Parole Board formally assumed those duties.

Hernandez should warrant consideration of clemency based on his taking responsibility for his crimes and working hard to improve himself while incarcerated. Should he be successful in having his sentences commuted to a term of years, then he would be eligible to seek parole, wrote Justice Sullivan.

The case is remanded to the post-conviction court to enter judgment in favor of the state.

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  1. Indianapolis employers harassment among minorities AFRICAN Americans needs to be discussed the metro Indianapolis area is horrible when it comes to harassing African American employees especially in the local healthcare facilities. Racially profiling in the workplace is an major issue. Please make it better because I'm many civil rights leaders would come here and justify that Indiana is a state the WORKS only applies to Caucasian Americans especially in Hamilton county. Indiana targets African Americans in the workplace so when governor pence is trying to convince people to vote for him this would be awesome publicity for the Presidency Elections.

  2. Wishing Mary Willis only God's best, and superhuman strength, as she attempts to right a ship that too often strays far off course. May she never suffer this personal affect, as some do who attempt to change a broken system: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QojajMsd2nE

  3. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  4. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  5. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

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