ILNews

Court reverses indeterminate commitment of juvenile

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The Indiana Court of Appeals addressed the interplay between sections 6 and 10 of Indiana Code 31-37-19 governing juvenile commitment for the first time today. The judges noted when they are applied separately the sections produce opposite results regarding the purpose of the statutes.   

D.C. pleaded guilty to what would have been Class A felony burglary if committed by an adult and was committed to the Department of Correction for 24 months and also was ordered to an indeterminate commitment to the DOC until he turned 21. He was 14 years old when he committed the crime. He argued that the court erred by imposing both a determinate and indeterminate commitment, and that he should have been placed in a less restrictive facility because one was available.

The judges didn’t find the trial court erred in ordering D.C. committed to the DOC even though he had been accepted into another facility because he had a history of adjudications, and stayed at residential facilities in the past. He always re-offended once being released.

“Given the serious nature of D.C.’s offense and the likelihood that he will reoffend, this is clearly a situation in which commitment to a less restrictive environment than DOC is not in the best interest of D.C. or of the community,” wrote Judge Margret Robb.

In D.C. v. State of Indiana, No. 49A02-1002-JV-100, the judges then examined the statutes at question here – I.C. 31-37-19-6 and -10 that deal with dispositional decrees for children found to be delinquent for committing an act that would be an offense if committed by an adult.

Section 6 says except as provided in Section 10, the court awards wardship of a juvenile to the DOC and the DOC determines the placement and duration of placement. Section 10 applies to D.C. because he was at least 14 when he committed the Class A felony burglary and has prior unrelated adjudications. Section 10 says the court can’t place a child in a facility for more than 2 years.

The judges agreed with D.C. that Section 6 precludes a juvenile court from entering a dispositional order with both an indeterminate commitment under Section 6 and a determinant commitment under Section 10.

Judge Robb noted that Section 10 is clearly aimed at the most serious juvenile offenders, yet it’s possible that someone who offends under Section 6 may be placed in a facility for a time longer than the 2 years ordered under Section 10.  

“We acknowledge a juvenile committed under Section 6 could also be released in less than two years and therefore ultimately receive a lesser penalty than a juvenile sentenced under Section 10. However, at their extremes, sections 6 and 10 when applied separately produce results antithetical to the purpose of the statutes,” she wrote.

The Court of Appeals reversed the part of the dispositional order imposing commitments under both sections and remanded for a new order imposing only a determinate commitment under Section 10.
 

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  1. Just an aside, but regardless of the outcome, I 'm proud of Judge William Hughes. He was the original magistrate on the Home place issue. He ruled for Home Place, and was primaried by Brainard for it. Their tool Poindexter failed to unseat Hughes, who won support for his honesty and courage throughout the county, and he was reelected Judge of Hamilton County's Superior Court. You can still stand for something and survive. Thanks, Judge Hughes!

  2. CCHP's real accomplishment is the 2015 law signed by Gov Pence that basically outlaws any annexation that is forced where a 65% majority of landowners in the affected area disagree. Regardless of whether HP wins or loses, the citizens of Indiana will not have another fiasco like this. The law Gov Pence signed is a direct result of this malgovernance.

  3. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  4. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  5. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

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