ILNews

Court reverses Pelley convictions

Michael W. Hoskins
January 1, 2008
Keywords
Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share
The Indiana Court of Appeals has reversed the murder convictions of a Lakeville man accused of murdering his family almost 20 years ago as a teenager.

But in doing so, the three-judge panel all but directly asked the Indiana Supreme Court to take on this issue of first impression and clarify an earlier ruling justices made. That ruling specifically refused to dismiss the case on Robert Pelley's argument that a delay between charging and trial dates conflicted with his due process of getting a speedy trial.

Now, the Indiana Supreme Court will likely be offered a chance to consider the question: "For purposes of Criminal Rule 4(C), against whom should the delay occasioned by legal maneuvers of a third party be charged - the defendant or the state?"

The ruling came Tuesday in Robert Jeffrey Pelley v. State of Indiana, No. 71A05-0612-CR-726. The ruling was originally marked as a not for publication memorandum, but was later revised as a for publication opinion.

Pelley's quadruple murder trial took place in St. Joseph County in July 2006, about four years after Pelley was first charged with the shotgun deaths of his father, stepmother, and two stepsisters in their Lakeville home in 1989. Prosecutors alleged that Pelley, 17 at the time, was angry that his father had told him he couldn't attend after-prom activities and killed the family so he could attend. The trial didn't start immediately after the 2002 charges because of legal wrangling involving the release of family counseling records, which the Indiana Supreme Court ruled in June 2005 were not protected by the state's counselor-client privilege. Pelley's defense team asked justices in mid-2006 before trial to dismiss the case because the delays had violated his due process, but the court denied that petition and the case went to trial.

A jury found him guilty, and Pelley received a 160-year sentence.

But the Indiana Court of Appeals voted 2-1 to reverse the convictions on grounds that Pelley's motion to dismiss the case before it ever went to trial should have been granted. At issue was whether Criminal Rule 4(C) applied in this case to ensure a speedy trial within one year, if that delay wasn't caused by the defendant, a congested court calendar, or an emergency situation.

Here, the state had issued a subpoena for Pelley's family counseling records but the agency had denied the request, and that resulted in a three-year delay as the case weaved its way to the Indiana Supreme Court.

"This case confronts this Court with an extremely unpleasant but compelling responsibility," Judge John T. Sharpnack wrote, citing a past case and pointing out the unusual circumstances of this appeal. "We realize that the defendant was ultimately convicted following an arduous jury trial. Such cases extract an enormous personal toll from the witnesses, jurors, and others participating. Resulting costs are significant and burden our taxpayers, and the time devoted to such trials and subsequent proceedings operate to delay the resolution of other pending controversies. It is with extreme reluctance that we must consider setting aside the defendant's conviction, thus rendering futile the results of the jury trial which found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."

The court's majority determined that res judicata didn't bar its consideration of Pelley's argument because the previous writ of mandamus decision from the Indiana Supreme Court didn't clearly result in a final judgment on the merits.

Judge Sharpnack wrote that the justices didn't explain the basis for denying Pelley's petition, and the panel couldn't conclude that his claims were barred without having to guess what the justices were thinking. The authoring judge delved into possibilities of the high court's decision, but in the end noted that, "On this record, we cannot conclude that the Indiana Supreme Court rendered a judgment on the merits or that Pelley's claim is barred by res judicata."

For that reason, the court analyzed the issue and determined the delay could be attributed to the state, not Pelley, and the petition to dismiss would have been timely and should have been granted.

The state argued that it couldn't control the length of the appellate process and that it shouldn't be held responsible for the delays, as that would hinder its ability to file future interlocutory appeals. But the court determined the state's interpretation of caselaw would create a blanket exemption under Criminal Rule 4(C) for delays caused by interlocutory appeals.

"Although some states have blanket exceptions, Indiana does not," Judge Sharpnack wrote. "In order to accept the State's argument, we would have to rewrite Rule 4(C) to include a blanket exception for interlocutory appeals ... We are constrained to interpret and apply the rule as written. Consequently, we cannot write in a blanket exception."

Judge Ezra Friedlander dissented in his own five-page opinion, writing that the court wasn't barred from considering the issue but that he thought neither Pelley nor the state is at fault for the delay. He determined the facts in this case could be classified as an "emergency" or court "congestion" to justify a continuance for the trial date past the one-year limit.

"In view of the time it takes an appeal to wend its way through the appellate process, to hold otherwise could and in many cases would effectively deny the State the option of pursuing an interlocutory appeal of an unfavorable evidentiary ruling," he wrote, noting that he'd affirm the trial court's ruling on the motion.

The Attorney General's Office plans to ask the state's highest court to consider the case by a May 8 deadline, spokeswoman Staci Schneider said.
ADVERTISEMENT

Post a comment to this story

COMMENTS POLICY
We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
 
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
 
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
 
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
 
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.
 

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. Mr. Levin says that the BMV engaged in misconduct--that the BMV (or, rather, someone in the BMV) knew Indiana motorists were being overcharged fees but did nothing to correct the situation. Such misconduct, whether engaged in by one individual or by a group, is called theft (defined as knowingly or intentionally exerting unauthorized control over the property of another person with the intent to deprive the other person of the property's value or use). Theft is a crime in Indiana (as it still is in most of the civilized world). One wonders, then, why there have been no criminal prosecutions of BMV officials for this theft? Government misconduct doesn't occur in a vacuum. An individual who works for or oversees a government agency is responsible for the misconduct. In this instance, somebody (or somebodies) with the BMV, at some time, knew Indiana motorists were being overcharged. What's more, this person (or these people), even after having the error of their ways pointed out to them, did nothing to fix the problem. Instead, the overcharges continued. Thus, the taxpayers of Indiana are also on the hook for the millions of dollars in attorneys fees (for both sides; the BMV didn't see fit to avail itself of the services of a lawyer employed by the state government) that had to be spent in order to finally convince the BMV that stealing money from Indiana motorists was a bad thing. Given that the BMV official(s) responsible for this crime continued their misconduct, covered it up, and never did anything until the agency reached an agreeable settlement, it seems the statute of limitations for prosecuting these folks has not yet run. I hope our Attorney General is paying attention to this fiasco and is seriously considering prosecution. Indiana, the state that works . . . for thieves.

  2. I'm glad that attorney Carl Hayes, who represented the BMV in this case, is able to say that his client "is pleased to have resolved the issue". Everyone makes mistakes, even bureaucratic behemoths like Indiana's BMV. So to some extent we need to be forgiving of such mistakes. But when those mistakes are going to cost Indiana taxpayers millions of dollars to rectify (because neither plaintiff's counsel nor Mr. Hayes gave freely of their services, and the BMV, being a state-funded agency, relies on taxpayer dollars to pay these attorneys their fees), the agency doesn't have a right to feel "pleased to have resolved the issue". One is left wondering why the BMV feels so pleased with this resolution? The magnitude of the agency's overcharges might suggest to some that, perhaps, these errors were more than mere oversight. Could this be why the agency is so "pleased" with this resolution? Will Indiana motorists ever be assured that the culture of incompetence (if not worse) that the BMV seems to have fostered is no longer the status quo? Or will even more "overcharges" and lawsuits result? It's fairly obvious who is really "pleased to have resolved the issue", and it's not Indiana's taxpayers who are on the hook for the legal fees generated in these cases.

  3. From the article's fourth paragraph: "Her work underscores the blurry lines in Russia between the government and businesses . . ." Obviously, the author of this piece doesn't pay much attention to the "blurry lines" between government and businesses that exist in the United States. And I'm not talking only about Trump's alleged conflicts of interest. When lobbyists for major industries (pharmaceutical, petroleum, insurance, etc) have greater access to this country's elected representatives than do everyday individuals (i.e., voters), then I would say that the lines between government and business in the United States are just as blurry, if not more so, than in Russia.

  4. For some strange reason this story, like many on this ezine that question the powerful, seems to have been released in two formats. Prior format here: http://www.theindianalawyer.com/nominees-selected-for-us-attorney-in-indiana/PARAMS/article/44263 That observed, I must note that it is quite refreshing that denizens of the great unwashed (like me) can be allowed to openly question powerful elitists at ICE MILLER who are on the public dole like Selby. Kudos to those at this ezine who understand that they cannot be mere lapdogs to the powerful and corrupt, lest freedom bleed out. If you wonder why the Senator resisted Selby, consider reading the comments here for a theory: http://www.theindianalawyer.com/nominees-selected-for-us-attorney-in-indiana/PARAMS/article/44263

  5. Why is it a crisis that people want to protect their rights themselves? The courts have a huge bias against people appearing on their own behalf and these judges and lawyers will face their maker one day and answer for their actions.

ADVERTISEMENT