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Court rules in favor of insurer in environmental cleanup dispute

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A release executed between a chemical manufacturing business and its insurer that relieved the insurer from claims or demands related to remediation was unambiguous and covered all policies held by the company, not just the primary liability ones, the Indiana Court of Appeals ruled.

United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. was the general liability insurer of Warsaw Chemical Company when Warsaw learned of environmental contamination. Warsaw sought reimbursement for the remediation pursuant to its primary and excess policies. The insurer denied coverage under primary and excess liability policies. In 1992, the two entered into the release in exchange for $25,000.

Fifteen years later, Warsaw sued, arguing that the release only covered primary liability polices and there should be coverage under the excess policies. The trial court ultimately entered judgment in favor of Warsaw for $417,953.

At issue in United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company v. Warsaw Chemical Company, Inc., 49A04-1203-CT-97, is the language in the 1992 release and the distinction between recitals – or “whereas” clauses – and operative language in contracts. The release stated that USF&G would be forever discharged “from any further claims … .” The Court of Appeals held under the binding precedent of Irwin’s Bank v. Fletcher, etc. Trust Co. Rec (1924) 195 Ind. 699, 145 N.E. 869, 146 N.E. 869, and Kerfoot v. Kessener (1949) 227 Ind. 58, 84 N.E.2d 190, the recitals referencing only the primary policies may not be used to interpret the unambiguous operative language releasing the insurer from any further claims.

The judges rejected Warsaw’s claim that those cases are no longer good law based on OEC-Diasonics Inc. v. Major, 674 N.E.2d 1312 (Ind. 1996).

“Recital language that arguably suggests that the release applied to only some of the insurance policies Warsaw had with USF&G does not trump this clear language. Because the Release covered the excess policies, the trial court erred in denying USF&G’s summary judgment motion on this point. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of summary judgment in favor of USF&G,” Judge Cale Bradford wrote.

 

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  1. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  2. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  3. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

  4. Here's an idea...how about we MORE heavily regulate the law schools to reduce the surplus of graduates, driving starting salaries up for those new grads, so that we can all pay our insane amount of student loans off in a reasonable amount of time and then be able to afford to do pro bono & low-fee work? I've got friends in other industries, radiology for example, and their schools accept a very limited number of students so there will never be a glut of new grads and everyone's pay stays high. For example, my radiologist friend's school accepted just six new students per year.

  5. I totally agree with John Smith.

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