ILNews

Court rules on 3 emotional distress cases

Michael W. Hoskins
January 1, 2008
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The Indiana Supreme Court says that insurance policy language "bodily injury" includes emotional distress subject to its own damage limits, but only if those making the claim are directly involved in the underlying accident or incident.

A trio of anticipated rulings came late afternoon on Feb. 28 from the state's highest court, with Justice Frank Sullivan authoring all three as they involve similar cases regarding insurance policy coverage of emotional distress. The cases are: State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Patricia Jakupko, et al., No. 29S02-0704-CV-140, Austin J. Elliott, b/n/f William K. Elliott, et al. v. Allstate Insurance Co., No. 49S02-0704-CV-143, and State Farm Insurance Co. v. D.L.B., No. 89S05-0802-CV-102.

The 13-page unanimous ruling in Jakupko is the meat of the bunch, but the five-page D.L.B. decision clinches the decisions involving this complex area of insurance law.

Attorneys on both sides of the aisle in these cases credit the court for taking a considerate and reasonable approach.

"They are being sensitive to emotional distress claims getting out of hand," said Indianapolis attorney Scott Montross, who represented the Jakupko family. "They want to make it clear that there has to be a strong connection with the incident. That makes sure we don't lower the bar and let this get abused."

On the insurance industry's side, Bose McKinney & Evans attorney Brian Babb, who represented national and state trade groups as amicus parties, had a similar take.

"This is really a masterful stroke, what they did here," he said. "They've struck a reasonable compromise and swept away all the language that had broadened common law claims of emotional distress without any limitation."

To be clear: Babb lost.

"Although we're disappointed, these three decisions taken together represent a reasonable compromise," he said. "This is going to have an impact on the insurance industry, but it's reasonable and manageable."

Last May, the court heard consolidated arguments in Jakupko and Elliott, and recently agreed to accept D.L.B. as it involves an identical issue, with a twist.

Both in Jakupko and Elliott involve passengers in auto accidents who claimed they suffered negligent infliction of emotional distress, with and without physical manifestations, after being injured themselves and witnessing severe injury to a family member. The family-member passengers of the insurance policyholders sought coverage under uninsured and underinsured provisions of their contracts, arguing that each should be able to recover on their own claims subject to their own liability caps - $100,000 in Jakupko and $25,000 in Elliott, rather than having each person lumped into one policyholder's claim. Each would still be subject to a total accident cap in each case.

Circumstances are slightly different in D.L.B., though, as the case involves a bike-riding 6-year-old boy who witnessed his cousin get struck and killed by a car in July 2000 and suffered post-traumatic stress disorder as a result.

Following the Court of Appeals decisions on these cases, the insurance industry had concerns that the common law had been expanded to the point where there was no limitation, Babb said. Those concerns are gone now.

In the Supreme Court decisions, justices agreed with their appellate colleagues in that the term "bodily injury" covers emotional distress and is subject to its own "per person limit" as long as the claim arises from "bodily touching" - meaning that the person claiming emotional distress had to have been directly involved, not a third-party.

The Jakupko and Elliott decisions reach the same conclusion, though one trial court was affirmed and the other reversed based on those initial judgments.

Justices relied on multiple cases from across the country, but most specifically on Wayne Township Board of School Commissioners v. Indiana Insurance Co., 650 N.E.2d 1205 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) that held "sickness" included emotional distress when there was physical injury and each claim is a distinct "bodily injury." Part of that ruling also determined that emotional-distress damage wasn't included unless it arose from "bodily touching," or physical contact of someone directly involved.

The court also relied on that 1995 ruling in D.L.B., using the "bodily touching" definition to determine that the cousin couldn't recover for emotional distress because the car that struck and killed his cousin didn't directly injure him.

Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard wrote a separate, concurring opinion that steps back to offer a point of clarity to the court's decision in Jakupko.

"I do not read my colleagues' embrace of (caselaw) to suggest that a person who walks away from an accident without any damage to life or limb, not so much as a bruise, has suffered 'bodily injury' because he or she is 'distressed,'" he wrote, tying that decision to the others.

He also wrote that Richard Jakupko and his family should be covered for pain and suffering customary to tort damages.

Justices Brent E. Dickson and Robert D. Rucker dissented in the third decision, opining that whether a separate physical impact occurred was irrelevant to the court's construction of insurance policy language saying "bodily injury to a person and sickness, disease or death which results from it."

Karl Mulvaney, who represented State Farm in the Jakupko case, said he was disappointed in the ruling but that he understands why the court decided the way it did. He said it's too early to tell if a rehearing will be requested.

Indianapolis attorney John Townsend III, who also represented the Jakupkos along with Montross, praised the court's decisions.

"This protects the traveling public from attempts by the insurance industry to whittle away at coverage beyond what the legislature requires and consumers have a right to expect," he said.
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  1. Call it unauthorized law if you must, a regulatory wrong, but it was fraud and theft well beyond that, a seeming crime! "In three specific cases, the hearing officer found that Westerfield did little to no work for her clients but only issued a partial refund or no refund at all." That is theft by deception, folks. "In its decision to suspend Westerfield, the Supreme Court noted that she already had a long disciplinary history dating back to 1996 and had previously been suspended in 2004 and indefinitely suspended in 2005. She was reinstated in 2009 after finally giving the commission a response to the grievance for which she was suspended in 2004." WOW -- was the Indiana Supreme Court complicit in her fraud? Talk about being on notice of a real bad actor .... "Further, the justices noted that during her testimony, Westerfield was “disingenuous and evasive” about her relationship with Tope and attempted to distance herself from him. They also wrote that other aggravating factors existed in Westerfield’s case, such as her lack of remorse." WOW, and yet she only got 18 months on the bench, and if she shows up and cries for them in a year and a half, and pays money to JLAP for group therapy ... back in to ride roughshod over hapless clients (or are they "marks") once again! Aint Hoosier lawyering a great money making adventure!!! Just live for the bucks, even if filthy lucre, and come out a-ok. ME on the other hand??? Lifetime banishment for blowing the whistle on unconstitutional governance. Yes, had I ripped off clients or had ANY disciplinary history for doing that I would have fared better, most likely, as that it would have revealed me motivated by Mammon and not Faith. Check it out if you doubt my reading of this, compare and contrast the above 18 months with my lifetime banishment from court, see appendix for Bar Examiners report which the ISC adopted without substantive review: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS

  2. Wow, over a quarter million dollars? That is a a lot of commissary money! Over what time frame? Years I would guess. Anyone ever try to blow the whistle? Probably not, since most Hoosiers who take notice of such things realize that Hoosier whistleblowers are almost always pilloried. If someone did blow the whistle, they were likely fired. The persecution of whistleblowers is a sure sign of far too much government corruption. Details of my own personal experience at the top of Hoosier governance available upon request ... maybe a "fake news" media outlet will have the courage to tell the stories of Hoosier whistleblowers that the "real" Hoosier media (cough) will not deign to touch. (They are part of the problem.)

  3. So if I am reading it right, only if and when African American college students agree to receive checks labeling them as "Negroes" do they receive aid from the UNCF or the Quaker's Educational Fund? In other words, to borrow from the Indiana Appellate Court, "the [nonprofit] supposed to be [their] advocate, refers to [students] in a racially offensive manner. While there is no evidence that [the nonprofits] intended harm to [African American students], the harm was nonetheless inflicted. [Black students are] presented to [academia and future employers] in a racially offensive manner. For these reasons, [such] performance [is] deficient and also prejudice[ial]." Maybe even DEPLORABLE???

  4. I'm the poor soul who spent over 10 years in prison with many many other prisoners trying to kill me for being charged with a sex offense THAT I DID NOT COMMIT i was in jail for a battery charge for helping a friend leave a boyfriend who beat her I've been saying for over 28 years that i did not and would never hurt a child like that mine or anybody's child but NOBODY wants to believe that i might not be guilty of this horrible crime or think that when i say that ALL the paperwork concerning my conviction has strangely DISAPPEARED or even when the long beach judge re-sentenced me over 14 months on a already filed plea bargain out of another districts court then had it filed under a fake name so i could not find while trying to fight my conviction on appeal in a nut shell people are ALWAYS quick to believe the worst about some one well I DID NOT HURT ANY CHILD EVER IN MY LIFE AND HAVE SAID THIS FOR ALMOST 30 YEARS please if anybody can me get some kind of justice it would be greatly appreciated respectfully written wrongly accused Brian Valenti

  5. A high ranking Indiana supreme Court operative caught red handed leading a group using the uber offensive N word! She must denounce or be denounced! (Or not since she is an insider ... rules do not apply to them). Evidence here: http://m.indianacompanies.us/friends-educational-fund-for-negroes.364110.company.v2#top_info

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