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Court rules on agency record appeals

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In two separate opinions, the Indiana Court of Appeals tackled the issue of timely and complete filing of an agency record.

In William B. Reedus v. Indiana Dept. of Workforce Development, No. 49A02-0808-CV-760, the issue is whether William Reedus' appeal of an order of the Indiana State Employees' Appeals Commission should have contained certain documents. He only attached uncertified copies of the Department of Workforce Development's dismissal letter, the administrative law judge's non-final order with findings and conclusions, the judge's final order, and the DWD's witness and exhibit list for the SEAC hearing. His petition for judicial review of agency action lacked the transcripts or exhibits from the hearing. The trial court dismissed his appeal.

In Indiana Family and Social Services Administration v. Alice V. Meyer, et al., No. 69A01-0807-CV-358, the issue is whether Alice Meyer's trust failed to timely file the agency record after Meyer's Medicaid benefits were denied. The trial court denied the Family and Social Service Agency's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction for failing to timely file the agency record. The trial court also corrected the administrative law judge's mathematical error in calculating the value of the reminder of interest of a farm.

In both appeals, the appellate court examined Indiana Code Section 4-21.5-5-13, which stipulates the means for judicial review of a final agency action and ruled that the phrase "cause for dismissal" means the General Assembly intended to empower, but not require a trial court to dismiss an appeal that doesn't follow statute requirements.

In the Meyer case, there was substantial procedural compliance by the trust and an obvious substantive error in the administrative law decision when it incorrectly determined the value of the remainder interest of a farm, wrote Judge Patricia Riley for the majority. In this case, the appellate court concluded I.C. Section 4-21.5-5-13 doesn't speak to subject matter jurisdiction, doesn't mandate automatic dismissal for procedural error, and must be read to confer the trial court discretion in some circumstances, wrote Judge Riley. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Judge Paul Mathias dissented, writing the timely and complete filing of the agency record is a condition precedent to the acquisition of jurisdiction to consider a petition for judicial review.

In Reedus, the appellate court ruled the trial court didn't abuse its discretion for dismissing Reedus' appeal. Under Administrative Orders and Procedures Act Section 5-13, a petitioner must timely file the documents on which the agency relied in issuing the orders. Reedus argued the transcripts and exhibits he didn't submit weren't necessary for review of the decision, but it's clear from the administrative law judge's order that he relied on the testimony to make his findings. Therefore, Reedus had to file the evidence as required by the AOPA and his petition was inadequate, wrote Judge Riley. In this case, Judge Mathias concurred in result, giving similar reasoning as he did in his dissent in Meyer.

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  1. Living in South Bend, I travel to Michigan a lot. Virtually every gas station sells cold beer there. Many sell the hard stuff too. Doesn't seem to be a big deal there.

  2. Mr. Ricker, how foolish of you to think that by complying with the law you would be ok. Don't you know that Indiana is a state that welcomes monopolies, and that Indiana's legislature is the one entity in this state that believes monopolistic practices (such as those engaged in by Indiana Association of Beverage Retailers) make Indiana a "business-friendly" state? How can you not see this????

  3. Actually, and most strikingly, the ruling failed to address the central issue to the whole case: Namely, Black Knight/LPS, who was NEVER a party to the State court litigation, and who is under a 2013 consent judgment in Indiana (where it has stipulated to the forgery of loan documents, the ones specifically at issue in my case)never disclosed itself in State court or remediated the forged loan documents as was REQUIRED of them by the CJ. In essence, what the court is willfully ignoring, is that it is setting a precedent that the supplier of a defective product, one whom is under a consent judgment stipulating to such, and under obligation to remediate said defective product, can: 1.) Ignore the CJ 2.) Allow counsel to commit fraud on the state court 3.) Then try to hide behind Rooker Feldman doctrine as a bar to being held culpable in federal court. The problem here is the court is in direct conflict with its own ruling(s) in Johnson v. Pushpin Holdings & Iqbal- 780 F.3d 728, at 730 “What Johnson adds - what the defendants in this suit have failed to appreciate—is that federal courts retain jurisdiction to award damages for fraud that imposes extrajudicial injury. The Supreme Court drew that very line in Exxon Mobil ... Iqbal alleges that the defendants conducted a racketeering enterprise that predates the state court’s judgments ...but Exxon Mobil shows that the Rooker Feldman doctrine asks what injury the plaintiff asks the federal court to redress, not whether the injury is “intertwined” with something else …Because Iqbal seeks damages for activity that (he alleges) predates the state litigation and caused injury independently of it, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not block this suit. It must be reinstated.” So, as I already noted to others, I now have the chance to bring my case to SCOTUS; the ruling by Wood & Posner is flawed on numerous levels,BUT most troubling is the fact that the authors KNOW it's a flawed ruling and choose to ignore the flaws for one simple reason: The courts have decided to agree with former AG Eric Holder that national banks "Are too big to fail" and must win at any cost-even that of due process, case precedent, & the truth....Let's see if SCOTUS wants a bite at the apple.

  4. I am in NJ & just found out that there is a judgment against me in an action by Driver's Solutions LLC in IN. I was never served with any Court pleadings, etc. and the only thing that I can find out is that they were using an old Staten Island NY address for me. I have been in NJ for over 20 years and cannot get any response from Drivers Solutions in IN. They have a different lawyer now. I need to get this vacated or stopped - it is now almost double & at 18%. Any help would be appreciated. Thank you.

  5. I am in NJ & just found out that there is a judgment against me in an action by Driver's Solutions LLC in IN. I was never served with any Court pleadings, etc. and the only thing that I can find out is that they were using an old Staten Island NY address for me. I have been in NJ for over 20 years and cannot get any response from Drivers Solutions in IN. They have a different lawyer now. I need to get this vacated or stopped - it is now almost double & at 18%. Any help would be appreciated. Thank you.

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