ILNews

Court rules on incurred risk in malpractice suit

Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

The Indiana Supreme Court ruled today that, in general, incurred risk isn't a defense to medical malpractice based on negligence or lack of informed consent. It also ruled a patient's prior consents to similar surgeries were relevant and admissible at trial.

In Brenda Spar v. Jin S. Cha, M.D., No. 45S05-0906-CV-273, Brenda Spar brought a medical malpractice action against Dr. Jin Cha after she suffered complications from a laparoscopy to determine fertility issues. Spar signed a consent form to "Video Laparoscopy Possible Laparotomy," which stated she had been told risks and benefits and possible complications of the surgery. The morning of her surgery, Cha explained the surgery and possible complications. Cha performed a laparoscopy instead of laparotomy based on comments from Spar prior to surgery.

Spar had previous surgeries to her abdomen following a severe car accident and to remove her gallbladder and gallstones. After the surgery by Cha, she developed post-operative complications and had to have part of her bowel removed during emergency surgery. She was hospitalized for nearly six weeks and developed peritonitis, cysts, and fistulas.

A medical review panel found Cha failed to meet the standard of care and the case proceeded to trial under two theories: negligence in failing to employ alternative diagnostic procedures in lieu of surgery, and failure to obtain Spar's informed consent to the chosen course of treatment.

The trial court admitted evidence by Cha over Spar's objection that he obtained Spar's informed consent for the laparoscopy based on her informed consent to previous surgeries by other doctors. The trial court denied Spar's motion for judgment on the evidence on the issue of incurred risk and gave a jury instruction on it. The jury returned a general verdict in favor of Cha.

On appeal, Spar argued the evidence at trial didn't establish any form of incurred risk as to either her claim for negligent advice or her claim for lack of informed consent. The Supreme Court agreed with the Indiana Court of Appeals that assumption of risk has little legitimate application in the medical malpractice context. A patient is entitled to expect the services will be rendered in accordance with the standard of care, no matter how risky the procedure may be, wrote Justice Theodore Boehm. The disparity in knowledge between professionals and their clients generally precludes recipients from knowing whether a professional's conduct is in fact negligent.

Even if incurred risk is an available defense in some cases, the record in the instant case is devoid of any evidence Spar somehow incurred the risk of negligent care. The doctor's incurred-risk defense to Spar's claim of negligent advice shouldn't have been submitted to the jury.

Incurred risk was also not a defense to Spar's lack-of-informed-consent claim. A waiver of informed consent doesn't assume risks associated with negligent performance of the underlying procedure or treatment, the justice wrote. And, there's no evidence Spar waived her right to informed consent or otherwise assumed risks related to negligent nondisclosure. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial.

The justices also determined the trial court properly admitted evidence of Spar's consent to prior surgeries by other doctors.

"If Spar had been made aware of typical complications by Dr. McKinnon and Dr. Shabeeb and already had a thorough appreciation of the common risks from invasive abdominal procedures, the jury was entitled to take her knowledge into consideration when assessing whether she would have declined surgery in light of more comprehensive disclosure," wrote Justice Boehm.

ADVERTISEMENT

Post a comment to this story

COMMENTS POLICY
We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
 
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
 
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
 
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
 
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.
 

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

ADVERTISEMENT