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Court rules on liability in nursing home accident

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The Indiana Court of Appeals today turned to an issue that has been dealt with few times in state court history:

What happens when a nursing home facility brings a local string band to play for the residents, and one of those volunteers arrives on the property and drives into the building before the performance, jumping a curb and striking a nursing home resident on the front porch before crashing into the building itself?

An answer comes today in Albert Gilbert, an incapacitated adult, by his guardians Viola Parsley, et al. v. Loogootee Realty LLC d/b/a Loogootee Nursing Center, No. 29A02-0912-CV-1188, in which the appeals panel affirmed a judgment from Hamilton Superior Judge Daniel Pfleging.

The Hamilton Superior case involves the 24-hour Loogootee Nursing Center that often encourages volunteer groups and individuals to visit the center and provide entertainment. One of those groups is the local string band known as the Charles Bruner Band, in which Carroll Ledgerwood was a singer and bass player for several years at the time of this incident in April 2007. Scheduled to perform at the nursing center, Ledgerwood drove to the facility to unload his equipment but his foot slipped off the brake and hit the accelerator when backing into a parking space. That led to his car traveling across the front porch and hitting a moderately mentally disabled Loogootee resident, Albert Gilbert, who was sitting on a front porch swing. The car ultimately crashed through the building’s wall, and as a result of the accident Gilbert suffered injuries that rendered him unable to walk and dress himself for several months. The man’s guardians filed a complaint for damages on his behalf, suing both Ledgerwood who was driving and Loogootee for not adequately protecting Gilbert from one of its gratuitous servants.

After various motions and court hearings, Judge Pfleging late last year determined that Ledgerwood fit the definition of a “gratuitous servant” as defined by a 1983 Indiana Court of Appeals decision, but that the driver wasn’t acting in that capacity when behind the wheel of his own vehicle and so the nursing facility wasn’t vicariously liable. The trial judge also found Loogootee didn’t owe Gilbert a duty because the accident wasn’t reasonably foreseeable.

In today’s 16-page decision, Judge Ezra Friedlander wrote for a unanimous panel that this issue hasn’t been dealt with inside the state.

“We find scant cases in Indiana that have discussed the doctrine of gratuitous servant. Although Gilbert cites numerous cases in support of his contention that the doctrine applies here, the only case cited that specifically discusses this principle is Trinity Lutheran Church Inc. of Evansville v. Miller, 451 N.E. 2d 1099, (Ind. Ct. App. 1983), (which) appears to be the first case in Indiana to recognize the doctrine and one of only two publicized cases that mentions it.”

Basically, the doctrine is a form of master-servant or principal-servant relationship, giving rise to liability if there’s no direct evidence of a traditional employment agreement between the two parties. Based on Trinity, the test to determine whether that relationship exists depends on the element of control and the facts of the case.

Finding that Loogootee exercised no control over the band or Ledgerwood in this situation, the appellate court found that the driver wasn’t a gratuitous servant at the time he drove into the nursing home and injured Gilbert.

The appeals judges turned to other employer-liability issues and again found that the nursing home wasn’t liable for what happened in this case, and that a common-carrier exception in another 1989 case didn’t apply here. That case was Stropes by Taylor v. Heritage House Childrens Ctr. of Shelbyville Inc., 547 N.E.2d 244 (Ind. 1989), and the appellate panel now analyzed it to determine the best interpretation of Heritage is that it’s understood to address liability of an employer for an employee’s conduct.

The panel didn’t agree with Gilbert on the other liability aspects of the appeal, but did note that it wasn’t deciding more than whether Ledgerwood was a gratuitous servant at the time of the injury-producing event.

“We can conceive of many foreseeable dangers inherent in living in a nursing facility such as Loogootee and from which Loogootee had a duty to protect its residents,” Judge Friedlander wrote. “We cannot agree, however, that a person driving a vehicle across the front porch and through the wall of the facility was one of them.”
 

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  1. Applause, applause, applause ..... but, is this duty to serve the constitutional order not much more incumbent upon the State, whose only aim is to be pure and unadulterated justice, than defense counsel, who is also charged with gaining a result for a client? I agree both are responsible, but it seems to me that the government attorneys bear a burden much heavier than defense counsel .... "“I note, much as we did in Mechling v. State, 16 N.E.3d 1015 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied, that the attorneys representing the State and the defendant are both officers of the court and have a responsibility to correct any obvious errors at the time they are committed."

  2. Do I have to hire an attorney to get co-guardianship of my brother? My father has guardianship and my older sister was his co-guardian until this Dec 2014 when she passed and my father was me to go on as the co-guardian, but funds are limit and we need to get this process taken care of quickly as our fathers health isn't the greatest. So please advise me if there is anyway to do this our self or if it requires a lawyer? Thank you

  3. I have been on this program while on parole from 2011-2013. No person should be forced mentally to share private details of their personal life with total strangers. Also giving permission for a mental therapist to report to your parole agent that your not participating in group therapy because you don't have the financial mean to be in the group therapy. I was personally singled out and sent back three times for not having money and also sent back within the six month when you aren't to be sent according to state law. I will work to het this INSOMM's removed from this state. I also had twelve or thirteen parole agents with a fifteen month period. Thanks for your time.

  4. Our nation produces very few jurists of the caliber of Justice DOUGLAS and his peers these days. Here is that great civil libertarian, who recognized government as both a blessing and, when corrupted by ideological interests, a curse: "Once the investigator has only the conscience of government as a guide, the conscience can become ‘ravenous,’ as Cromwell, bent on destroying Thomas More, said in Bolt, A Man For All Seasons (1960), p. 120. The First Amendment mirrors many episodes where men, harried and harassed by government, sought refuge in their conscience, as these lines of Thomas More show: ‘MORE: And when we stand before God, and you are sent to Paradise for doing according to your conscience, *575 and I am damned for not doing according to mine, will you come with me, for fellowship? ‘CRANMER: So those of us whose names are there are damned, Sir Thomas? ‘MORE: I don't know, Your Grace. I have no window to look into another man's conscience. I condemn no one. ‘CRANMER: Then the matter is capable of question? ‘MORE: Certainly. ‘CRANMER: But that you owe obedience to your King is not capable of question. So weigh a doubt against a certainty—and sign. ‘MORE: Some men think the Earth is round, others think it flat; it is a matter capable of question. But if it is flat, will the King's command make it round? And if it is round, will the King's command flatten it? No, I will not sign.’ Id., pp. 132—133. DOUGLAS THEN WROTE: Where government is the Big Brother,11 privacy gives way to surveillance. **909 But our commitment is otherwise. *576 By the First Amendment we have staked our security on freedom to promote a multiplicity of ideas, to associate at will with kindred spirits, and to defy governmental intrusion into these precincts" Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 574-76, 83 S. Ct. 889, 908-09, 9 L. Ed. 2d 929 (1963) Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, concurring. I write: Happy Memorial Day to all -- God please bless our fallen who lived and died to preserve constitutional governance in our wonderful series of Republics. And God open the eyes of those government officials who denounce the constitutions of these Republics by arbitrary actions arising out capricious motives.

  5. From back in the day before secularism got a stranglehold on Hoosier jurists comes this great excerpt via Indiana federal court judge Allan Sharp, dedicated to those many Indiana government attorneys (with whom I have dealt) who count the law as a mere tool, an optional tool that is not to be used when political correctness compels a more acceptable result than merely following the path that the law directs: ALLEN SHARP, District Judge. I. In a scene following a visit by Henry VIII to the home of Sir Thomas More, playwriter Robert Bolt puts the following words into the mouths of his characters: Margaret: Father, that man's bad. MORE: There is no law against that. ROPER: There is! God's law! MORE: Then God can arrest him. ROPER: Sophistication upon sophistication! MORE: No, sheer simplicity. The law, Roper, the law. I know what's legal not what's right. And I'll stick to what's legal. ROPER: Then you set man's law above God's! MORE: No, far below; but let me draw your attention to a fact I'm not God. The currents and eddies of right and wrong, which you find such plain sailing, I can't navigate. I'm no voyager. But in the thickets of law, oh, there I'm a forester. I doubt if there's a man alive who could follow me there, thank God... ALICE: (Exasperated, pointing after Rich) While you talk, he's gone! MORE: And go he should, if he was the Devil himself, until he broke the law! ROPER: So now you'd give the Devil benefit of law! MORE: Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after the Devil? ROPER: I'd cut down every law in England to do that! MORE: (Roused and excited) Oh? (Advances on Roper) And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you where would you hide, Roper, the laws being flat? (He leaves *1257 him) This country's planted thick with laws from coast to coast man's laws, not God's and if you cut them down and you're just the man to do it d'you really think you would stand upright in the winds that would blow then? (Quietly) Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's sake. ROPER: I have long suspected this; this is the golden calf; the law's your god. MORE: (Wearily) Oh, Roper, you're a fool, God's my god... (Rather bitterly) But I find him rather too (Very bitterly) subtle... I don't know where he is nor what he wants. ROPER: My God wants service, to the end and unremitting; nothing else! MORE: (Dryly) Are you sure that's God! He sounds like Moloch. But indeed it may be God And whoever hunts for me, Roper, God or Devil, will find me hiding in the thickets of the law! And I'll hide my daughter with me! Not hoist her up the mainmast of your seagoing principles! They put about too nimbly! (Exit More. They all look after him). Pgs. 65-67, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS A Play in Two Acts, Robert Bolt, Random House, New York, 1960. Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen. of Indiana, Indianapolis, for defendants. Childs v. Duckworth, 509 F. Supp. 1254, 1256 (N.D. Ind. 1981) aff'd, 705 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1983)

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