ILNews

Court rules on liability in nursing home accident

Back to TopE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

The Indiana Court of Appeals today turned to an issue that has been dealt with few times in state court history:

What happens when a nursing home facility brings a local string band to play for the residents, and one of those volunteers arrives on the property and drives into the building before the performance, jumping a curb and striking a nursing home resident on the front porch before crashing into the building itself?

An answer comes today in Albert Gilbert, an incapacitated adult, by his guardians Viola Parsley, et al. v. Loogootee Realty LLC d/b/a Loogootee Nursing Center, No. 29A02-0912-CV-1188, in which the appeals panel affirmed a judgment from Hamilton Superior Judge Daniel Pfleging.

The Hamilton Superior case involves the 24-hour Loogootee Nursing Center that often encourages volunteer groups and individuals to visit the center and provide entertainment. One of those groups is the local string band known as the Charles Bruner Band, in which Carroll Ledgerwood was a singer and bass player for several years at the time of this incident in April 2007. Scheduled to perform at the nursing center, Ledgerwood drove to the facility to unload his equipment but his foot slipped off the brake and hit the accelerator when backing into a parking space. That led to his car traveling across the front porch and hitting a moderately mentally disabled Loogootee resident, Albert Gilbert, who was sitting on a front porch swing. The car ultimately crashed through the building’s wall, and as a result of the accident Gilbert suffered injuries that rendered him unable to walk and dress himself for several months. The man’s guardians filed a complaint for damages on his behalf, suing both Ledgerwood who was driving and Loogootee for not adequately protecting Gilbert from one of its gratuitous servants.

After various motions and court hearings, Judge Pfleging late last year determined that Ledgerwood fit the definition of a “gratuitous servant” as defined by a 1983 Indiana Court of Appeals decision, but that the driver wasn’t acting in that capacity when behind the wheel of his own vehicle and so the nursing facility wasn’t vicariously liable. The trial judge also found Loogootee didn’t owe Gilbert a duty because the accident wasn’t reasonably foreseeable.

In today’s 16-page decision, Judge Ezra Friedlander wrote for a unanimous panel that this issue hasn’t been dealt with inside the state.

“We find scant cases in Indiana that have discussed the doctrine of gratuitous servant. Although Gilbert cites numerous cases in support of his contention that the doctrine applies here, the only case cited that specifically discusses this principle is Trinity Lutheran Church Inc. of Evansville v. Miller, 451 N.E. 2d 1099, (Ind. Ct. App. 1983), (which) appears to be the first case in Indiana to recognize the doctrine and one of only two publicized cases that mentions it.”

Basically, the doctrine is a form of master-servant or principal-servant relationship, giving rise to liability if there’s no direct evidence of a traditional employment agreement between the two parties. Based on Trinity, the test to determine whether that relationship exists depends on the element of control and the facts of the case.

Finding that Loogootee exercised no control over the band or Ledgerwood in this situation, the appellate court found that the driver wasn’t a gratuitous servant at the time he drove into the nursing home and injured Gilbert.

The appeals judges turned to other employer-liability issues and again found that the nursing home wasn’t liable for what happened in this case, and that a common-carrier exception in another 1989 case didn’t apply here. That case was Stropes by Taylor v. Heritage House Childrens Ctr. of Shelbyville Inc., 547 N.E.2d 244 (Ind. 1989), and the appellate panel now analyzed it to determine the best interpretation of Heritage is that it’s understood to address liability of an employer for an employee’s conduct.

The panel didn’t agree with Gilbert on the other liability aspects of the appeal, but did note that it wasn’t deciding more than whether Ledgerwood was a gratuitous servant at the time of the injury-producing event.

“We can conceive of many foreseeable dangers inherent in living in a nursing facility such as Loogootee and from which Loogootee had a duty to protect its residents,” Judge Friedlander wrote. “We cannot agree, however, that a person driving a vehicle across the front porch and through the wall of the facility was one of them.”
 

ADVERTISEMENT

Sponsored by

facebook - twitter on Facebook & Twitter

Indiana State Bar Association

Indianapolis Bar Association

Evansville Bar Association

Allen County Bar Association

Indiana Lawyer on Facebook

facebook
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. It's a big fat black mark against the US that they radicalized a lot of these Afghan jihadis in the 80s to fight the soviets and then when they predictably got around to biting the hand that fed them, the US had to invade their homelands, install a bunch of corrupt drug kingpins and kleptocrats, take these guys and torture the hell out of them. Why for example did the US have to sodomize them? Dubya said "they hate us for our freedoms!" Here, try some of that freedom whether you like it or not!!! Now they got even more reasons to hate us-- lets just keep bombing the crap out of their populations, installing more puppet regimes, arming one faction against another, etc etc etc.... the US is becoming a monster. No wonder they hate us. Here's my modest recommendation. How about we follow "Just War" theory in the future. St Augustine had it right. How about we treat these obvious prisoners of war according to the Geneva convention instead of torturing them in sadistic and perverted ways.

  2. As usual, John is "spot-on." The subtle but poignant points he makes are numerous and warrant reflection by mediators and users. Oh but were it so simple.

  3. ACLU. Way to step up against the police state. I see a lot of things from the ACLU I don't like but this one is a gold star in its column.... instead of fighting it the authorities should apologize and back off.

  4. Duncan, It's called the RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION and in the old days people believed it did apply to contracts and employment. Then along came title vii.....that aside, I believe that I am free to work or not work for whomever I like regardless: I don't need a law to tell me I'm free. The day I really am compelled to ignore all the facts of social reality in my associations and I blithely go along with it, I'll be a slave of the state. That day is not today......... in the meantime this proposed bill would probably be violative of 18 usc sec 1981 that prohibits discrimination in contracts... a law violated regularly because who could ever really expect to enforce it along the millions of contracts made in the marketplace daily? Some of these so-called civil rights laws are unenforceable and unjust Utopian Social Engineering. Forcing people to love each other will never work.

  5. I am the father of a sweet little one-year-old named girl, who happens to have Down Syndrome. To anyone who reads this who may be considering the decision to terminate, please know that your child will absolutely light up your life as my daughter has the lives of everyone around her. There is no part of me that condones abortion of a child on the basis that he/she has or might have Down Syndrome. From an intellectual standpoint, however, I question the enforceability of this potential law. As it stands now, the bill reads in relevant part as follows: "A person may not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion . . . if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome." It includes similarly worded provisions abortion on "any other disability" or based on sex selection. It goes so far as to make the medical provider at least potentially liable for wrongful death. First, how does a medical provider "know" that "the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion SOLELY" because of anything? What if the woman says she just doesn't want the baby - not because of the diagnosis - she just doesn't want him/her? Further, how can the doctor be liable for wrongful death, when a Child Wrongful Death claim belongs to the parents? Is there any circumstance in which the mother's comparative fault will not exceed the doctor's alleged comparative fault, thereby barring the claim? If the State wants to discourage women from aborting their children because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis, I'm all for that. Purporting to ban it with an unenforceable law, however, is not the way to effectuate this policy.

ADVERTISEMENT