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Court rules on suspended sentence issue

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A panel of Indiana Court of Appeals judges ruled on an issue that has generated a split of opinion among them: whether a fully executed sentence is equivalent to a sentence of equal length but partially suspended to probation for purposes of review under Appellate Rule 7(B).

In Christopher Jenkins v. State of Indiana, No. 49A05-0812-CR-711, the appellate court unanimously disagreed with its colleagues who concluded that the two sentences are equivalent for purposes of an appropriateness challenge. Christopher Jenkins was sentenced to eight years, with six suspended and only two of those suspended to probation for Class C felony possession of cocaine and Class D felony methamphetamine.

He argued his sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character, and that his sentence must be treated as a "maximum" sentence for purposes of App. R. 7(B).

Most defendants would gladly accept a partially suspended sentence over a fully executed one of equal length, wrote Judge Cale Bradford. Even though the imposition of a suspended sentence leaves open the possibility that a person will be incarcerated for some period before being released from his or her penal obligation, whether or not the suspended time is eventually served depends on the actions of the defendant.

"In a sense, an eight-year sentence with two years executed and two years suspended to probation is a two-year sentence with an option for two more, the exercise of which option is entirely up to the defendant," he wrote. "In the end, we believe all would agree that, all else being equal, a two-year executed sentence is less harsh than an eight-year executed sentence. It is just as clear that an eight-year sentence with six years suspended, two of those to probation, lies somewhere in between, and we treat it as such for purposes of Rule 7(B) review."

Although the appellate court wasn't aware of any Indiana Supreme Court cases directly on this point, it used Hole v. State, 851 N.E.2d 302, 304, (Ind. 2006), Mask v. State, 829 N.E.2d 932, 936 (Ind. 2005), and Buchanan v. State, 767 N.E.2d 967, 973 (Ind. 2002), to support its view.

The Court of Appeals affirmed Jenkins' convictions and sentence, but reversed the order he pay $55 in restitution to the police officer whose uniform was torn while chasing Jenkins after he fled during a traffic stop.

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  1. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  2. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  3. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

  4. Here's an idea...how about we MORE heavily regulate the law schools to reduce the surplus of graduates, driving starting salaries up for those new grads, so that we can all pay our insane amount of student loans off in a reasonable amount of time and then be able to afford to do pro bono & low-fee work? I've got friends in other industries, radiology for example, and their schools accept a very limited number of students so there will never be a glut of new grads and everyone's pay stays high. For example, my radiologist friend's school accepted just six new students per year.

  5. I totally agree with John Smith.

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