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Court rules on transfer to California court

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The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's decision to relinquish its jurisdiction over child support matters to a California trial court. In its opinion, the high court examined the interplay between the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act and the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act.

In Mahmoud M. Basileh v. Arwa G. Alghusain, No. 29S02-0810-CV-584, father Mahmoud Basileh appealed the trial court's transfer of visitation, custody, and child support matters to Superior Court of Monterey County, Calif., where mother Arwa Alghusain relocated with their children shortly after the couple divorced in Hamilton County, Ind. Basileh had also moved overseas to take care of his mother and no longer lived in Indiana. He objected to Alghusain's petition to transfer jurisdiction and he never filed a written consent to the transfer. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, finding Basileh was no longer a resident of the state within the meaning of the FFCCSOA and that act preempts the UIFSA because of a conflict between the two statutes.

The high court summarily affirmed the Court of Appeals' determination concerning residency and examined the preemption issue in its opinion released today. The justices examined the history behind the acts and Indiana's adoption of its UIFSA and concluded that Congress didn't intend for the FFCCSOA to preempt the UIFSA and that it appeared the FFCCSOA was intended to follow the contours of UIFSA, wrote Justice Robert Rucker. In addition, the nonresidency requirement and consent requirement of Indiana's version of the UIFSA are closely modeled after the federal version of the UIFSA.

The Court of Appeals interpreted the Indiana statute to say for the state to no longer retain jurisdiction, both the nonresidency requirement and the written consent requirement must be met. But the Supreme Court found this part of the statute to be ambiguous and looked to legislative intent. The UIFSA contains a consent requirement from both parties that the FFCCSOA does not, the justice noted.

The justices found the language in the federal act to be a strong indicator of the legislative intent when it enacted the Indiana statute in that the nonresidency requirement and the consent requirement of the statute are separate and alternative methods by which an Indiana court may maintain its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child support order. As such, both the absence of the parties and consent before a court loses jurisdiction isn't required.

"In this case it is of no moment that the parties did not file a written consent with the Indiana court for the California court to modify the Indiana support order. Rather, the Indiana court lost its jurisdiction because Father, like Mother and the children, is no longer an Indiana resident," wrote Justice Rucker.

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  1. Oh, the name calling was not name calling, it was merely social commentary making this point, which is on the minds of many, as an aside to the article's focus: https://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20100111082327AAmlmMa Or, if you prefer a local angle, I give you exhibit A in that analysis of viva la difference: http://fox59.com/2015/03/16/moed-appears-on-house-floor-says-hes-not-resigning/

  2. Too many attorneys take their position as a license to intimidate and threaten non attorneys in person and by mail. Did find it ironic that a reader moved to comment twice on this article could not complete a paragraph without resorting to insulting name calling (rethuglican) as a substitute for reasoned discussion. Some people will never get the point this action should have made.

  3. People have heard of Magna Carta, and not the Provisions of Oxford & Westminster. Not that anybody really cares. Today, it might be considered ethnic or racial bias to talk about the "Anglo Saxon common law." I don't even see the word English in the blurb above. Anyhow speaking of Edward I-- he was famously intolerant of diversity himself viz the Edict of Expulsion 1290. So all he did too like making parliament a permanent institution-- that all must be discredited. 100 years from now such commemorations will be in the dustbin of history.

  4. Oops, I meant discipline, not disciple. Interesting that those words share such a close relationship. We attorneys are to be disciples of the law, being disciplined to serve the law and its source, the constitutions. Do that, and the goals of Magna Carta are advanced. Do that not and Magna Carta is usurped. Do that not and you should be disciplined. Do that and you should be counted a good disciple. My experiences, once again, do not reveal a process that is adhering to the due process ideals of Magna Carta. Just the opposite, in fact. Braveheart's dying rebel (for a great cause) yell comes to mind.

  5. It is not a sign of the times that many Ind licensed attorneys (I am not) would fear writing what I wrote below, even if they had experiences to back it up. Let's take a minute to thank God for the brave Baron's who risked death by torture to tell the government that it was in the wrong. Today is a career ruination that whistleblowers risk. That is often brought on by denial of licenses or disciple for those who dare speak truth to power. Magna Carta says truth rules power, power too often claims that truth matters not, only Power. Fight such power for the good of our constitutional republics. If we lose them we have only bureaucratic tyranny to pass onto our children. Government attorneys, of all lawyers, should best realize this and work to see our patrimony preserved. I am now a government attorney (once again) in Kansas, and respecting the rule of law is my passion, first and foremost.

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