ILNews

Court split on dismissing murder, attempted feticide charges

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In a case of first impression involving a mother who ingested rat poison in an attempt to kill herself and her unborn child, one Indiana Court of Appeals judge felt that if the feticide statute is applied to women’s prenatal conduct, it might lead to a “slippery slope” in which a full range of a woman’s conduct while pregnant could fall under the feticide statute.

Bei Bei Shuai got pregnant during an affair with a married man, and when he ended their relationship, she decided to ingest rat poison to kill herself and her 33-week-old fetus. Both she and the fetus originally survived, but the baby had to be delivered by emergency C-section and died days later. The coroner concluded that A.S. died of “intracerebral hemorrhage due to maternal Coumadin ingestion.” Coumadin is a variant of an ingredient found in rat poison.

The state charged Shuai with felony murder and Class B felony attempted feticide. Shuai’s request for bail was denied, as was her motion to dismiss. Whether or not the murder and feticide statutes can be applied to a woman in this situation is one of first impression.

The appellate court unanimously agreed in Bei Bei Shuai v. State of Indiana, No. 49A02-1106-CR-486, that the trial court erred in denying Shuai’s request for bail. While evidence was presented to show she ingested rat poison with the intent to kill herself and her child, Shuai also presented evidence to support alternate explanations for the hemorrhage that led to A.S.’s death. The COA remanded for a determination of bail.

The judges split with regards to dismissing the charges against Shuai. The charging information said Shuai, on Dec. 23, 2010, knowingly killed her fetus that had attained viability when she ingested the rat poison and caused A.S. to be born in distress and subsequently die. Shuai claimed A.S. didn’t die on Dec. 23 because she was born alive and died on Jan. 3. When she died, she was no longer a fetus and now a human being.

The state argued that even though A.S.’s birth changed her from a “viable fetus” to a “human being,” it was Shuai’s actions that caused her death and the date she took the rat poison doesn’t matter.

The majority held that the charging information isn’t defective and that the feticide is not ambiguous as applied here. The plain language of the statute encompasses Shuai’s alleged actions and she doesn’t have immunity from prosecution.

Judge Patricia Riley dissented because she believed the charges should be dismissed. The facts show that on Dec. 23, Shuai didn’t kill a viable fetus, and the state didn’t provide evidence that Shuai did anything to endanger A.S. after her birth. She disagreed with the state’s contention that the categories of “viable fetus” and “another human being” as defined in the murder statute, can be used interchangeably with the focus on Shuai’s actions, not A.S.’s legal status.

“By arguing that A.S.’s legal status as a viable fetus and as a human being are interchangeable, the State disregards legislative reality and impermissibly attempts to enlarge the murder statute,” she wrote. “In light of Indiana's long-standing statutory and case law history, I conclude that it was never the intention of the legislature that the feticide statute should be used to criminalize prenatal conduct of a pregnant woman. Rather, the statute should only be applied to third-party conduct which endangers or harms a non-viable fetus.”


 

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  1. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  2. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  3. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

  4. Here's an idea...how about we MORE heavily regulate the law schools to reduce the surplus of graduates, driving starting salaries up for those new grads, so that we can all pay our insane amount of student loans off in a reasonable amount of time and then be able to afford to do pro bono & low-fee work? I've got friends in other industries, radiology for example, and their schools accept a very limited number of students so there will never be a glut of new grads and everyone's pay stays high. For example, my radiologist friend's school accepted just six new students per year.

  5. I totally agree with John Smith.

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