ILNews

Court splits on standard used to modify custody

Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

Even though the trial court departed from established statutory procedures by using the “best interests” standard to modify physical custody, the majority of Indiana Court of Appeals judges affirmed the lower court’s decision.

In Diane Werner v. Gregory Werner, No. 46A03-1008-DR-447, Diane Werner appealed the LaPorte Superior Senior Judge Steven King’s use of the best interests test to modify custody of the Werner’s two children. Judge King announced during the dissolution decree hearing and later at a custody hearing that his decision would be governed by the best interests test. Diane did not object either time. Diane relocated with the children 35 miles away to be closer to her job and was originally ordered primary physical custody of the children.

At the later custody hearing, Judge King found it would be in the best interests for Gregory to be the children’s primary physical custodian and awarded Diane parenting time.

The standard for modifying custody requires the modification to be in the best interests of the child and that there is a substantial change in one or more of the facts a court may consider under Indiana Code 31-17-2-8. The majority held that Diane waived her claim of error because she didn’t object when Judge King first announced at the dissolution decree and at the beginning of the custody hearing that he was going to use the best interests standard.  

Diane believed the trial court committed a fundamental error by interfering with her custodial relationship by not applying the modification standard as opposed to the best interests standard after an initial custody arrangement has been made. But she didn’t cite any authority for her argument that the use of the best interests standard in this case constitutes fundamental error, wrote Judge Terry Crone. Also, this case doesn’t deal with the termination of Diane’s right to establish a home and raise her children.

Judge Kirsch dissented, pointing out the case also involves the fundamental rights of the children to a stable home. Indiana courts are supposed to modify their custody decisions only upon a showing of a substantial change in one of the enumerated factors of I.C. 31-17-2-8.

“Because the affected interests of such decisions extend beyond the interests of the parents, parents cannot waive this standard,” he wrote. “The trial court committed clear error in ignoring the express statutory directive.”

Judge Crone wrote in response that the purpose of the trial court’s decision here was to allow enough time to gather sufficient information before entering a final custody determination “on less than complete information that could not be altered absent a substantial change in circumstances. … The trial court exercised extreme thoughtfulness and restraint in this regard and, we believe that the trial court's deviation from the general modification standard served the purpose of promoting true long term stability for these children. This is the cornerstone of our statutory law.”

The majority pointed out that they don’t condone the departure from the established statutory procedure and in fact, strongly discourage similar departures in the future. But they are unable to say a mistake has been made in this case.

ADVERTISEMENT

Post a comment to this story

COMMENTS POLICY
We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
 
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
 
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
 
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
 
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.
 

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by

facebook - twitter on Facebook & Twitter

Indiana State Bar Association

Indianapolis Bar Association

Evansville Bar Association

Allen County Bar Association

Indiana Lawyer on Facebook

facebook
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. It's a big fat black mark against the US that they radicalized a lot of these Afghan jihadis in the 80s to fight the soviets and then when they predictably got around to biting the hand that fed them, the US had to invade their homelands, install a bunch of corrupt drug kingpins and kleptocrats, take these guys and torture the hell out of them. Why for example did the US have to sodomize them? Dubya said "they hate us for our freedoms!" Here, try some of that freedom whether you like it or not!!! Now they got even more reasons to hate us-- lets just keep bombing the crap out of their populations, installing more puppet regimes, arming one faction against another, etc etc etc.... the US is becoming a monster. No wonder they hate us. Here's my modest recommendation. How about we follow "Just War" theory in the future. St Augustine had it right. How about we treat these obvious prisoners of war according to the Geneva convention instead of torturing them in sadistic and perverted ways.

  2. As usual, John is "spot-on." The subtle but poignant points he makes are numerous and warrant reflection by mediators and users. Oh but were it so simple.

  3. ACLU. Way to step up against the police state. I see a lot of things from the ACLU I don't like but this one is a gold star in its column.... instead of fighting it the authorities should apologize and back off.

  4. Duncan, It's called the RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION and in the old days people believed it did apply to contracts and employment. Then along came title vii.....that aside, I believe that I am free to work or not work for whomever I like regardless: I don't need a law to tell me I'm free. The day I really am compelled to ignore all the facts of social reality in my associations and I blithely go along with it, I'll be a slave of the state. That day is not today......... in the meantime this proposed bill would probably be violative of 18 usc sec 1981 that prohibits discrimination in contracts... a law violated regularly because who could ever really expect to enforce it along the millions of contracts made in the marketplace daily? Some of these so-called civil rights laws are unenforceable and unjust Utopian Social Engineering. Forcing people to love each other will never work.

  5. I am the father of a sweet little one-year-old named girl, who happens to have Down Syndrome. To anyone who reads this who may be considering the decision to terminate, please know that your child will absolutely light up your life as my daughter has the lives of everyone around her. There is no part of me that condones abortion of a child on the basis that he/she has or might have Down Syndrome. From an intellectual standpoint, however, I question the enforceability of this potential law. As it stands now, the bill reads in relevant part as follows: "A person may not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion . . . if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome." It includes similarly worded provisions abortion on "any other disability" or based on sex selection. It goes so far as to make the medical provider at least potentially liable for wrongful death. First, how does a medical provider "know" that "the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion SOLELY" because of anything? What if the woman says she just doesn't want the baby - not because of the diagnosis - she just doesn't want him/her? Further, how can the doctor be liable for wrongful death, when a Child Wrongful Death claim belongs to the parents? Is there any circumstance in which the mother's comparative fault will not exceed the doctor's alleged comparative fault, thereby barring the claim? If the State wants to discourage women from aborting their children because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis, I'm all for that. Purporting to ban it with an unenforceable law, however, is not the way to effectuate this policy.

ADVERTISEMENT