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Court upholds man’s molestation convictions

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Finding no juror misconduct or any fundamental error in the admission of certain testimony during a man’s trial for molesting his daughter, the Indiana Court of Appeals upheld his multiple molestation convictions. He will also have to file a petition for post-conviction relief to challenge his habitual offender adjudication.

Brandon Robey was found guilty of four counts of Class A felony child molesting and two counts of Class C felony child molesting for molesting his six-year-old daughter, A.P. After trial, he admitted that he was a habitual offender and habitual substance offender, and he was sentenced to an aggregate term of 110 years.

But in Brandon Robey v. State of Indiana, 12A02-1306-CR-502, Robey argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to correct error on the basis of alleged juror misconduct. Juror John Brannan knew of Robey from his previous employment at the county jail. Brannan did not work there when Robey was incarcerated on the molestation charges.

After he was convicted, two other jurors had a conversation on Facebook that said Brannan told them Robey bragged about raping his daughter and getting away with it. When juror Julie Gillespie testified about the conversation, she said that information came up after the jury had made a unanimous decision to convict Robey.

The Court of Appeals rejected Robey’s request for a retrial, finding the court was entitled to believe Gillespie’s testimony and did. They declined to reweight the evidence.

The judges also found he was not denied a fair trial based on the admission of statements by his daughter’s child services interviewer and her psychologist.  The DCS case managers comments were general in nature, and she did not directly comment on whether A.P.’s accusations against Robey were true in particular or whether A.P. was a truthful person in general, as allowed by Kindred v. State, 973 N.E.2d 1245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), Judge Cale Bradford wrote.

The judges only found one statement by the child’s counselor that constituted impermissible vouching, however, it was at most merely cumulative of her previous statements, both of which were elicited by Robey.

And even though Robey’s prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance can’t be used to support his habitual offender adjudication, he cannot challenge it on direct appeal based on Tumulty v. State, 666 N.E.2d 394 (Ind. 1996).  

“There is, quite simply, no room in Tumulty’s holding for any exceptions to the rule that you cannot challenge a habitual offender adjudication on direct appeal after pleading guilty. If Robey wishes to further challenge the factual basis underlying his admission to being a habitual offender, he will have to do so in a PCR petition,” Bradford wrote.

 

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  1. It's a big fat black mark against the US that they radicalized a lot of these Afghan jihadis in the 80s to fight the soviets and then when they predictably got around to biting the hand that fed them, the US had to invade their homelands, install a bunch of corrupt drug kingpins and kleptocrats, take these guys and torture the hell out of them. Why for example did the US have to sodomize them? Dubya said "they hate us for our freedoms!" Here, try some of that freedom whether you like it or not!!! Now they got even more reasons to hate us-- lets just keep bombing the crap out of their populations, installing more puppet regimes, arming one faction against another, etc etc etc.... the US is becoming a monster. No wonder they hate us. Here's my modest recommendation. How about we follow "Just War" theory in the future. St Augustine had it right. How about we treat these obvious prisoners of war according to the Geneva convention instead of torturing them in sadistic and perverted ways.

  2. As usual, John is "spot-on." The subtle but poignant points he makes are numerous and warrant reflection by mediators and users. Oh but were it so simple.

  3. ACLU. Way to step up against the police state. I see a lot of things from the ACLU I don't like but this one is a gold star in its column.... instead of fighting it the authorities should apologize and back off.

  4. Duncan, It's called the RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION and in the old days people believed it did apply to contracts and employment. Then along came title vii.....that aside, I believe that I am free to work or not work for whomever I like regardless: I don't need a law to tell me I'm free. The day I really am compelled to ignore all the facts of social reality in my associations and I blithely go along with it, I'll be a slave of the state. That day is not today......... in the meantime this proposed bill would probably be violative of 18 usc sec 1981 that prohibits discrimination in contracts... a law violated regularly because who could ever really expect to enforce it along the millions of contracts made in the marketplace daily? Some of these so-called civil rights laws are unenforceable and unjust Utopian Social Engineering. Forcing people to love each other will never work.

  5. I am the father of a sweet little one-year-old named girl, who happens to have Down Syndrome. To anyone who reads this who may be considering the decision to terminate, please know that your child will absolutely light up your life as my daughter has the lives of everyone around her. There is no part of me that condones abortion of a child on the basis that he/she has or might have Down Syndrome. From an intellectual standpoint, however, I question the enforceability of this potential law. As it stands now, the bill reads in relevant part as follows: "A person may not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion . . . if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome." It includes similarly worded provisions abortion on "any other disability" or based on sex selection. It goes so far as to make the medical provider at least potentially liable for wrongful death. First, how does a medical provider "know" that "the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion SOLELY" because of anything? What if the woman says she just doesn't want the baby - not because of the diagnosis - she just doesn't want him/her? Further, how can the doctor be liable for wrongful death, when a Child Wrongful Death claim belongs to the parents? Is there any circumstance in which the mother's comparative fault will not exceed the doctor's alleged comparative fault, thereby barring the claim? If the State wants to discourage women from aborting their children because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis, I'm all for that. Purporting to ban it with an unenforceable law, however, is not the way to effectuate this policy.

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