Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department v. Donald Prout - 4/10/14

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Thursday  April 10, 2014 
11:30 AM  EST

11:30 a.m. 49A04-1305-CR-236. Indiana University South Bend. In April 2012, Donald A. Prout was arrested and charged with four counts of class D felony theft based on evidence that he engaged in ghost employment with the Marion County Sheriff’s Department on four occasions.  The State alleged that Prout clocked in at the Sheriff’s Department and his part-time security job at the same time, and thus he received double pay for those hours reported to both entities.  Prout pleaded not guilty on all counts.  In September 2012, the State dismissed all charges against Prout, citing “Evidentiary Problems.”  In December 2012, Prout filed a verified petition for expungement of his arrest records pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-38-5-1, asserting that expungement was appropriate because no offense had been committed and there was an absence of probable cause.  The trial court granted Prout’s petition.
On appeal, the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”) argues that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Prout’s petition for expungement because probable cause existed both at the time of Prout’s arrest and at the time the charges were dismissed.  The parties argue about which time in the proceedings – at arrest or at dismissal – that probable cause is required under Indiana Code Section 35-38-5-1.  IMPD also asserts that Prout did not prove that he did not commit theft, which was his burden in the expungement proceedings.  Prout asserts that IMPD’s arguments are requests for this Court to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses.

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  1. I need an experienced attorney to handle a breach of contract matter. Kindly respond for more details. Graham Young

  2. I thought the slurs were the least grave aspects of her misconduct, since they had nothing to do with her being on the bench. Why then do I suspect they were the focus? I find this a troubling trend. At least she was allowed to keep her law license.

  3. Section 6 of Article I of the Indiana Constitution is pretty clear and unequivocal: "Section 6. No money shall be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of any religious or theological institution."

  4. Video pen? Nice work, "JW"! Let this be a lesson and a caution to all disgruntled ex-spouses (or soon-to-be ex-spouses) . . . you may think that altercation is going to get you some satisfaction . . . it will not.

  5. First comment on this thread is a fitting final comment on this thread, as that the MCBA never answered Duncan's fine question, and now even Eric Holder agrees that the MCBA was in material error as to the facts: "I don't get it" from Duncan December 1, 2014 5:10 PM "The Grand Jury met for 25 days and heard 70 hours of testimony according to this article and they made a decision that no crime occurred. On what basis does the MCBA conclude that their decision was "unjust"? What special knowledge or evidence does the MCBA have that the Grand Jury hearing this matter was unaware of? The system that we as lawyers are sworn to uphold made a decision that there was insufficient proof that officer committed a crime. How can any of us say we know better what was right than the jury that actually heard all of the the evidence in this case."

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