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Courts leave election law questions unanswered

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In the days leading up to an Election Day where thousands of Hoosier voters had already cast ballots before polls even opened, Indiana's appellate judges issued a pair of election law rulings that leave more questions than answers and will likely lead to further review.

That review may evolve into post-election review, as parties get through today's historic presidential election and examine the next legal steps in cases of first impression arising from two of Indiana's most populated counties.

The state's Supreme Court and Court of Appeals issued rulings on Friday and Monday in one or both of these cases - Marion County Election Board v. Raymond J. Schoettle, et al.,  49S00-0811-CV-586, that involved the process of reviewing absentee ballot challenges; and John B. Curley, et al. v. Lake County Board of Elections and Registration, et al.,  45A03-0810-CV-512, that left early voting locations open.

Both decisions pointed to uncertainties and ambiguity in state statutes on those issues, but the public importance and limited timeframe before the election left the courts with little recourse other than upholding the local judges' decisions.

"These provisions are at least ambiguous and at most simply irreconcilable," Justice Robert Rucker wrote in Schoettle. "We are of course constrained by the emergency nature of these proceedings from providing a more thorough analysis of apparently conflicting Indiana election law statutes."

In Schoettle, Marion Circuit Judge Theodore M. Sosin on Friday ordered that the Marion County Election Board is to treat all challenged mail-in absentee votes as provisional ballots and set them aside for future resolution by the election board pursuant to Indiana Code Section 3-11.7. The county election board filed an emergency motion for stay pending appeal, arguing that the order was vague and contradictory and would require hundreds of poll workers to be retrained before Election Day.

A Court of Appeals decision came about 4 p.m. Monday, dissolving the preliminary injunction with a 2-1 vote. The appellate panel found that Judge Sosin erred in finding the appellees were likely to succeed on the merits. But within two hours of that decision, the justices handed down their own ruling that reinstated Judge Sosin's original order.

The unanimous order itself contained no rationale, but two concurring opinions outlined what at least two justices think about the issue.

Justice Rucker wrote that he had reservations about concurring because of ambiguity in the statutory scheme, but the constrained timeframe of only hours before Election Day arrived left him with little choice.

In agreeing to uphold Judge Sosin's order, Justice Rucker cited a chapter of an Election Day handbook distributed statewide by the Indiana Election Division that details guidelines to challenging an absentee ballot consistent with the trial court injunction.

Justice Frank Sullivan also wrote separately, noting that he too finds ambiguity in the statutes but that he expects this decision to affect few ballots, if any, because no allegation of fraudulent absentee ballots has been made.

A Court of Appeals panel offered similar rationale on Friday in Curley, which presented an issue of first impression for the court. In that decision, the court supported the election board's conclusion that a Circuit Court clerk's office is not a satellite location for purposes of in-person absentee voting and isn't subject to a unanimous election board vote. However, that decision came despite what it described as conflicting and ambiguous state statutes.

"In sum, we do hesitate to conclude that the meaning of these critical statutory provisions are subject to more than one reasonable and plausible interpretation and are, therefore, ambiguous," Judge Edward Najam wrote in the opinion, noting that even if the court found a violation of law, that the public interest weighs heavily in affirming the decision.

Now, the two sets of legal questions may present post-election arguments for those parties - they could ask for rehearings or further review and election results could be used in making the arguments.

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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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