ILNews

Deficient counsel does not overcome convincing evidence

Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

Even though the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals spelled out in a 17-page opinion what defense counsel should have done during a bench trial, the appellate panel ultimately concluded the deficient representation did not prejudice the case.

Roy Smith appealed the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana’s denial of his habeas petition to set aside his criminal conviction because of ineffective counsel. In Roy A. Smith v. Richard Brown, 12-3731, the 7th Circuit affirmed the denial of the habeas petition.

Smith, serving a 90-year sentence for murder in an Indiana state prison, was charged with attempted murder and aggravated battery after correctional officers saw him stab another inmate with half a pair of scissors.

James Cupp was appointed as Smith’s public defender. Smith continually complained to the trial court about Cupp’s performance, claiming the attorney was not filing the motions he wanted and was not communicating with him.

After he was convicted, Smith obtained a review by the Indiana Court of Appeals which found defense counsel did not mount a defense but ruled Smith had failed to show any prejudice from Cupp’s performance. Smith then filed a petition for post-conviction relief which was also denied.

The District Court considered Smith’s habeas petition and agreed with the Court of Appeals that Cupp’s behavior did not prejudice Smith.

At the 7th Circuit, the judges faulted Cupp on multiple counts. It noted at trial, the defense attorney failed to explore Smith’s self-defense motive, did not point out inconsistencies between the testimonies of two guards, and did not highlight to the trial court that none of the other inmates provided testimony and the victim himself refused to identify his attacker.

Moreover, the 7th Circuit criticized Cupp for offering a closing argument that was a little more than “just a throat-clearing exercise.”

However, the appellate panel pointed out the evidence was overwhelming against Smith, and Cupp did not abandon his client nor egregiously fail in his representation of the defendant.

“… against the overwhelming weight of the state’s evidence, he did not have many promising options,” Judge John Tinder wrote for the court. “Considering prejudice, or its absence, is particularly important when a lawyer’s deficient representation is at least in part influenced by the utter weakness of the defendant’s case.”

ADVERTISEMENT

Post a comment to this story

COMMENTS POLICY
We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
 
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
 
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
 
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
 
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.
 

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by

facebook - twitter on Facebook & Twitter

Indiana State Bar Association

Indianapolis Bar Association

Evansville Bar Association

Allen County Bar Association

Indiana Lawyer on Facebook

facebook
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. I need an experienced attorney to handle a breach of contract matter. Kindly respond for more details. Graham Young

  2. I thought the slurs were the least grave aspects of her misconduct, since they had nothing to do with her being on the bench. Why then do I suspect they were the focus? I find this a troubling trend. At least she was allowed to keep her law license.

  3. Section 6 of Article I of the Indiana Constitution is pretty clear and unequivocal: "Section 6. No money shall be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of any religious or theological institution."

  4. Video pen? Nice work, "JW"! Let this be a lesson and a caution to all disgruntled ex-spouses (or soon-to-be ex-spouses) . . . you may think that altercation is going to get you some satisfaction . . . it will not.

  5. First comment on this thread is a fitting final comment on this thread, as that the MCBA never answered Duncan's fine question, and now even Eric Holder agrees that the MCBA was in material error as to the facts: "I don't get it" from Duncan December 1, 2014 5:10 PM "The Grand Jury met for 25 days and heard 70 hours of testimony according to this article and they made a decision that no crime occurred. On what basis does the MCBA conclude that their decision was "unjust"? What special knowledge or evidence does the MCBA have that the Grand Jury hearing this matter was unaware of? The system that we as lawyers are sworn to uphold made a decision that there was insufficient proof that officer committed a crime. How can any of us say we know better what was right than the jury that actually heard all of the the evidence in this case."

ADVERTISEMENT