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Denial of summary judgment upheld over questions of car ownership

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The insurer of a car dealership is not entitled to summary judgment because there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the dealership or the son of an employee who purchased a car from the dealership owned the car at the time the son hit a bicyclist.

The Indiana Court of Appeals upheld the denial of Auto-Owners Insurance Co.’s motion for summary judgment on its motion asking the court to determine that it had no liability for the injuries of the cyclist, Edward Foster, under the dealership’s commercial liability policy or a garage liability policy.

Foster was hit by a car driven by Garrett Gaddis. When he was 18, he purchased the car from his father, Scott Gaddis, who was a salesman at the dealership owned by Scott Gaddis’ father. Scott Gaddis “charged” the car to an account he had with the dealership, and the car’s title was never transferred to Garrett Gaddis’ name. He did not register or insure the car and it had a temporary license plate. The day Garrett Gaddis hit Foster while driving, he had taken the car without his father’s permission.

The trial court found material questions as to ownership, possession and control of the car and denied summary judgment. It also denied two motions to strike filed by Auto-Owners regarding “untimely filed evidence” and certain exhibits.

In Auto-Owners Insurance Company v. Bill Gaddis Chrysler Dodge, Inc., Garrett Gaddis and Edward Foster, 18A02-1112-PL-1087, the Court of Appeals found the trial court shouldn’t have allowed the four exhibits designated by Foster, which included Garrett Gaddis’ bank records and his employment records, because Foster’s attempt to certify and authenticate the four challenged exhibits was untimely. However, Auto-Owners didn’t show it was prejudiced by the denial of its motion to strike, Judge Edward Najam wrote. The judges also found the trial court didn’t err in granting Foster’s motion for extension of time to file a response in opposition to summary judgment, as it was timely filed under Ind. Trial Rule 56(C).

There are questions as to who owned the car at the time of the accident and whether Garrett Gaddis is an insured under the terms of the dealership’s garage liability policy, he wrote.  

 

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  1. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  2. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  3. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

  4. Here's an idea...how about we MORE heavily regulate the law schools to reduce the surplus of graduates, driving starting salaries up for those new grads, so that we can all pay our insane amount of student loans off in a reasonable amount of time and then be able to afford to do pro bono & low-fee work? I've got friends in other industries, radiology for example, and their schools accept a very limited number of students so there will never be a glut of new grads and everyone's pay stays high. For example, my radiologist friend's school accepted just six new students per year.

  5. I totally agree with John Smith.

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