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Disciplinary Actions - 6/19/13

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Indiana Lawyer Disciplinary Actions

The Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission brings charges against attorneys who have violated the state’s rules for admission to the bar and Rules of Professional Conduct. The Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications brings charges against judges, judicial officers, or judicial candidates for misconduct. Details of attorneys’ and judges’ actions for which they are being disciplined by the Supreme Court will be included unless they are not a matter of public record under the court’s rules.

Suspension
The Indiana Supreme Court issued a May 30 order suspending more than 300 attorneys for either not paying the annual registration fee required to practice in Indiana, not making the IOLTA certification required and/or failing to comply with certain continuing legal education requirements. Since the order was released, the court has vacated attorneys Hamilton L. Carmouche, Joy McCray Pearson and Douglas Peters from the original listing. Those who do not remedy the reason for their suspension will have their suspensions take effect June 27. The original list may be viewed in the May 30 order at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/2768.htm.

Thomas R. Philpot, of Lake County, has been suspended pendente lite, effective 15 days from the May 30 Supreme Court order. Philpot was found guilty of two counts of mail fraud and one count of theft from a federally funded program. All are felonies.

He was convicted in September 2012 of taking more than $24,000 from federal funds for child support that he oversaw as clerk from December 2004 to November 2009. He was ordered to begin his sentence in February.

Mary K. Kleiss, of Marion County, has been suspended from the practice of law due to disability, per a May 30 order. Kleiss submitted an affidavit of consent to disability suspension. Her suspension took effect immediately, and she may petition for reinstatement upon termination of the disability.

Randy C. Eyster, of Marion County, has been suspended for 90 days, with it all stayed subject to completion of at least two years of probation, per a May 30 order. Eyster pleaded guilty in August 2011 to operating while intoxicated with at least 0.08 grams of alcohol per 210 liter of breath, a Class C misdemeanor. Nearly two years later, he pleaded guilty to OWI endangering a person as a Class C misdemeanor and Class D felony OWI with a previous OWI conviction within five years. He was found to have violated Indiana Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(b).

As part of his probation, he must refrain from using alcohol or mind-altering substances except as prescribed and comply with all Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program requirements. The costs of the proceedings are assessed against Eyster. Justice Loretta Rush and Chief Justice Brent Dickson dissent, with Dickson believing that the proposed discipline is significantly inadequate in light of his felony conviction.

Julia N. Compton, of Johnson County, has been suspended for 180 days, with it all stayed subject to the completion of at least two years of probation, per a May 30 order. Compton pleaded guilty in April 2012 in Marion County to misdemeanor public intoxication; in May 2012, she pleaded guilty in Hancock County to misdemeanor resisting law enforcement and public intoxication. She pleaded guilty in October 2012 to Class D felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated and was granted alternative misdemeanor sentencing. She was incarcerated for four months, according to the order.

Compton violated Indiana Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(b). She must refrain from use of alcohol and mind-altering substances while on probation, follow all Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program requirements, and not violate criminal law or the rules of professional conduct. The costs of the proceeding are assessed against her. Justice Loretta Rush and Chief Justice Brent Dickson dissent, with Dickson believing that the proposed discipline is significantly inadequate in light of Compton’s felony conviction.

Alex R. Voils, of Boone County, has been suspended for 30 days for his handling of a claim for accidental death benefits under a life insurance policy, per a May 30 order. The insurance company denied the claim and Voils did little to press the claim against the insurance company. He was fired, and later failed to timely respond to the Disciplinary Commission’s demand for a response to the grievance filed by the former client.

The order notes that Voils had physical and mental health problems at the time of the misconduct. He was found to have violated Indiana Professional Conduct Rules 1.3, 1.16(d) and 8.1(b). The justices also noted that his punishment may have been more severe if not for the commission’s agreement to the proposed discipline.

Voils’ suspension takes effect July 12, and he will be automatically reinstated provided there are no other suspensions in effect. Justice Steven David did not participate.

Shane E. Beal, of Grant County, has been indefinitely suspended in seven separate causes for noncooperation, per a May 30 order. In each of the cases, Beal was ordered to show cause within 10 days, but has still not cooperated in three of the causes. He has responded adequately to the Disciplinary Commission regarding three other causes and responded falsely to the show cause order in the remaining case.

The court also granted the commission’s request that he reimburse the costs in six of the cases in the amount of $512.22 per case.•

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  1. It's a big fat black mark against the US that they radicalized a lot of these Afghan jihadis in the 80s to fight the soviets and then when they predictably got around to biting the hand that fed them, the US had to invade their homelands, install a bunch of corrupt drug kingpins and kleptocrats, take these guys and torture the hell out of them. Why for example did the US have to sodomize them? Dubya said "they hate us for our freedoms!" Here, try some of that freedom whether you like it or not!!! Now they got even more reasons to hate us-- lets just keep bombing the crap out of their populations, installing more puppet regimes, arming one faction against another, etc etc etc.... the US is becoming a monster. No wonder they hate us. Here's my modest recommendation. How about we follow "Just War" theory in the future. St Augustine had it right. How about we treat these obvious prisoners of war according to the Geneva convention instead of torturing them in sadistic and perverted ways.

  2. As usual, John is "spot-on." The subtle but poignant points he makes are numerous and warrant reflection by mediators and users. Oh but were it so simple.

  3. ACLU. Way to step up against the police state. I see a lot of things from the ACLU I don't like but this one is a gold star in its column.... instead of fighting it the authorities should apologize and back off.

  4. Duncan, It's called the RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION and in the old days people believed it did apply to contracts and employment. Then along came title vii.....that aside, I believe that I am free to work or not work for whomever I like regardless: I don't need a law to tell me I'm free. The day I really am compelled to ignore all the facts of social reality in my associations and I blithely go along with it, I'll be a slave of the state. That day is not today......... in the meantime this proposed bill would probably be violative of 18 usc sec 1981 that prohibits discrimination in contracts... a law violated regularly because who could ever really expect to enforce it along the millions of contracts made in the marketplace daily? Some of these so-called civil rights laws are unenforceable and unjust Utopian Social Engineering. Forcing people to love each other will never work.

  5. I am the father of a sweet little one-year-old named girl, who happens to have Down Syndrome. To anyone who reads this who may be considering the decision to terminate, please know that your child will absolutely light up your life as my daughter has the lives of everyone around her. There is no part of me that condones abortion of a child on the basis that he/she has or might have Down Syndrome. From an intellectual standpoint, however, I question the enforceability of this potential law. As it stands now, the bill reads in relevant part as follows: "A person may not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion . . . if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome." It includes similarly worded provisions abortion on "any other disability" or based on sex selection. It goes so far as to make the medical provider at least potentially liable for wrongful death. First, how does a medical provider "know" that "the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion SOLELY" because of anything? What if the woman says she just doesn't want the baby - not because of the diagnosis - she just doesn't want him/her? Further, how can the doctor be liable for wrongful death, when a Child Wrongful Death claim belongs to the parents? Is there any circumstance in which the mother's comparative fault will not exceed the doctor's alleged comparative fault, thereby barring the claim? If the State wants to discourage women from aborting their children because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis, I'm all for that. Purporting to ban it with an unenforceable law, however, is not the way to effectuate this policy.

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