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Disciplinary Actions - 9/29/10

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Indiana Lawyer Disciplinary Actions

The Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission brings charges against attorneys who have violated the state’s rules for admission to the bar and Rules of Professional Conduct. The Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications brings charges against judges, judicial officers, or judicial candidates for misconduct. Details of attorneys’ and judges’ actions for which they are being disciplined by the Supreme Court will be included unless they are not a matter of public record under the court’s rules.

Public reprimand
Kenneth E. Lauter of Morgan County was publicly reprimanded by the Indiana Supreme Court for violating Ind. Prof. Cond. R.1.5 (b) and (c). The court issued a per curiam decision in the case Sept.17, 2010.

The Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission charged Lauter with violating Ind. Prof. Cond. R. 1.5 (b) and (c) and 1.8(a); however the hearing officer concluded Lauter did not violate any rules and recommended judgment for Lauter. The disciplinary commission sought Supreme Court review of the hearing officer’s findings.

Justices Brent Dickson and Robert Rucker dissented, believing that the disciplinary commission did not prove a charged violation by clear and convincing evidence and that the hearing officer correctly found no violation.

In May 2003, a client hired Lauter and his firm to pursue an employment discrimination claim. The client signed a written attorney services contract that provided for a contingency fee based on the amount recovered – one-third if settled prior to trial, 40 percent otherwise. It also called for an “engagement fee” of $750, which the client paid. The contract also contained a hand-written notation in the bottom margin, initialed by the client, calling for an “additional retainer fee payable if client and firm agree to file federal court litigation.” The client and Lauter agreed to leave the amount of the additional retainer undetermined until Lauter had completed due diligence and decided whether to proceed to federal court. Lauter testified that a typical engagement fee for an attorney taking an employment discrimination case is $5,000, whether or not federal litigation is involved.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission found no probable cause in December 2003 so Lauter filed a Freedom of Information Act request for the EEOC file. He received the file in February 2004 and contacted the client the next day to tell her he believed the case had sufficient merit to proceed to federal court. He also testified that he reminded her of the additional retainer that she had initialed and said it would be $4,250 – which was not reduced to writing. He did not advise the client that she might want to consult independent counsel before agreeing to the amount. Three days after their conversation, the client wrote a check to Lauter’s firm for $4,400 that included $150 filing fee and the $4,250 additional retainer. The client’s lawsuit was successfully settled, and the client recovered $75,000 from the defendant May 15, 2006. Lauter’s total fee was $30,000 (the $750 engagement fee, the $4,250 additional retainer, and the $25,000 one-third contingent fee).

“Respondent’s structuring of his fees so clients whose claims are resolved at the administration level pay a lower fee than those whose cases must go to court appears intended to benefit his clients and is certainly not to be discouraged. The problem in this case is that Respondent gave no indication to the client of what the additional retainer would be or how it would be determined,” the court wrote.

Because Lauter and the client agreed at the outset to leave the amount of the additional retainer undetermined until later, the court determined Lauter did not violate Rule 1.8(a). •
 

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  1. It's a big fat black mark against the US that they radicalized a lot of these Afghan jihadis in the 80s to fight the soviets and then when they predictably got around to biting the hand that fed them, the US had to invade their homelands, install a bunch of corrupt drug kingpins and kleptocrats, take these guys and torture the hell out of them. Why for example did the US have to sodomize them? Dubya said "they hate us for our freedoms!" Here, try some of that freedom whether you like it or not!!! Now they got even more reasons to hate us-- lets just keep bombing the crap out of their populations, installing more puppet regimes, arming one faction against another, etc etc etc.... the US is becoming a monster. No wonder they hate us. Here's my modest recommendation. How about we follow "Just War" theory in the future. St Augustine had it right. How about we treat these obvious prisoners of war according to the Geneva convention instead of torturing them in sadistic and perverted ways.

  2. As usual, John is "spot-on." The subtle but poignant points he makes are numerous and warrant reflection by mediators and users. Oh but were it so simple.

  3. ACLU. Way to step up against the police state. I see a lot of things from the ACLU I don't like but this one is a gold star in its column.... instead of fighting it the authorities should apologize and back off.

  4. Duncan, It's called the RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION and in the old days people believed it did apply to contracts and employment. Then along came title vii.....that aside, I believe that I am free to work or not work for whomever I like regardless: I don't need a law to tell me I'm free. The day I really am compelled to ignore all the facts of social reality in my associations and I blithely go along with it, I'll be a slave of the state. That day is not today......... in the meantime this proposed bill would probably be violative of 18 usc sec 1981 that prohibits discrimination in contracts... a law violated regularly because who could ever really expect to enforce it along the millions of contracts made in the marketplace daily? Some of these so-called civil rights laws are unenforceable and unjust Utopian Social Engineering. Forcing people to love each other will never work.

  5. I am the father of a sweet little one-year-old named girl, who happens to have Down Syndrome. To anyone who reads this who may be considering the decision to terminate, please know that your child will absolutely light up your life as my daughter has the lives of everyone around her. There is no part of me that condones abortion of a child on the basis that he/she has or might have Down Syndrome. From an intellectual standpoint, however, I question the enforceability of this potential law. As it stands now, the bill reads in relevant part as follows: "A person may not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion . . . if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome." It includes similarly worded provisions abortion on "any other disability" or based on sex selection. It goes so far as to make the medical provider at least potentially liable for wrongful death. First, how does a medical provider "know" that "the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion SOLELY" because of anything? What if the woman says she just doesn't want the baby - not because of the diagnosis - she just doesn't want him/her? Further, how can the doctor be liable for wrongful death, when a Child Wrongful Death claim belongs to the parents? Is there any circumstance in which the mother's comparative fault will not exceed the doctor's alleged comparative fault, thereby barring the claim? If the State wants to discourage women from aborting their children because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis, I'm all for that. Purporting to ban it with an unenforceable law, however, is not the way to effectuate this policy.

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