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Disciplinary Commission overreached, justices agree

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An Ohio attorney who argued his disciplinary case in a rare public forum before the Indiana Supreme Court prevailed as justices said the Indiana Disciplinary Commission’s arguments failed.   

Derek Farmer’s attorney claimed before the court in October that Ohio colleagues who argued on his behalf said that they believed his past and race were being used against him, because Farmer had been cleared in the same matter by Ohio’s attorney discipline authorities.

The Indiana Supreme Court opinion in State of Indiana Ex Rel., Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission v. Derek A. Farmer, 94S00-1103-MS-165, didn’t broach those arguments, but justices rejected charges the commission brought against Farmer. He had been accused of the unauthorized practice of law, and the commission also charged that he could not have reasonably expected to be authorized to practice.

“The commission has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that an injunction should issue against Farmer. Accordingly, the court denies the Commission’s verified petition,” the per curiam opinion says. It was signed by all justices except Steven David, who concurred without a separate opinion. “The costs and expenses incurred by the hearing in this matter shall be borne by the Commission,” the court wrote.

Farmer is the only attorney in Ohio admitted to practice after a conviction in connection with a murder. He was convicted as a young accomplice in the 1974 murder of a civil-rights figure and a Dayton police officer. Farmer was 16 at the time and running with an 18-year-old relative who pulled the trigger in both killings after the pair robbed a jewelry store. Farmer served 18 years in prison, earning a college degree, and later completed law school. He was admitted to the Ohio bar in 1999.

“In the present proceeding, a federal judge and an attorney in Ohio who testified regarding Farmer’s good character and competence as an attorney stated that they would have provided an affidavit supporting Farmer’s request for temporary admission in Indiana if he had made one before or after his Ohio suspension,” the court wrote.

“Under these circumstances and in light of the discretion exercised by trial courts in ruling on motions for temporary admission under Admission and Discipline Rule 3(2), the Court concludes that the commission has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that, due to the pending disciplinary proceeding in Ohio, Farmer could not have reasonably expected to be authorized” to practice, the court wrote.

The commission also failed to prove that Farmer’s services to an Indiana client seeking post-conviction relief violated the “safe harbor” provision in Rule 5.5(c) that allows attorneys to practice in multistate jurisdictions “on a temporary basis” in some circumstances.

“Here, the charged conduct of Farmer involves occasional visits to Indiana for a single client in a single legal matter, not multiple matters or clients or any systematic or continuous presence in Indiana. Under these circumstances, the court concludes that the Commission has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Farmer’s provision of legal service to (the client) was more than ‘temporary.’”
 

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  1. It's a big fat black mark against the US that they radicalized a lot of these Afghan jihadis in the 80s to fight the soviets and then when they predictably got around to biting the hand that fed them, the US had to invade their homelands, install a bunch of corrupt drug kingpins and kleptocrats, take these guys and torture the hell out of them. Why for example did the US have to sodomize them? Dubya said "they hate us for our freedoms!" Here, try some of that freedom whether you like it or not!!! Now they got even more reasons to hate us-- lets just keep bombing the crap out of their populations, installing more puppet regimes, arming one faction against another, etc etc etc.... the US is becoming a monster. No wonder they hate us. Here's my modest recommendation. How about we follow "Just War" theory in the future. St Augustine had it right. How about we treat these obvious prisoners of war according to the Geneva convention instead of torturing them in sadistic and perverted ways.

  2. As usual, John is "spot-on." The subtle but poignant points he makes are numerous and warrant reflection by mediators and users. Oh but were it so simple.

  3. ACLU. Way to step up against the police state. I see a lot of things from the ACLU I don't like but this one is a gold star in its column.... instead of fighting it the authorities should apologize and back off.

  4. Duncan, It's called the RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION and in the old days people believed it did apply to contracts and employment. Then along came title vii.....that aside, I believe that I am free to work or not work for whomever I like regardless: I don't need a law to tell me I'm free. The day I really am compelled to ignore all the facts of social reality in my associations and I blithely go along with it, I'll be a slave of the state. That day is not today......... in the meantime this proposed bill would probably be violative of 18 usc sec 1981 that prohibits discrimination in contracts... a law violated regularly because who could ever really expect to enforce it along the millions of contracts made in the marketplace daily? Some of these so-called civil rights laws are unenforceable and unjust Utopian Social Engineering. Forcing people to love each other will never work.

  5. I am the father of a sweet little one-year-old named girl, who happens to have Down Syndrome. To anyone who reads this who may be considering the decision to terminate, please know that your child will absolutely light up your life as my daughter has the lives of everyone around her. There is no part of me that condones abortion of a child on the basis that he/she has or might have Down Syndrome. From an intellectual standpoint, however, I question the enforceability of this potential law. As it stands now, the bill reads in relevant part as follows: "A person may not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion . . . if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome." It includes similarly worded provisions abortion on "any other disability" or based on sex selection. It goes so far as to make the medical provider at least potentially liable for wrongful death. First, how does a medical provider "know" that "the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion SOLELY" because of anything? What if the woman says she just doesn't want the baby - not because of the diagnosis - she just doesn't want him/her? Further, how can the doctor be liable for wrongful death, when a Child Wrongful Death claim belongs to the parents? Is there any circumstance in which the mother's comparative fault will not exceed the doctor's alleged comparative fault, thereby barring the claim? If the State wants to discourage women from aborting their children because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis, I'm all for that. Purporting to ban it with an unenforceable law, however, is not the way to effectuate this policy.

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