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Dissent: new issues can be raised in response

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Parties shouldn't be allowed to raise arguments for the first time in response to a rehearing petition before an appellate court, an Indiana Court of Appeals judge wrote in disagreeing with two of her colleagues.

But the other two judges allowed that to happen in granting a rehearing request in U.S. Bank v. Integrity Land Title Corp, No. 17A03-0812-CV-577, a DeKalb Superior case the appellate court had decided in a June 16 opinion.

The case involves a real estate transaction in early 2006 where Integrity Land Title prepared a title commitment indicating a title search, performed by a subcontractor, had uncovered no judgments against the property seller. The buyer's lender relied on that title commitment and approved a mortgage loan, and Integrity received payment for doing the closing and title search. U.S. Bank eventually got assigned the mortgage from the buyer's lender.

But in August 2006, a judgment lien owner that hadn't been identified by the title search by Integrity initiated a foreclosure action against the buyer and the lender, and U.S. Bank intervened to file a third-party complaint against Integrity because of the search. That complaint alleged that U.S. Bank's "pending loss is a direct and proximate result of negligent real estate closing and certification of title by (its mortgager), through its agent [Integrity]."

In February 2008, the trial court enforced and foreclosed the judgment lien and U.S. Bank later filed a motion for summary judgment against Integrity. Both parties began filing cross-motions, and in September 2008 the trial court denied U.S. Bank's summary judgment motion against Integrity.

The Court of Appeals ruled on the case June 16, reiterating the trial court's finding that Integrity wasn't a party to the policy and owed no contractual duty to U.S. Bank, even though the bank had argued alternative contract theories in its response to summary judgment motions. The panel at the time reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Integrity and remanded, but U.S. Bank later filed a petition for rehearing. In a response brief to that petition, Integrity raised new issues and U.S. Bank asked that part of the response be stricken because it should have been raised in a separate rehearing petition, rather than a response brief.

"U.S. Bank's contentions are well taken, but the interests of justice and judicial economy would be ill served if we were to turn a blind eye to Integrity's arguments, the correctness of which is apparent on the face of the record," Judge Terry Crone wrote, citing precedent that gives a court power to reconsider an order or ruling that isn't yet certified. "Consequently, we exercise our inherent authority to reconsider our original opinion and hereby vacate our reversal of summary judgment on U.S. Bank's contract claim. In other words, we affirm the trial court in all respects."

The judges also invited Integrity to renew any claims it may have in a transfer petition to the state's highest court, but in a four-page dissent Judge Melissa May disagreed with her fellow panel members.

"Our rules do not permit Integrity to raise the contract argument in what it characterizes as its 'response' to the tort argument U.S. Bank raised in its petition for rehearing," she wrote. "Moreover, allowing Integrity to do so in a brief in response to a petition for rehearing is unfair because it effectively deprives U.S. Bank of an opportunity to respond to the contract argument."

The Integrity response brief went outside the rule by raising contract-related matters U.S. Bank had not raised, and in effect it grants Integrity a rehearing it didn't timely request, Judge May found. The original opinion should stand, she said.

Citing her colleague's language in the majority decision, Judge May wrote, "I would decline to adopt the premise that if one litigant's argument 'appears correct,' that is enough to deprive the other litigant of any opportunity to respond to it. I have no authority that would permit such a result, and it is inconsistent with the essential structure of litigation to hold that if a party's initial argument appears convincing, we will not entertain the opponent's response."

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  1. It's a big fat black mark against the US that they radicalized a lot of these Afghan jihadis in the 80s to fight the soviets and then when they predictably got around to biting the hand that fed them, the US had to invade their homelands, install a bunch of corrupt drug kingpins and kleptocrats, take these guys and torture the hell out of them. Why for example did the US have to sodomize them? Dubya said "they hate us for our freedoms!" Here, try some of that freedom whether you like it or not!!! Now they got even more reasons to hate us-- lets just keep bombing the crap out of their populations, installing more puppet regimes, arming one faction against another, etc etc etc.... the US is becoming a monster. No wonder they hate us. Here's my modest recommendation. How about we follow "Just War" theory in the future. St Augustine had it right. How about we treat these obvious prisoners of war according to the Geneva convention instead of torturing them in sadistic and perverted ways.

  2. As usual, John is "spot-on." The subtle but poignant points he makes are numerous and warrant reflection by mediators and users. Oh but were it so simple.

  3. ACLU. Way to step up against the police state. I see a lot of things from the ACLU I don't like but this one is a gold star in its column.... instead of fighting it the authorities should apologize and back off.

  4. Duncan, It's called the RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION and in the old days people believed it did apply to contracts and employment. Then along came title vii.....that aside, I believe that I am free to work or not work for whomever I like regardless: I don't need a law to tell me I'm free. The day I really am compelled to ignore all the facts of social reality in my associations and I blithely go along with it, I'll be a slave of the state. That day is not today......... in the meantime this proposed bill would probably be violative of 18 usc sec 1981 that prohibits discrimination in contracts... a law violated regularly because who could ever really expect to enforce it along the millions of contracts made in the marketplace daily? Some of these so-called civil rights laws are unenforceable and unjust Utopian Social Engineering. Forcing people to love each other will never work.

  5. I am the father of a sweet little one-year-old named girl, who happens to have Down Syndrome. To anyone who reads this who may be considering the decision to terminate, please know that your child will absolutely light up your life as my daughter has the lives of everyone around her. There is no part of me that condones abortion of a child on the basis that he/she has or might have Down Syndrome. From an intellectual standpoint, however, I question the enforceability of this potential law. As it stands now, the bill reads in relevant part as follows: "A person may not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion . . . if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome." It includes similarly worded provisions abortion on "any other disability" or based on sex selection. It goes so far as to make the medical provider at least potentially liable for wrongful death. First, how does a medical provider "know" that "the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion SOLELY" because of anything? What if the woman says she just doesn't want the baby - not because of the diagnosis - she just doesn't want him/her? Further, how can the doctor be liable for wrongful death, when a Child Wrongful Death claim belongs to the parents? Is there any circumstance in which the mother's comparative fault will not exceed the doctor's alleged comparative fault, thereby barring the claim? If the State wants to discourage women from aborting their children because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis, I'm all for that. Purporting to ban it with an unenforceable law, however, is not the way to effectuate this policy.

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