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Divided court affirms sentence that exceeds statutory authority

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A man who pleaded guilty to misdemeanor charges and whose sentence exceeded statutory authority must nonetheless serve the term, a divided Court of Appeals ruled Tuesday.

Travis Koontz was charged with misdemeanor false informing, driving while suspended, and operating a vehicle while intoxicated. He pleaded guilty to the latter two charges and agreed to a sentence of 365 days in jail with 18 days to be executed and 365 days of probation for the Class B misdemeanor driving while suspended conviction, along with 60 days in jail with 18 days to be executed and 365 days of probation for the Class C misdemeanor drunken-driving conviction. The sentences were to run concurrently.

Though the maximum sentence for a Class B misdemeanor is 180 days and the maximum term for any misdemeanor is one year, two of the three judges ruled that the plea agreement between Koontz and the state prevailed.

“Concluding that Koontz waived any error in his sentence by consenting to the sentence as part of a plea agreement, we affirm,” Chief Judge Margret Robb wrote in Travis Koontz v. State of Indiana,  29A05-1202-CR-77. Judge Cale Bradford joined in the opinion.

But Judge John Baker wrote that had Koontz gone to trial and been convicted, at least one of the initial charges against him would have constituted double-jeopardy, and that Koontz received no benefit from the plea agreement.

“I acknowledge that our Supreme Court has made it clear that “[a] defendant ‘may not enter a plea agreement calling for an illegal sentence, benefit from that sentence, and then later complain that it was an illegal sentence.’” Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d 35, 40 (Ind. 2004) (quoting Collins v. State, 509 N.E.2d 827, 833 (Ind. 1987)),” Baker wrote.

“The practical effect is that only the charge of class B misdemeanor false informing was dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. Nevertheless, Koontz was exposed to a combined term of imprisonment and probation that exceeded statutory limits. Accordingly, in cases where the offenses are misdemeanors or minor felonies, the potential for abuse could be too great to justify permitting the imposition of illegal sentences through plea agreements. Therefore, I would reverse,” Baker wrote.

But the majority found that Koontz had benefited from the plea deal and appealed the sentence only after he violated terms of probation and was ordered to serve 240 days in jail.

“Had the trial court had discretion in sentencing Koontz, he could have received a sentence of up to one year imprisonment, and by virtue of the plea, he was to serve only eighteen days. The dissent believes that ‘where the offenses are misdemeanors or minor felonies,’ … the potential for abuse is too great and the benefit too small to justify allowing an illegal sentence to stand because it was the result of a plea bargain. We do not believe it is our place to categorically declare the Supreme Court’s position inapplicable to misdemeanors,” the opinion states.

 

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  1. Don't we have bigger issues to concern ourselves with?

  2. Anyone who takes the time to study disciplinary and bar admission cases in Indiana ... much of which is, as a matter of course and by intent, off the record, would have a very difficult time drawing lines that did not take into account things which are not supposed to matter, such as affiliations, associations, associates and the like. Justice Hoosier style is a far departure than what issues in most other parts of North America. (More like Central America, in fact.) See, e.g., http://www.theindianalawyer.com/indiana-attorney-illegally-practicing-in-florida-suspended-for-18-months/PARAMS/article/42200 When while the Indiana court system end the cruel practice of killing prophets of due process and those advocating for blind justice?

  3. Wouldn't this call for an investigation of Government corruption? Chief Justice Loretta Rush, wrote that the case warranted the high court’s review because the method the Indiana Court of Appeals used to reach its decision was “a significant departure from the law.” Specifically, David wrote that the appellate panel ruled after reweighing of the evidence, which is NOT permissible at the appellate level. **But yet, they look the other way while an innocent child was taken by a loving mother who did nothing wrong"

  4. Different rules for different folks....

  5. I would strongly suggest anyone seeking mediation check the experience of the mediator. There are retired judges who decide to become mediators. Their training and experience is in making rulings which is not the point of mediation.

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