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DTCI: Make No Bones About It

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karns By Timothy L. Karns

While there is no shortage of challenges facing the food and beverage industry, one of the most prevalent issues today is product liability claims resulting from foreign objects inadvertently incorporated into finished products. Despite the use of numerous safeguards in a production facility, food manufacturers can never eliminate the possibility that a physical hazard will be introduced during the manufacturing process. This is especially true where the hazard is an object that is intrinsic to the product, such as bone or gristle.

Indiana’s Product Liability Act, Indiana Code §§ 34-20-1-1 through 34-20-9-1, governs all actions brought by a user or consumer against a manufacturer or seller for physical harm caused by a product regardless of the theory of liability. See Ind. Code § 34-20-1-1. The Act provides, in pertinent part:

a person who sells, leases, or otherwise puts into the stream of commerce any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to any user or consumer … is subject to liability for physical harm caused by that product to the user or consumer … . Ind. Code § 34-20-2-1.

Thus, in order to prevail in a product liability action, “the plaintiff must prove that the product is in a defective condition which renders it unreasonably dangerous.” Welch v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 651 N.E.2d 810, 814 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).

“The requirement that the product be in a defective condition focuses on the product itself while the requirement that the product be unreasonably dangerous focuses on the reasonable expectations of the consumer.” Id. at 814 (emphasis added). Specifically, a product is in a defective condition if at the time it is conveyed by the seller to another party, it is in a condition:

(1) not contemplated by reasonable persons among those considered expected users or consumers of the product; and

(2) that will be unreasonably dangerous to the expected user or consumer when used in reasonably expectable ways of handling or consumption. Ind. Code § 34-20-4-1.

A product is also in a defective condition if the seller fails to give reasonable warnings or instructions to the consumer, thereby leaving the product in an unreasonably dangerous condition. See Ind. Code § 34-20-4-2; Natural Gas Odorizing, Inc. v. Downs, 685 N.E.2d 155, 162 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), (“The Act imposes liability upon a manufacturer who puts into the stream of commerce any product without a reasonably adequate warning thereby leaving it in an unreasonably dangerous condition to any user, if such warning could be given in the exercise of reasonable diligence.”). However, a product is unreasonably dangerous only if its use “exposes the user or consumer to a risk of physical harm to an extent beyond that contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it with the ordinary knowledge about the product’s characteristics common to the community of consumers.” Ind. Code § 34-6-2-146 (emphasis added).

Under this standard, when the object that causes an injury is a foreign material, such as a screw, a piece of metal or a stone, a food manufacturer will be hard pressed to avoid liability. In that situation, an ordinary consumer with ordinary knowledge of the product would not reasonably expect such an item to be present in the food. However, when the injury-causing material is an item that is intrinsic to a finished product, a food manufacturer may be able to escape liability by arguing that the injured consumer should have anticipated and guarded against the presence of the object in the food.

Although some courts rely on a distinction between foreign and natural characteristics of a food product to determine liability, a majority of courts have adopted the “reasonable expectations test” to determine whether an ingredient that caused the harm is an unanticipated adulteration or is an inherent aspect of the product. See, e.g., Morrison’s Cafeteria of Montgomery, Inc. v. Haddox, 431 So. 2d 975, 978 (Ala. 1983) (applying the reasonable expectations test the court found, as a matter of law, that a bone in a fish fillet did not disappoint such expectations); Clime v. Dewey Beach Enterprises, 831 F. Supp. 341, (D. Del. 1993), (holding, as a matter of law, that a consumer could not reasonably expect to receive a raw clam free of injurious bacteria); Mathews v. Maysville Seafoods Inc., 602 N.E.2d 764, 765-66 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a “consumer must reasonably anticipate and guard against the presence of a fish bone in a fish fillet”). Under the reasonable consumer expectations test, substances that are natural to the preparation of the food served are to be anticipated and, therefore, do not render the food unfit or defective. Mitchell. v. T.G.I. Friday’s, 748 N.E.2d 89 (Ohio Ct. App 2000). Thus, the reasonable consumer expectations test focuses on the final item sold to the consumer and the expectations that are engendered by the type of preparation used in making the dish.

For example, in Mitchell v. T.G.I. Friday’s, the plaintiff was eating a fried clam strip when she bit into a hard substance she believed to be a piece of a clam shell. Id. at 90. The plaintiff experienced immediate pain and later required dental treatment for her injuries. Id. at 90-91. Consequently, the plaintiff filed a product liability action against the restaurant that served the meal and the supplier of the fried clams. Id. at 91. Both defendants filed motions for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Id.

On appeal, the reviewing court began its analysis by summarizing the reasonable expectation test as “‘the test … for what is “reasonably expected” by the consumer in the food as served, not what might be natural to the ingredients of that food prior to preparation.’” Mitchell, 748 N.E.2d at 93 (quoting Mathews, 602 N.E.2d at 765). Thus, the Mitchell court concluded that the reasonable expectation test “is related to the foreseeability of harm on the part of the defendant.” Id. (quoting Mathews, 602 N.E.2d at 765). While the court noted that the test “usually presents a question for the jury,” it further stated that it “is clear that in some cases the occurrence of a deleterious substance must be reasonably expected as a matter of law.” Id. at 94. In fact, the court specifically stated that “‘[c]ourts cannot and must not ignore the common experience of life and allow rules to develop that would make sellers of food or other consumer goods insurers of the products they sell.’” Id. (quoting Morrison’s Cafeteria of Montgomery, Inc., 431 So. 2d at 979). Applying the reasonable expectation test to the matter at hand, the court concluded that one who eats clams can reasonably anticipate and guard against eating a piece of shell. See also Allen v. Grafton, 164 N.E.2d 167 (“Bones which are natural to the type of meat served cannot legitimately be called a foreign substance, and a consumer who eats meat dishes ought to anticipate and be on guard against the presence of such bones.”); Ruvolo v. Homovich, 778 N.E. 2d 661 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002), (holding that a consumer should reasonably anticipate the natural occurrence of chicken bone fragments in a gordita sandwich).

While it has not explicitly been adopted by Indiana’s courts, the reasonable expectations test directly comports with the Act’s definition of an unreasonably dangerous product. Consequently, where there is no dispute that the injury-causing mechanism is an object intrinsic to the finished product, a food manufacturer should explore the consumer’s understanding of the product, its preparation process and its raw ingredients early in the discovery process. A typical consumer will be hard pressed to argue that he was unaware that the animal from which the product or its ingredients were derived originally contained such an object. Accordingly, a food manufacturer may, through the filing of a dispositive motion, be able to convince the trial court that it should apply the reasonable expectations test and find, as a matter of law, the injured consumer should have reasonably anticipated and guarded against the presence of the object that caused their injury.

The reasonable expectations test is not the only defense a food manufacturer has to a product liability claim. Ind. Code § 24-20-5-1 provides that:

In a product liability action, there is a rebuttable presumption that the product that caused the physical harm was not defective and that the manufacturer or seller of the product was not negligent if, before the sale by the manufacturer, the product:

(1) was in conformity with the general recognized state of the art applicable to the safety of the product at the time the product was designed, manufactured, packaged and labeled; or

(2) complied with applicable codes, standards, regulations or specifications established, adopted, promulgated or approved by the United States or by Indiana, or by any agency of the United States or Indiana.

Thus, when the object that causes an injury is an extrinsic object, such as a screw, a piece of metal or a stone, a food manufacturer that adheres to a strict quality control program will have an avenue to try to avoid liability.

To reduce the inclusion of bone and gristle in their finished products, all food manufacturers use numerous preventative measures and safeguards in their facilities. In light of these programs and process controls, an argument can be made that the finished product, even when it contains foreign matter, was in conformity with the generally recognized state of the art applicable to the safety of the product at the time it was designed, manufactured, packaged and labeled. This is particularly true when, on the date the subject product was prepared and packaged, the manufacturer was operating its facility in compliance with the applicable requirements of the United States Department of Agriculture and/or the United States Food and Drug Administration. Thus, a food manufacturer should do everything it can to establish it has both a prerequisite program intended to prevent foreign objects from entering its production line and process control steps that are designed to eradicate any materials that are concealed in the raw materials used to make the finished product.

Although compelling in nature, a product liability claim resulting from a foreign object in a finished product is not an automatic victory for the plaintiff. Caselaw from multiple jurisdictions supports the proposition that a consumer who eats certain dishes ought to anticipate and be on the guard against the presence of certain foreign materials that may be contained in those foods. Furthermore, even if a court were to find that an inclusion of a foreign object in the finished product renders it unreasonably dangerous, the manufacturer may be entitled to use the rebuttable presumption that the product that caused the physical harm was not defective and that the manufacturer or seller of the product was not negligent.•

Mr. Karns is a senior associate in the Indianapolis office of Frost Brown Todd. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.

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  1. Applause, applause, applause ..... but, is this duty to serve the constitutional order not much more incumbent upon the State, whose only aim is to be pure and unadulterated justice, than defense counsel, who is also charged with gaining a result for a client? I agree both are responsible, but it seems to me that the government attorneys bear a burden much heavier than defense counsel .... "“I note, much as we did in Mechling v. State, 16 N.E.3d 1015 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied, that the attorneys representing the State and the defendant are both officers of the court and have a responsibility to correct any obvious errors at the time they are committed."

  2. Do I have to hire an attorney to get co-guardianship of my brother? My father has guardianship and my older sister was his co-guardian until this Dec 2014 when she passed and my father was me to go on as the co-guardian, but funds are limit and we need to get this process taken care of quickly as our fathers health isn't the greatest. So please advise me if there is anyway to do this our self or if it requires a lawyer? Thank you

  3. I have been on this program while on parole from 2011-2013. No person should be forced mentally to share private details of their personal life with total strangers. Also giving permission for a mental therapist to report to your parole agent that your not participating in group therapy because you don't have the financial mean to be in the group therapy. I was personally singled out and sent back three times for not having money and also sent back within the six month when you aren't to be sent according to state law. I will work to het this INSOMM's removed from this state. I also had twelve or thirteen parole agents with a fifteen month period. Thanks for your time.

  4. Our nation produces very few jurists of the caliber of Justice DOUGLAS and his peers these days. Here is that great civil libertarian, who recognized government as both a blessing and, when corrupted by ideological interests, a curse: "Once the investigator has only the conscience of government as a guide, the conscience can become ‘ravenous,’ as Cromwell, bent on destroying Thomas More, said in Bolt, A Man For All Seasons (1960), p. 120. The First Amendment mirrors many episodes where men, harried and harassed by government, sought refuge in their conscience, as these lines of Thomas More show: ‘MORE: And when we stand before God, and you are sent to Paradise for doing according to your conscience, *575 and I am damned for not doing according to mine, will you come with me, for fellowship? ‘CRANMER: So those of us whose names are there are damned, Sir Thomas? ‘MORE: I don't know, Your Grace. I have no window to look into another man's conscience. I condemn no one. ‘CRANMER: Then the matter is capable of question? ‘MORE: Certainly. ‘CRANMER: But that you owe obedience to your King is not capable of question. So weigh a doubt against a certainty—and sign. ‘MORE: Some men think the Earth is round, others think it flat; it is a matter capable of question. But if it is flat, will the King's command make it round? And if it is round, will the King's command flatten it? No, I will not sign.’ Id., pp. 132—133. DOUGLAS THEN WROTE: Where government is the Big Brother,11 privacy gives way to surveillance. **909 But our commitment is otherwise. *576 By the First Amendment we have staked our security on freedom to promote a multiplicity of ideas, to associate at will with kindred spirits, and to defy governmental intrusion into these precincts" Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 574-76, 83 S. Ct. 889, 908-09, 9 L. Ed. 2d 929 (1963) Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, concurring. I write: Happy Memorial Day to all -- God please bless our fallen who lived and died to preserve constitutional governance in our wonderful series of Republics. And God open the eyes of those government officials who denounce the constitutions of these Republics by arbitrary actions arising out capricious motives.

  5. From back in the day before secularism got a stranglehold on Hoosier jurists comes this great excerpt via Indiana federal court judge Allan Sharp, dedicated to those many Indiana government attorneys (with whom I have dealt) who count the law as a mere tool, an optional tool that is not to be used when political correctness compels a more acceptable result than merely following the path that the law directs: ALLEN SHARP, District Judge. I. In a scene following a visit by Henry VIII to the home of Sir Thomas More, playwriter Robert Bolt puts the following words into the mouths of his characters: Margaret: Father, that man's bad. MORE: There is no law against that. ROPER: There is! God's law! MORE: Then God can arrest him. ROPER: Sophistication upon sophistication! MORE: No, sheer simplicity. The law, Roper, the law. I know what's legal not what's right. And I'll stick to what's legal. ROPER: Then you set man's law above God's! MORE: No, far below; but let me draw your attention to a fact I'm not God. The currents and eddies of right and wrong, which you find such plain sailing, I can't navigate. I'm no voyager. But in the thickets of law, oh, there I'm a forester. I doubt if there's a man alive who could follow me there, thank God... ALICE: (Exasperated, pointing after Rich) While you talk, he's gone! MORE: And go he should, if he was the Devil himself, until he broke the law! ROPER: So now you'd give the Devil benefit of law! MORE: Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after the Devil? ROPER: I'd cut down every law in England to do that! MORE: (Roused and excited) Oh? (Advances on Roper) And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you where would you hide, Roper, the laws being flat? (He leaves *1257 him) This country's planted thick with laws from coast to coast man's laws, not God's and if you cut them down and you're just the man to do it d'you really think you would stand upright in the winds that would blow then? (Quietly) Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's sake. ROPER: I have long suspected this; this is the golden calf; the law's your god. MORE: (Wearily) Oh, Roper, you're a fool, God's my god... (Rather bitterly) But I find him rather too (Very bitterly) subtle... I don't know where he is nor what he wants. ROPER: My God wants service, to the end and unremitting; nothing else! MORE: (Dryly) Are you sure that's God! He sounds like Moloch. But indeed it may be God And whoever hunts for me, Roper, God or Devil, will find me hiding in the thickets of the law! And I'll hide my daughter with me! Not hoist her up the mainmast of your seagoing principles! They put about too nimbly! (Exit More. They all look after him). Pgs. 65-67, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS A Play in Two Acts, Robert Bolt, Random House, New York, 1960. Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen. of Indiana, Indianapolis, for defendants. Childs v. Duckworth, 509 F. Supp. 1254, 1256 (N.D. Ind. 1981) aff'd, 705 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1983)

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